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Abstract 
 
 
This research has used a critical discourse analysis approach encompassing 
postcolonial theory and theory of media effects in order to investigate the influence of 
political discourse in the media upon youth’s violence in Cameroon. As a result it has 
been found that the use of private violence by young people in urban cities has 
become ordinary. Such an attitude reflects among other some aspects of youth’s 
lifestyle designed to cope with the hardship of their social status and to resist the 
elite’s dominance. While no counter-narrative has been found in the independent 
publications about the portrayal of  youth’s violence as criminal by the state-owned 
press, the  young  people nevertheless have produced through a street culture a 
narrative deconstructing the political discourse in the media and highlighting their 
grievances in a more or less violent tone.  Thus the use of private violence during the 
riot in February 2008,  is far from an isolated (re)action of angry young people , it 
obeys  the very  practicality of their existence and  the political turmoil it might cause 
is incidental to the way of  life in which  it is embedded. 
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Opsomming 
 
Die navorsing het ‘n kritiese diskoers analise-benadering gebruik wat ‘n post-
koloniale teorie en ‘n teorie van media-effekte insluit om sodoende die invloed van 
politieke diskoers in die media op jeuggeweld in Kameroen, te ondersoek. Daar is 
gevolglik gevind dat die gebruik van private geweld deur jongmense in stedelike 
gebiede normaal geword het. So ‘n houding reflekteer onder andere sommige aspekte 
van die jeug se leefstyl wat ontwerp is om die ontbering van hul sosiale status te 
hanteer en ook die elite se dominasie te weerstaan. Ofskoon geen teen-narratief sover 
gevind is in die onafhanklike publikasies oor die uitbeelding van jeuggeweld as 
krimineel en die publikasies van die staatsbeheerde pers wat die jeug uitbeeld met min 
agentskap nie, het jongmense wel ‘n teen-narratief geskep deur ‘n straat-kultuur. 
Hierdie teen-narratief dekonstruktueer die politieke diskoers in die media en 
onderstreep hul griewe in ‘n geweldadige toon. Dus die gebruik van private geweld 
gedurende die onluste in Februarie 2008, wat nie as ‘n geïsoleerde (re)aksie van 
woedende jongmense gesien kan word nie, is getrou aan die wese van hulle bestaan 
en die politieke onrus wat dit moontlik mag veroorsaak, is bykomstig tot die leefstyl 
waarin dit vasgelê is.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the first half of 2010, International Crisis Group published two reports concerning the 
current political situation in Cameroon. The first report titled Cameroon: Fragile State? in 
Africa Report No 160, uncovers some points of  political instability and suggests how to 
tackle them. In the light of this report it appears that the country shows a pattern of apparent 
stability followed by violent crisis. In this regard International Crisis Group (2010) argues 
that: 
 
For long periods, problems have been masked but not dealt with, and consequent frustrations have 
led to explosions of violence. Today, the nation-building project has become frayed, as the 
economy has stagnated, and unemployment and inequality have risen. While potential organising 
forces are weak and dissipated, popular anger is high (Africa Report, 2010: 1). 
 
The second report titled Cameroon: The Dangers of A fracturing Regime in Africa Report No 
161, puts the emphasis on political transition and the risks of conflict which could emerge 
from internal rivalries among the ruling elite. In this respect the report opines that:  
 
With the country afflicted by high levels of corruption, a clientelist political system and a heavy 
security presence in all areas of life, many citizens feel excluded from the system. Fully half of the 
population is younger than twenty, so the high level of youth unemployment is a considerable 
source of social tension. Given such a fissures, were Biya to die in office a serious crisis could 
unfold, aggravated by the unclear constitutional provisions for a transition. Such an event may not 
occur for some time, but with democracy at an impasse, the immediate post-Biya period  is already 
a significant factor in intra-regime politics, and acknowledged as a major potential cause of 
instability (Africa Report, 2010: 1).  
 
The current study is concerned with the way some agents (private and public) use and give a 
meaning to violent acts prior to state failure – I mean the state internal conflict. Reno (2002: 
838-839) suggests that organized interest and political networks of state collapse survive 
corruption and the destruction of the state agencies to shape the character and aims of 
insurgencies. In the case of Nigeria he distinguishes two sides of opposition. At times young 
rebels behave like social bandits struggling to overturn a deeply corrupt political order. Yet, 
many work for corrupt politicians and strongmen whom they criticize, sometimes 
clandestinely, but often in public. These opposition groups signal the emergence of social 
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category associated with collapsing states and crises of patronage politics rather than a 
broader notion of “civil society” distinct from collapsing state. Though many see themselves 
as marginalized critics of corrupt rulers, they often end up serving elite interests. Rebellion on 
these terms does not represent a collective action found among social bandits and others 
usually associated with marginalized or excluded groups since its aim is not to destroy the 
existing social structures.  
 
Inspired by Reno’s insight, this thesis investigates how youth in Cameroon use violence. 
What is the meaning attached to such a use of violence by them and by the political discourse 
in the media? In order to grasps some answers, this study focuses on the February 2008 
protests through an analysis divided into five chapters. All these chapters are pervaded by the 
assumption that the use of violence during the February 2008 protests is an expression of the 
practice of rebellion as a lifestyle in Cameroon. Such a practice tends to obey more to its own 
logic than to the insurrectional character of the orthodox rebellion. The first chapter provides 
a discussion of a critical discourse analysis theory approach encompassing postcolonial and 
media theories but also the role of media in framing violence.  The second chapter locates the 
February protest within the historical, political and socio-economic context of Cameroon. 
The third chapter will explore how the rebellion as a lifestyle has emerged within the 
structures of the postcolonial state. The fourth chapter highlight how the Febraury 2008 
protests were portrayed in the political discourse in the media and explore the meta-texts 
underlying those portrayals. Finally  chapter five concludes by giving a broad picture of the 
core assumption of this thesis namely the practice of rebellion as a lifestyle. 
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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS THEORY 
 
 
‘Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily 
studies the way social power  abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and 
resisted by text and talk in the social and political context’ (van Dijk,1993:1).The field of 
CDA it is not an homogeneous one, it subsumes a variety of approaches towards the social 
analysis of discourse which differ in theory, methodology, and the type of research issues 
they emphasise (Fairclough,2004:1). Wodak (2007:3) notes that  
 
‘critical means not taking things for granted, opening up complexity, challenging reductionism, 
dogmatism and dichotomies, being self-reflective in my research, and through these processes making 
opaque structures of power manifest.’  
 
She adds that ‘critical’ is not to be understood in the common sense of the word i.e. 
criticizing or being negative. Wodak corroborates the view of Norman Fairclough, when she 
adds that ‘there is no one critical discourse analysis approach. All critical discourse analysis 
have their own theoretical position combined with specific methodology and methods’. 
According to her, every theoretical approach in CDA is inherently inter- or trans-disciplinary 
and certainly not to be studied by linguists alone (Wodak, 2007:4). Both Fairclough and 
Wodak (1997:271-80) recapitulate the main tenets of CDA as follows: 
1. CDA addresses social problems 
2. Power relations are discursive 
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture 
4. Discourse does ideological work 
5. Discourse is historical 
6. The link between text and society is mediated 
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory 
8. Discourse is a form of social action 
11 
 
Wetherell (2001:391) says that critical discourse analysts prefer keeping theoretical and 
analytical distinctions between different extra-discursive practices. This difference reflects 
the influence of Marxism in the development of CDA. According to her [Wetherell], for 
instance Fairclough (2001) while arguing that every social practice has linguistic or 
discursive elements, he tries to make distinctions between the various elements making up a 
practice such as manufacturing for example or child rearing.  Such practice he argues might 
divide into the productive activity, the means of production, social relations, social identities, 
cultural values, forms of consciousness involved and meaning making. Critical discourse 
analysts tend to take a more materialist position indicating that they have an interest in the 
real material world independent of talk and discourse (Wetherell,2001:392). If ontological 
separations are made between different kinds of social practices (discursive and non 
discursive), then it is also possible to ask about the determination by one another. 
 
Although, there are many perspectives in the study and critique of social inequality, the way 
CDA approaches these questions and dimensions is by focusing on the role of discourse in 
the (re)production and challenge of dominance1.This reproduction process may involve such 
different ‘modes’ of discourse2. CDA wants to understand ‘what structures strategies or other 
properties of text, talk verbal interaction or communicative events play a role in these modes 
of reproduction’. Therefore assuming the bias of its approach, CDA pays more attention to 
top-down relations of dominance than to bottom –up relations of resistance, compliance and 
acceptance. This does not mean that critical discourse analysts see power as unilaterally 
imposed on others. On the contrary in many situations , and sometimes paradoxically ,power 
and even power abuse may seem ‘jointly produced’ ,e.g. when dominated groups are 
persuaded by whatever means that dominance is ‘natural’ or otherwise legitimate. Thus, 
although an analysis of strategies of resistance and challenge is crucial for our understanding 
of actual power and dominance relations in society, and although such analysis needs to be 
included in a broader theory of power, counter and discourse. Our critical approach here 
prefers to focus on the elites and their discursive strategies for the maintenance of inequality 
(van Dijk, 1993:301). 
                                                 
1  Dominance is defined here as the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups that results in 
social inequality including political , cultural, class, ethnic, racial, and gender inequality (van Dijk,1993:301) 
2 Power relations as the more or less direct or overt support, enactment, representation, legitimation, denial, 
mitigation or concealment of dominance among others (van Dijk, 1993:301). 
12 
 
 
In effect a central notion in most critical work on discourse is that of power, and more 
specifically the social power of groups and institutions. Social power in this context is 
defined in term of control. Thus, groups have (more or less) power if they are able to control 
(more or less) the acts and minds of (members of) other group .This ability presupposes a 
power base of privileges access to scarce social resources, such as force, money, status, fame, 
knowledge, information, ‘culture’ or indeed  various forms of public discourse and 
communication of the vast literature of power. There are different types of power depending 
on the various resources employed to exercise such power: The coercive power of the 
military and violent means is based on force. The rich man’s power, rather than being based 
on force,  will have power because of their money whereas the more or less persuasive power 
of parents, professors, or journalist may be based on knowledge, information, and authority. 
Also power is seldom absolute. Groups may more or less control other groups, or only 
control them in specific situations or social domains. Moreover, dominated groups may more 
or less resist, accept, condone, comply with, or legitimate such power and even find it 
‘natural’. The power of the dominant group is integrated in  law , rules, norms, habits, and 
even a quite general consensus, in this sense it is similar with the Gramscian notion of 
hegemony (van Dick,2001:354:355). 
 
CDA operates with both micro and macro level of analysis. Language use, discourse, verbal 
interaction and communication belong to the micro level of social order. Power, dominance 
and inequality between social groups are typically terms that belong to a macro level of 
analysis. This means that CDA has to theoretically bridge the well-known ‘gap’ between 
micro and macro approaches. A CDA analysis of the relations between discourse and power 
therefore find firstly,  access to specific forms of discourses, i.e. politics, mediaand secondly 
examines  the way discourse impacts on minds knowing that action is controlled by our 
minds. Finally this is to say that those groups who are most influential also have more 
chances to control the minds and the actions of others. In other words van Dick (2001) splits 
the issue of discursive power into two basic questions for CDA: 
1. How do (more) powerful groups control public discourse? 
2. How does such discourse control mind and action of (less) powerful groups, and what 
are the social consequences of such control, such as social inequality? 
13 
 
1.2 POSTCOLONIAL THEORY 
 
Grovogui (2007:231) argues that postcolonialism provides new way for thinking about 
techniques of power that constraint self determination, whether they emanate from within or 
from without. According to him, firstly  postcolonialism contests the views of Western 
rationalists, humanists, and other universalists that their modes of significations  (or way of 
making sense of the world) were superior and that ‘ Europe’ possessed the finer forms of 
reason, morals, and law. Secondly, postcolonialism intends to participate in the creations of 
‘truths’, based on distinct modes of signification and forms  of  knowledge  (or the manners 
of representations) that advance justice, peace, and political pluralism. It applies in so-called 
local memories, arts, and timeless features. Thirdly, postcolonialism rejects ‘native 
essentialism’, or the idea of the primordial and timeless features of the ‘natives’. Such ideas 
have been used and abused by the western powers and their counterpart postcolonial elites for 
different purposes, both connected to the acquisition and retention of power. Finally 
postcolonialism enlightens the precarious relations between ‘freedom and politics’. In this 
respect, postcolonialism elucidates the persistence of the colonial intellectual legacy in the 
supposedly neutral and universal settings of knowledge production and policy-making. By 
doing this postcolonialism provides the possibility of alternative conceptions and imaginaries 
of society, law and morals. 
 
The approach of postcolonialism adopted for the purposes of this thesis is drawn from the so 
called ‘postcolony’s thought’.  
 
The notion ‘postcolony’ identifies specifically a given historical trajectory that of societies 
recently emerging from experience of colonisation and the violence which colonial relationship, 
par excellence, involves. To be sure, the postcolony is chaotically pluralistic, yet it has 
nonetheless an internal coherence. It is a specific system of signs, a particular way of fabricating 
simulacra or reforming-forming stereotypes. It is not however, just an economy of signs in which 
power is mirrored and imagined self reflectively. The postcolony is characterised by a distinctive 
style of political improvisation, by a tendency to excess and a lack of proportion as well as by 
distinctive ways in which identities are multiplied, transformed and put into circulation. But the 
postcolony is also made up of a series of corporate institutions and political machinery which, 
once they are in place, constitute a distinctive regime of violence (Mbembe 1992:3).  
 
14 
 
According to Mbembe (1992, 1-10) the peculiar features of the postcolony come from  the 
fact that, contrary to other regimes of  violence  and domination, the postcolony ‘is not only 
luxuriousness of style and down-to-earth realism that characterise its power, or even the fact 
that it is particularly raw power that it prefers to exercise.  Peculiar also is the way the 
relationship between rulers and ruled is forged by means of a specific practice simulacrum (le 
simulacre)’. Furthermore he argues that in order to account for both the mind-set and the 
effectiveness of postcolonial relations of power, we need to go beyond the binary categories 
used in standard explanations of dominations, such as resistance /passivity, 
autonomy/subjection, state/civil society, hegemony/counter-hegemony, totalisation/de-
totalisation. As he notes in the postcolony the commandement 3 tends to institutionalise itself, 
in order to achieve legitimation and hegemony, in the form of fetish4.Thus in relation to 
conflict in the postcolony, he notes that: 
 
Confrontation occurs at the moment the commandement with vacuous indifference to any sense of 
truth, seeks to compel submission and force people into dissimulation. The problem here is not 
that they do not obey nor even pretend to obey. Conflict arises from the fact that the postcolony is 
chaotically pluralistic and that it is in practice impossible to create a single, permanently stable 
system out of all signs, images and markers current in the postcolony; and that is why they are 
constantly being shaped and reshaped as much by the rulers as by the ruled, in attempts to rewrite 
the mythologies of power. 
 
Moreover he [Mbembe] argues that by taking over the signs and the official language of 
officialdom, people have been able to remythologise the commandement into a form of 
zombie. Strictly speaking, such processes do not increase either the depth of people 
subordination or their level of resistance; it simply produces a situation of disempowerment 
for both ruled and rulers. In fact the postcolony is made up  not only of a single ‘public space’ 
but of several each having its own separate logic yet nonetheless liable to be entangled with 
other logics when operating within certain specific contexts: Hence the postcolonial subject 
                                                 
3‘ I use the term commandement in the way it was used to denote colonial authority, that is so far as it 
embraces the images and structures of power and coercion, the instruments and agents of their enactment 
and degree of rapport between those who give orders and those who are supposed to obey them, without, of 
course discussing them (Mbembe,1992:30)’ 
4 ‘Understood as the institutionalised forms adopted by a regime of domination in seeking to legitimise violent 
practice (Mbembe, 1992:30).’ 
15 
 
has had to learn to bargain in this conceptual  market place. Also the subjects in the 
postcolony have a marked ability to manage many identities for themselves, which are 
flexible enough to negotiate when required. In addition Mbembe (1992:5) suggests that: 
 
If there is, then such a ‘postcolonial subject’, he is publicly visible only at the point where the two 
activities overlap- on one hand in the common daily rituals that ratify the commandment’s own 
institutionalisation in its capacity as a fetish to which the subject is bound; and on the other, the 
subject’s deployment of a talent for play and a sense of fun which makes him homo ludens par 
excellence. It is in this practice as homo ludens that enables subjects to split their identities and to 
represent themselves as always changing their persona; there are constantly undergoing mitosis, 
whether it be in ‘official’ space or not.  
 
In conclusion Mbembe (2008:12) argues that the postcolony’s thought, is a thought of life 
and responsibility through the prism of what denies the both. It is the continuum of some 
aspects of the black thought (Fanon, Senghor, Cesaire and others). It is a thought of 
responsibility, responsibility understood as an obligation to response on his behalf, to be 
accountable of his own action. The ethic of which lies behind this thought of responsibility  is 
the future of the self in relation to the remembrance of what we have been when subjected to 
someone else’s will, to the remembrance we have undergone during the time of captivity and 
when the law and the subject were divided 
1.3 FRAMING AS A THEORY OF MEDIA EFFECTS 
 
Touri (2009:5) argues that there is a plethora of definitions of framing which illustrates the 
difficulty in creating a single definition for this concept .She notes that while Todd Gitlin 
(1980) describes news frames as: 
 
Persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, presentation, selection, emphasis and exclusion by 
which symbol-handlers routinely organise discourse; for William Gamson and Andre Modigliani 
(1989), frame is ‘a set of packages that give meaning to an issue. A package has an internal 
structure; at it core is a central organising idea, or frame, for making sense of relevant events, 
suggesting what is at issue. 
 
Touri suggests  that a more detailed definition is provided by Enteman (1993) when pointing 
out that ‘frames define problems-determine what a causal agent is doing with cost and 
benefits...; diagnose causes-identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments-
16 
 
evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies-offer and justify treatments for 
the problem.’ Reviewing the literature on framing, Camaj (2008) corroborates the view point 
of D’angelo (2002) stressing that framing scholarship has been divided into three main 
programs or paradigm: Cognitive, constructionist, and critical. While the cognitive program 
of framing has its roots in psychological conceptions and is interested more in framing 
effects, the constructionists and critical programs are rooted in sociological conceptions on 
the impact of the large culture and hegemony on frames. Therefore, the literature on framing 
has been divided into approaches examining media frames and audience frames (van Grop, 
2005). Gamson and Modigliani (1987) defined a media frame as ‘central organizing idea or 
story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events’. Entman’s view of media 
frame emphasises the selection and the salience  when he says that :’ To frame is to select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in 
such a way as promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’(Scheufele, 1999:107). In contrast individual 
frames are defined as ‘mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individual processing 
informations’ (Entman, 1993:53). 
 
Sheufele (1999:103) raises the problematic of conceptualization of framing. He notes that 
partly because of the vagueness of its conceptualization, the term framing has been used 
repeatedly to label similar but distinctly different approaches. He notes that Wicks (1992) for 
example identified subtle but distinct differences between various concepts of cognitive 
categorization. Hamill and Lodge (1986) and Lodge and Hamill (1986) saw only a 
terminological difference between concept like frame, script or schema. Also some studies 
have operationalized framing in combination with other concept such as agenda setting, or 
priming (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Sheufele (1999:1007) notes that in addition to 
classifying studies with respect to their focus on media or audience frames, framing research 
can be distinguished into research examining frames as independent or dependent variables. 
The analysis of frame as dependent variables has examined the role of various factors in 
influencing the creation or modification of frames. At the media level, journalist framing of 
an issue may be influenced by several socio-structural or organizational variables and by 
ideological variables. At the audience level, frames as independent variables are analysed 
mostly as direct results of the way mass media frame an issue. Thus Sheufele (1999:109) 
constructs a four cells typology based on these two facets by arguing that: 
17 
 
 
With respect to media frames as dependent variable, we should ask: 
RQ1: What factors influence the way journalists or other societal groups frame certain issues? 
RQ2: How do these process work and, as a result, what are the frames that journalist use? 
With respect to media frames as independent variable, we should ask: 
RQ3: What kinds of media frames influence the audience’s perception of certain issues, and how 
does this process work? 
With respect to individual frames as dependent variable, we should ask: 
RQ4: Which factors influence the establishment of individual frames, of reference, or are 
individual frames simply replications of media frames? 
RQ5: How can audience member play an active role in constructing meaning or resisting media 
frames? 
With respect to individual frames as independent variable, we should ask: 
RQ6: How do individual frames influence perception of issues? 
 
Inspired from this four cells typology, Sheufeule developed a framing model as a theory of 
media effects. The process model of framing of Sheufele breaks important links down into 
inputs, processes, and outcomes (figure 1). The four cell typology conceptualizes framing as 
a continuous process where outcomes serves as inputs for the subsequent processes. A 
process model of framing examines four processes: frame building, frame setting, individual 
setting; individual-level effects of framing; and a link between individual frames and media 
frames (Sheufele, 1999:114-115).The term frame building raises the questions how media 
frame are formed or what kinds of organizational and structural factors of the media system, 
or which individual characteristics of journalists, can impact the framing of news content. 
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     Figure 1 
The second process of interest for framing as a theory of media effects is inspired by the idea 
of agenda setting of McCombs and Shaw’s (1972).The frame setting and the agenda setting 
are based on the similar processes. Whereas agenda setting is concerned with the salience of 
the issues, frame setting is concerned with the salience of its attributes. In contrast to 
McCombs et al. (1997) who believe that ‘the first level of agenda setting is the transmission 
of object salience. The second level of agenda setting is the transmission of attributes’; the 
empirical work of Nelson, Clawson and Oxley ( 1997) and Nelson and Kinder (1996) point 
out that ‘ frames influence opinions by stressing specific values, and other considerations, 
endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have 
under an alternative frame’(Nelson et al:1997:569). Sheufele notes that this contrast between 
perceived importance of salience of  frames seems to be an operational one, with salience and 
perceived importance reflecting different ways of measuring essentially the same construct. 
Beyond the operational issues however, there are conceptual differences between salience of 
frame and perceived importance of frame. The salience of frame in this sense refers to 
accessibility, or to the ‘ease in which instances or associations could be brought to mind’ 
(Tversky and Kahneman quoted in Scheufele, 1999:116). In other words the accessibility of a 
frame influence the way people think about an issue. Based on the evidences collected by 
Nelson et al (1997) which demonstrate the discriminant validity of both the perceived 
importance of frames and the accessibility of frames; they argue that causal modelling 
revealed that various dimensions of perceived importance accounted for major propositions 
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of the variance of framing effects. Therefore salience or accessibility played a minor effect 
(Scheufele, 1999:117) 
 
Individual-level effects of framing. Individual level of influences of audience frames on 
several behavioural, attitudinal and cognitive variables have been examined by focusing on 
input and outputs. For instance Iyengar (1991) explored the impact of episodic and thematic 
media framing of issues on attribution of personal or societal responsibility. However is this 
relationship mediated by audience framing? This question of whether audiences adopt media 
frames or the degree, to which they use frames in their own information processing, has not 
been answered (Sheufele, 1999:117). 
 
Journalists as audiences. Touri (2009:5) notes that ‘Journalistic framing of event is not 
shaped in the vacuum but through the frame sponsored by different social actors’. A process 
model of framing stresses that the link between individual level and media frames deserves 
more attention. Journalists are viewed in this picture similarly as their audiences as cognitive 
misers. Thus they are equally susceptible to the very frames that they use to describe events 
and issues. The subjectivity of the framing phenomenon acknowledges that the actual frame 
‘is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits and 
personal characteristics of the decision maker’ (Tversky and Kahneman quoted in Touri, 
2009:4). 
 
To summarize, a process model of framing as a theory of media effects captures the dynamic 
of framing by stressing the aspects which are overlooked by the dichotomy inputs and 
outcomes, that is why of Scheufele (1999:1008) argues that: 
 
Beyond classifying research, framing as a theory of media effects needs to be conceptualized as a 
process model. Rather focusing on input and outcomes, therefore future research should address 
the four key links indicated in the figure 1: frame building, frame setting, individual-level framing 
processes and feedback from individual-level framing to media framing 
 
1.4  THE  ROLE  OF  MEDIA  IN  FRAMING  PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
VIOLENCE AS NEWS  
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Following the viewpoint of Sartorial (1987), Callaghan and Schnell (2001:183) argue that: 
‘In a democratic society, the exchange of information and ideas through free press as well as 
free and open public debate is a crucial element of mass participation and a requirement for 
democratic responsiveness to public preferences’. In an ideal  democratic world, media are 
expected to serve as political watchdogs or guardians of the public interests, defending truth, 
pluralism, objectivity, balance and accuracy (Janowitz,1975;Shudson,1998; Sparrow, 1999 
and Bennett, 1999).While some researchers see the news output as a function of ‘official’ 
view on a given issue ,  others maintain that journalists do keep their agency. Given the rating 
driven environment in which news is framed and conveyed, journalists frequently exploit the 
personality, sensationalism, drama and conflict of stories, thereby downplaying the larger 
social economic, or political picture (Callaghan and Schnell,2001:186). 
 
For Diamond and McDonald (1996:124) “Conflict and violence make news and peace 
doesn’t. News is perceived as what’s exciting and different. People living happily together 
are of no interest to the public. Violence is reportable; non violence is boring”. Discussing the 
salience of violence and conflict coverage, Galtung (1998, 2002) distinguished between 
‘war/violence journalism’ and ‘peace/conflict journalism’ (Gilboa,2005: 4). According to 
Galtung (1998, 2002) media usually follow ‘the low road’ of war journalism in reporting 
conflict; chasing wars, the elites that run them, and a ‘win-lose’ outcome. In contrast the 
alternative approach, the ‘high road’ of peace journalism focuses on conflict formation, the 
victims of violence and the win-win solution. War journalism points out who advances and 
who capitulates at what human and material cost . Gilboa (2005) notes that such kind of 
coverage polarizes and escalates war because it calls for hatred and violence to avenge or 
stop ‘them’. It sees ‘them’ as the problem and dehumanizes ‘them’. War journalism is fuelled 
by propaganda and manipulation and is therefore biased and distorted. On the other hand, 
peace journalism examines the causes of violence and provides a voice to all parties, as well 
as empathy and understanding. It focuses on suffering all over and humanizes all sides. 
‘Peace journalism is more truthful and attempts to de-escalate violence by highlighting peace 
and conflict resolution as much as violence. While war journalism attaches itself only on ‘our 
side’, peace journalism is a journalism of attachment to all actual and potential victims’. In 
the same fashion Howard (2003) says that ‘traditional journalism only bring the bare facts’ 
while ’conflict sensitive journalism’ goes beyond these facts  and explores solutions, new 
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ideas, and new voices. He notes that traditional journalism is concerned only with bad news, 
does not seek other sides or points of view, assigns blame, and uses emotional language such 
as terrorism or massacre and takes sides. In contrast , conflict sensitive journalism present 
balanced reports and only what is known, it is very careful about the words it uses and avoids 
emotional terms , it seeks explanations and comments from all sides and looks for solutions 
(Gilboa,2005:5-6). 
 
Further, despite the fact that two organizations (TRANSCEND and Conflict and Peace 
Forum) attempted to translate Galtung’s ideas into a specific manual, very little empirical 
research has been conducted on this approach. Hanitzsch (Hanitzsch quoted in Gilboa, 2005) 
provides an interesting critique of peace journalism and related approaches for being at odds 
with mass communication theory. According to him peace journalism is based on the 
assumption of powerful casual and linear media effects while communication theory has 
produced very little empirical support for this approach. Peace journalism understands the 
audience as a single aggregate of dispersed individuals, but communication theory has 
identified pluralistic audiences with different features. Peace journalism admits that publisher 
and journalists, especially at the local level can disregard the interest of their specific 
audiences , but for communication theory this assumption is going against the nature of the 
journalistic field and it is not economically feasible. For peace journalism media have the 
responsibility to prevent, manage, resolve, and transform conflicts, but communication theory 
eludes this role when sociological system theory places responsibility for these functions on 
political institutions and leaders. 
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CHAPTER 2: CAPTURING SOME LOGICS OF POSTCOLONIAL 
CAMEROON  
2.1 COLONIAL TRAJECTORY OF CAMEROON 
 
The name ‘Cameroon’ is said to originate with the Portuguese sailors who discovered a 
countless number of prawns (camaroes) as they sailed into the estuary of the River Wouri 
circa 1472. Although it turned out that the alleged prawns were in fact crayfish the name 
Cameroon has been maintained. In fact for Nyamnjoh (2005:100-101) the political history of 
Cameroon is often treated as if it has come about with the German occupation in the 
nineteenth century. He notes that sufficient significance is not given to the fact that before it 
became a German protectorate in 1884, ‘Cameroon consisted of organised states and 
kingdoms ruled by monarchs who had as much right to their crowns or positions as did their 
European counterparts’. For the purpose of this study we will not pay a lot of attention to the 
pre-colonial Cameroon rather than insisting in some features of the colonial rule relevant for 
this specific research.  
 
In the course World War I Cameroon ceased to be a German protectorate and became 
occupied by the French and British  who ruled the country under the League of Nations 
Mandate.  After the World War II the country was ruled  as a United Nation Trusteeship 
Territory. In British Cameroon the effects of the indirect rule was the same as in Nigeria. For 
example, the politics of amalgamation and the Richards constitution created anthetical forces, 
struggles and conflicts through the ethno-regional institutional structure that divided the elite 
(Garba and Garba, 2005:93-95).  In contrast the system of direct rule of the French colonist in 
the francophone areas eroded the local socio-political organizations in the francophone areas 
through its cultural assimilation and administrative centralization. Assimilation was different 
across the territory and certain ethnic groups within the colony gained disproportionate access 
to French education and therefore high status in the French colonial administration (Blanton 
et al, 2005:479).The result was a transition from a non competitive form of ethnicity to a 
competitive form of ethnicity or “political tribalism” (Lonsdale quoted in Turton,1997:79). 
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In the 1950s, the Union of the Peoples of the Cameroon (UPC) formed and articulated the 
twin goals of immediate independence and union with the British Cameroon (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2005:1). Their rebellion against the mandated authority reached civil war proportions. 
UPC was the leading national party. By 1949 it had become better organized and more 
organized than any other political party in the territory. Stark (1980:8) notes that it was 
clearly the party with the best claim on leadership of an independent Cameroonian nation; 
although other parties attempted to use its slogans and goal of independence and 
reunification. The UPC’s majority of supporters were primarily localized in the urban areas, 
in Bassa and Bamileke areas of the country and little in the north or around the capital, 
Yaoundé.  
 
On January 1, 1960 the French Cameroon became independent under the presidency of 
Amado Ahidjo, a Muslim from the North of the Country, and opponent of the radical UPC. 
The British-administered mandated territory (administered as part of Nigeria) had been 
divided into two zones. The outcome of the plebiscite in 1961, led to the union of the 
Northern zone with Nigeria, while Southern zone was incorporated into Cameroon. The 
enlarged Cameroon was reconstituted as a federal republic with two prime ministers and 
legislatures, a single president and a range of potential political cleavages (region, religion, 
ethnicity, language, and colonial heritage). Cameroon has approximately 259 ethnic groups. 
With an ethnic fractionalization score of 0.89 it is more diverse than the sub-Saharan average 
0.64 (Fearon and Laitin, 2005:2).  
 
                            
Table 1 , source: Fearon and Laitin (2005) 
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2.2 AHIDJO’S LEGACY 
2.2.1 ON POLITICS 
 
Ahidjo owed his position as Cameroon’s first president to the French who preferred him to 
his predecessor Prime Minister Andre Marie Mbida (southerner) because he was a northerner 
and because they believed that he could be easily manipulated (Fearon and Laitin, 2005:18). 
Some facets of his profile can be captured by this assertion of Englebert (2000:11) about the 
first generation of postcolonial leaders in Africa: 
 
From colonialism, they inherited the instruments of statehood but not the power that came with it 
in the colonial days. These leaders were indeed often the product of the colonial system and had 
limited power foundations in pre-colonial societies. Even when they originated from traditional 
chiefly families as Houphouet Boigny  in Cote d’Ivoire, Modibo Keita in Mali and several others, 
the customary foundations of their authority were mostly communal and failed to extend to the 
country as a whole. 
 
Ahidjo was a leader without a mass following; he had to accept the UPC values and slogans 
while at the same time fighting against the UPC insurgency with the French assistance (Stark, 
1980:278; Fearon and Laitin, 2005:9). His struggle against the UPC was therefore an attempt 
to consolidate his authority within the country, from the poorer North region where he 
belonged to the relatively rich and Christian South. However, according to Fearon and Laitin 
(2005:10) if it were a civil war in Cameroon, it would be that of Bamileke rebellion, since the 
Bassa leadership had been co-opted peacefully by Ahidjo. However , these scholars note that 
there is little agreement to the point when the war ended  and it is therefore difficult to assess 
whether this civil war spilled over  into a war against independent Cameroon. Bayart dated 
the end of civil war from 1955 to 1964. Levine (1971, 120-182) dates the end of domestic 
insurgency at 1962. Delancey and Delancey (2000, 169-269) suggest that the rebellion ended 
in 1971 when the prominent UPC figures were arrested and executed.  
 
According to Fearon and Laitin (2005) the UPC rebellion and the way it was suppressed 
decreased the likelihood that Cameroon would have another insurgency in two ways. It 
created firstly strong military completely loyal to Ahidjo. The French trained the 
Cameroonian army and helped to construct the service des Etudes de la Documentation 
(SEDOC) which according to Krieger and Takougang (1998:39) was ‘one of the most 
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effective intelligence services in sub-Saharan Africa’. Secondly, the insurgency allowed 
Ahidjo to assume emergency powers in 1959 which he used to postpone elections due in 
1960.  This situation allowed him to draft the constitution of independent Cameroon and to 
create an extremely powerful presidency and electoral rules designed to assure the dominance 
of his party Union Camerounaise (UC).These measures led to the defection of several 
opposition parties members and Ahidjo’s UC was effectively the only political party in East 
Cameroon well before Cameroon officially became a single-party state in 1966. Leaders of 
political parties in West Cameroon soon realized that cooperation with Ahidjo was their only 
option. Also the support of France gave the new president resource and political space to 
develop a strong state. 
 
In effect , from the beginning Ahidjo’s regime was autocratic but  soon developed the three 
central features of neopatrimonialism as mentioned by Bretton and van de Walle : 
presidentialism, clientelism and the massive redistribution of state resources (Gabriel, 
1999:4). The centralization of power around one person and one institution was defining the 
presidentialism under Ahidjo. The Pulaka code, the traditional code of his ethnic group, 
stressing the conservatives values of shyness, strict religious observance, patience, and 
forethought among others based on Islam, influenced also his leadership style (Stark, 
1980:277). Gabriel (1999:5) argues that Ahidjo built up a large clientelistic network reaching 
into practically every segment of the country. People got their jobs their licences, contracts or 
other administrative facilities through him and were expected to show in return gratitude. In 
such context loyalty to the president was more important than performance on the job; 
therefore the private good had priority over the public good. To a large extent clientelistic 
politics were financed from non Cameroonian sources. France was and important provider of 
funds, as were many other European countries, the United States, and some international 
organizations concerned with development. Ahidjo was a master in pressuring the French by 
courting the Germans, the British or the Americans. Nevertheless clientelism went hand in 
hand with the formation of a multi-ethnic ruling class which include the representative from 
practically all part of the country (Gabriel, 1999:6-7). The emphasis put on national unity by 
introducing a regime intolerant of the discussion of ethnicity, could justify  the fact that an 
important theme in the country literature for why the Cameroon was so stable is the 
distinctive personal style of Ahidjo (Stark,1980;Fearon and Laitin:,2005:11). 
26 
 
2.2.2 ON ECONOMICS 
 
The political skills of Ahidjo supersede his ability to drive a real economic development. 
Starks (1980:278) argues that with reference to economic development and all important 
issues about the economic relations with the former colonial power, Ahidjo‘s view was ‘at 
the liberal and laissez-faire end of the African policy continuum’. He was in agreement with 
the colonial legacy as strenuously as some. According to Koning (1996) early at the 
beginning, the federal state of Cameroon faced the problem of dependence and 
underdevelopment. The economy was largely dependent on the export of a few agricultural 
products (cocoa, coffee, bananas and palm oil). The tiny industrial sectors, dominated by 
French capital were mainly involved in the transformation of agricultural produce for exports. 
As a member of zone CFA franc zone, Cameroon was tied monetarily to France, while it has 
the advantage of promoting economic stability and allowing an open trade regime, it 
established a tendency of overvaluation of the currency and encouraged the development of 
imported consumer tastes (Vallee,1989; Koning, 1996:246). Despite the fact that Ahidjo 
constantly emphasized the need for ethnic balance and national unity, there is nevertheless 
sufficient evidence that two ethnic groups enjoyed a privileged position in opportunities for 
capital accumulation. There was first of all Muslim Fulbe elite, especially those originating 
from Garoua, Ahidjo’s home town. The second group was the Bamileké. It is widely believed 
that Ahidjo was ready to grant the Bamileke elite ample room for capital accumulation on 
condition that they would not meddle in politics (Koning, 1996:249). 
 
Ahidjo’s regime attends gradually a degree of autonomy from the French by trading with 
other partners. The regime’s apparent political stability, lack of ideological posturing and 
liberal investment code was attractive to Western donors and business milieu. Considering its 
annual growth rate of 8 per cent from 1970 to 1985 Cameroonian economy was long 
considered one of the success stories in sub-Saharan Africa. Koning (1996:249-250) notes 
that while not without foundation this view of the country’s economy has proved to be 
excessively optimistic as it failed to take several disturbing trends by the end of Ahidjo’s 
regime. In effect the country alleged economic success was based on its rich resources base, 
yet the agricultural sector was stagnating: the growth register was the result of increased 
acreage under cultivation brought about by expensive government programmes and it 
disguised the absence of sustained productivity growth. Furthermore, infrastructural problems 
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were daunting, and the rapid growth of a costly and inefficient public sector was becoming 
difficult to manage. Cameroon’s seemingly impressive growth rate until 1986 was inflated by 
the discovery of oil in 1977. The revenues from oil have been placed in foreign banks as extra 
budgetary accounts, to avoid the boom mentality that undermine agricultural production in 
other African countries. Nevertheless in the line of the regime’s patrimonial logic oil 
revenues primary function became  covering parastatal deficit. 
 
 
 
2.3  FROM  AHIDJO  TO  BIYA:  DISCONTINUITY  AND 
CONTINUITY OF THE NEOPATRIMONIAL REGIME 
2.3.1 LEADERSHIP TRANSITION 
 
Ahidjo surprised the Cameroonian population on 4 November 1982 by announcing that he 
was resigning as President of the country and turning his office to his constitutionally 
designate successor, the Prime Minister Paul Biya; the transfer to take effect on 6 November 
1982. Biya was a Christian from the Southern francophone Cameroon, he belonged to the 
Beti ethnic group and he was widely regarded as weak and inexperienced (Fearon and Laitin, 
2005:12). Ahidjo remained the head of the governing party (UC) after the transition. Right at 
the beginning of his leadership, Biya attempted to maintain Ahidjo’s ethno-regional coalition. 
Acknowledging the constraints he [Biya] encountered, Bayart (1993:57-58) notes that Biya 
toured his home region explaining that they should not expect too much from him. A 
leadership conflict between Ahidjo and Biya over the official status of the governing party 
and a Cabinet reshuffle led to an attempted coup by two of Ahidjo’s close aides (both 
northern military men) changed drastically the nature of Biya’s regime and its appearance by 
the creation of  CPDM (Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement) and the abolition of UC. 
Koning (1996:251) argues that: 
 
Given that his hold on power had become even more precarious after this failed coup d’état, Biya 
was compelled to raised the costs of maintaining the loose ruling alliance. He needed to please the 
state apparatus, notably those parts of the army which had supported him during the coup d’état 
attempt, and he wanted to meet the heightened expectations of his fellow Beti. The Beti elite saw 
the transfer of power from Ahidjo to Biya simply as an opportunity to promote ethno-fascism in 
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Bayart’s words (1989). By implication, therefore, the fact that the president hailed from a specific 
ethnic group, should automatically give his fellowmen the right to monopolize the power. 
 
Such a shift was illustrated by Biya’s co-optation of Beti elite in the ruling alliance. Thus the 
northern and Bamileke businessmen who enjoyed a privileged position during Ahidjo’s 
administration were increasingly replaced by Beti businessmen. Also the Biya regime 
increased the number of civil servants from 80 000 in 1982 to about 180, 000 in 1988; the 
majority of the new employees being among the Beti. The Beti also started to monopolize the 
pivotal positions in the government and security organ. Takougang (1993:95-6) reports that 
as  of August 1991, thirty-seven of the forty-seven senior prefects ( head of administrative 
divisions), three- quarters of the directors and general managers of the parastatal companies 
in the country and twenty-two of the thirty eight high-ranking bureaucrats who had been 
appointed in the newly created office of the prime minister , where from the president ethnic 
group. Van de Walle ( 1994:144)  argues that Biya ‘s precarious position during and after his 
power struggle with Ahidjo, led him to expand the use of state resources for political ends, to 
please the army, to undermine Ahidjo’s base of support and to meet the great expectation of 
his fellow southerners. For Koning (1996: 252), the new ruling elite, appeared to be much 
bolder in staking out claims on the state resources than Ahidjo’s supporters had been. As he 
notes, if corruption and rent-seeking had always been fundamentals characteristic of the 
Cameroonian regime, after 1984 they increased to the point of becoming dysfunctional. 
 
2.3.2 ECONOMIC REFORMS 
 
In the 1980s the clientelist model of governance was in crisis, especially owing to the fact 
that state resources had become scarcer- there was less to share around. African countries 
exported cheaply and bought at expensive rates. Furthermore, they reinvested in ineffective 
import substitutions, in an oversized public sector and in sumptuary expenses while 
neglecting agricultural production. By not diversifying agricultural production, the 
opportunities for widening domestic markets and local consumption were limited. At the 
same time, the state sector overexploited farmers to produces more: they were paid low rates 
while the produce was sold at higher prices on the market and profits were pocketed by 
officials. Corruption was a widespread practice at all levels of society and government 
(Sogge, 2006:8). The  postcolonial state has inherited from its colonial predecessor a situation 
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where  the power of ‘ traditional chiefs’ is weakened by the central authorities while that of 
‘warrant chief’ has to constantly get propped up by demonstration of force against local 
population (Rowlands and Warnier 1998:120). In this respect the Cameroonian postcolonial 
state is hardly in gear with the village communities representing some of 70-80 per cent of 
the population. Rowland and Warnier (1998) suggest that the state retain an interest  to 
discipline the rural population because of the foreign exchange resulting from the agricultural 
independence of rural areas. Thus as they note a check is needed on rural-urban migrations 
that deplete the country side of the young and crowd the cities with an increasing number of 
unemployed. A huge number of rural development projects have been launched in the last 
thirty years and para-statal organizations have operated without the success expected.  
 
Considering the failures of agriculture projects in rural areas it is therefore interesting to 
mention the intra national migration flux of this period inview of its influence on the political 
geography  and the identity politics of the political liberalization (allogenes /autochtones and 
Anglophone/ Bamileke issues) of the 1990s. Besisdes, according to the country census in 
1987, the intra national mobility index was 32,5 % of the total of population of 9,3 million. 
About 90% of the migrants were younger than 35 years. The inter-province migration was 
primarily fuelled by a large inter-provincial socio-economic cleavage and demand for 
education. The extreme North, the West and the Northwest provinces were supplying about 
four times more inter-province migrant labour than they received. They are major labour 
exporters, contributing 53 % of all migrants. The central and littoral provinces with their 
major urban cities Yaoundé and Douala were net receiver of intra-national migrants, 
providing 26% of all inter- province out –migrants. In the extreme North, west and northwest 
provinces, the high population density with respect to the available resources flow caused the 
large migration flow. Almost 50 % of the migrants from the west and north west provinces 
move to the other provinces most of them (60 %) go to Douala , the economic centre , to the 
plantations in littoral province or to the national province. Yaoundé and Douala alone 
received 33,8 of all inter-provincial migrants (Schrieder and Knerr,2000:226). 
 
However the economic crisis was aggravated by massive capital flight estimated at FCFA 
150 billion a year which was almost a quarter of the annual national budget. The free flow of 
currency between the CFA franc Zone and France encouraged the Cameroonian elite to 
transfer their capital to French banks which moreover supplied higher interest rates than the 
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Cameroonian banks. Also as a form of protestation for their ‘marginalization’ by the new 
regime the Bamileke elite withdrew their savings from the banks and transferred them to 
informal circuits the so called tontines. This aggravated the problem of liquidity of 
Cameroonian banks. Consequently, several new government projects which started with 
Biya’s New Deal, where suspended or abandoned because of the financial constraint. In this 
deterioting economic climate many foreign companies that had invested in Cameroon left the 
country creating behind them a huge segment of unemployed population (Koning, 1996, 251-
252). 
 
The government’s initial response to the trade shock of the mid- 1980s was to rely on 
external financing in the hope of favourable commodity prices or exchange rate changes. 
Consequently the external debt rose from US dollar 2.7 billion in 1984 to US$ 4.7 billion in 
1989. The IMF and the World Bank had been negotiating with the government on and off 
since mid-1986, without reaching an agreement. At that time Biya justified his refusal of an 
agreement with IMF, claiming that the austerity of the programme of those institutions could 
affect negatively the national prestige. Through 1987 and 1989, he pointed out that Cameroon 
would take only non conditional capital from bilateral donors and the private banks. But 
when the debt started to cripple, Biya and the IMF reached an agreement on a stabilization 
plan in September 1988 and with the World Bank on a structural adjustment loan in May 
1989. In return for refinancing debt, adjustment measures had to be imposed that included 
cutbacks in state spending, reductions in subventions for social spending, devaluation of 
national currencies in order to attract foreign investment and market liberalisation. At the 
same time, international credit organizations insisted that African states should devote more 
resources and attention to the agricultural sector, which had been neglected in favour of urban 
growth. 
 
Cameroon’s IMF agreement programmes signed in September 1988 and December 1991 
expired without having fully disbursed authorized funds and without a follow –on programme 
in place, due to the Biya government failures to meet the conditionality. In September 1992, 
IMF programming, World Bank project assistance and Paris club debt relief was suspended 
because of accumulating debt arrears. Koning (1996:253) stresses the pivotal role of France 
in Cameroon’s structural adjustment programme motivated by the suspicion of Washington 
intrusion in its “'pré-carré”. For Koning, France saved the Biya regime of failing in the status 
31 
 
of non accrual, which would destroyed the country‘s financial credibility, by proposing to 
pay Cameroon’s accumulated debt arrears with the World Bank amounting to FCFA 60 
billion and by supporting Cameroon regime through financial aid especially during the period 
1990-1992: this totalled 181 billion representing 36 per cent of all aid. If Biya’s regime was 
reluctant to give in to the World Bank’s demand to lay off about 40,000 civil servants and 
states agents knowing that most of them were Beti, he accepted at least to reduce the 
personnel costs of the public service with the exception of the army5 (Bidima, 2001:239). In 
1991 it announced further cuts in the salaries and benefits of government employees. The 
government however experienced difficulties in paying its civil servants. Rather than laying 
off a certain proportion of the overdeveloped civil services, it decided to implement a 
draconian salary reductions of respectively 30 per cent in November 1993. In October 1993 
France agreed to allocate a loan of FCFA 15 billion to Cameroon to help the government in 
coming to terms with the salary arrears owed to civil servants. France and Cameroon used to 
resist any pressures of the IMF and the World Bank to agree upon a devaluation of the 
currency in the CFA Franc Zone. In January 1994, however, they consented to a 50 per cent 
devaluation of the CFA Franc. In return the IMF ratified a standby credit of US dollar 114 
millions to Cameroon on 15 May 1994 and  the disbursement of this loan was made 
conditional upon the government’s termination of 20 000 civil servants (Page, 1999:44). In 
July 1997 the Cameroonian government successfully implemented a medium–term recovery 
program covering 1997/98/2002 (July-June). By October 2000, the Board of Executive 
directors of International Development Association and the IMF agreed that Cameroon had 
met the requirements for reaching the decision point under the enhanced Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. The amount of debt relief committed at the decision point 
was US$ 1, 6260 million in net present value (NPV) terms, calculated to bring the NPV of 
debt to the equivalent of 150 percent on the basis of end – June 1999 data (IMF Country 
Report, 2006:5). In May 2006 Cameroon reached the completion point under the enhanced 
HIPC after undergoing some genuine and incremental transformations. 
 
                                                 
5 According to Bidima (2001, 238‐247) , the regime of privileges of the army concerning their salaries, the 
budget of the Ministry of Defence and the involvement of  the army in the criminal activities such as the illegal 
exploitation of  Cameroonian Forest and other activities alike justify the fact that the army still support the 
regimes against all odds. 
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2.3.3 NEW ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE 
 
If the implementation of structural adjustment was marked by the procrastination of the 
Biya’s regime, its societal impact is better seen through the condition of ordinary citizens as 
the following assertion of Page (1999:44) suggests: 
 
From the perspective of a civil servant, the period from 1985-94 was one of the gradual 
retrenchment of privileges. Job losses were common in para-statal (44 of the148 para-statal were 
liquidated) but rare for those working in central bureaucracy. Rather than make civil servant 
redundant the government lowered the retirement age and halted recruitment. 
 
In fact the implementation of structural adjustment led to several changes in the state 
apparatus as well as in society. Hugon and Pages (1998: 36 – 41) point out the effect of the 
programme of structural adjustment in health system, education system, social services 
among others. According to those scholars, the devaluation of CFA Franc reduces the income 
of households and others economic agent (paysans, companies etc), increase the 
consummation of imported products as well as the increase of public debt and the dependence 
on foreign capital for public expenses. The SAP also contributes to the unemployment of 
youth by worsening the gap between the educated youth and the potentialities of job market. 
Also the privatisation of education and the suppression of scholarships excluded a huge 
number of rural and urban youth from poor families from educational opportunities . The 
SAP weakened health public services and fuelled private initiatives while at the same time a 
reduction of health expenses was observed because of the expensive prices of medications 
and equipments and the destabilization of private circuits of distributions. Beninguissé and 
Koné (n.d:108-109) argues that in 1976 a working person supported on average less than one 
non working person, whereas in 1987 one person was supported. Between 1991 and 1998 the 
weight of the working population and the economic dependency stabilized. The potential 
economic burden of the working population at that time was mainly due to the under 15 
years. 
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Figure 2 
 
In 1991, the World Bank notes that Cameroon’s overall rate of food self sufficiency reached 
96%; food security prevailed in    North West and North West  (Shrieder and Knerr, 
2000:227). In Cameroon as elsewhere, the aim of structural adjustment have been to 
encourage the production of cash crops for export, to generate more foreign exchange and 
improve the capacity of the state to service its external debt payment (Fonchinong,1999:3). 
Page (1999: 42) notes that agriculture absorbed the dissatisfaction of citizens whose standard 
of living fell drastically during the implementation of SAP. According to him rather than 
confront the government in the sphere of formal politics, many household preferred to make 
up for their failing purchasing power by increasing domestic agriculture. The government 
which never planned to diffuse the anger brought by the SAP maximises this initiative by 
changing the length of the working day, repealing the law that bared civil servant from 
private initiative and not enforcing existing by laws that forbids farming in towns. 
 
For Fonchinong ( 1999: 73-76 ) rural and urban women have been the most affected by the 
SAP, first by being the category which loses the most jobs and second by carrying  a double 
even a triple burden of work as they cope with housework, child care and subsistence 
agriculture. Comparing to the period before the SAP, women felt that there is now hardly any 
dividing line between men’s and women’s work in farming. The traditional division of 
labour, concentrating the men on cash crops and women on crops which existed before the 
crisis has changed. The distinction between cash crop and food crops has become blurred in 
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some cases. In both urban and rural areas, women have been putting more time on food crop 
cultivation since the implementation of SAP to compensate for the diminishing amount of 
available land and the lack of inputs. During 1998-99 land productivity in urban areas has 
gone from an average of about 40 per cent, and in rural areas land productivity has raised 
from 70 per cent to 85 per cent (Fonchinong, 1999:77). There have been an increased 
numbers of women engaged in food-crop production in urban areas and  those crops  which 
are for sale have become an extra source of income designed to supply in some extent health 
care or child education etc. The Cameroonian economy which once has been driven by the oil 
revenues can no longer count on this asset. Despite  the new exploration contracts signed by 
the government and stimulated by the rise of oil price no major oil field have been found yet 
(Alemagi, 2007:136). Therefore while  we can rely on the prediction of Cosse (2006) 
announcing the continuity of the decline of Cameroonian oil production over the medium to 
long term and the argument of Crisis group (2010:15) saying that despite a significant 
reduction of the external debt –from 98 per cent  of the Gross Domestic Product in 2000 to 13 
percent in 2008- any improvement of the Cameroonian economy depends  on the technical 
challenge and the eradication of  pervasive corruption, we can also point out the relevancy of 
this statement of Gabriel (1997:10), especially due to the  negative impact of the global 
financial crisis on its export economy : 
 
Cameroon’s economy has been in deep crisis, and although there are some efforts at reforms, it is 
simply inconceivable that the country will soon begin to industrialize and produce advanced 
commodities for the world market. In the decades to come, technology-oriented management is 
not likely to appear in Cameroon. One of the main reasons for this is the deplorable administrative 
environment. The country is suffering from poor governance in almost all realms of public 
administration.  
 
2.3.4 POLITICAL REFORMS 
 
The appeal for change in Cameroon as in most Sub-Saharan countries, should be understood 
in the context of economic breakdown, rather than the genuine will of the people to 
democratize, because behind this democratic effervescence lies their aspiration for economic 
improvement (Mbuagbo and Akoko, 2004:8). But not only economic aspiration of the people, 
more importantly those of international financial institutions. The liberalization of political 
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arena in Cameroon has been the outcome of endogenous and exogenous factors: The reform 
governance as a conditionality to obtain funds from International organizations and trade 
partners (world Bank); the demise of the communism; the spread of the third democratic 
wave in Eastern Europe and the protestation of Cameroonian fuelled by the crisis and the 
disappointment over Biya’s empty promise of political reforms (Gabriel, 1999; Koning, 
1996). Ngwa (2009: 7) notes that within Cameroon, the decision by France and Britain to 
advocate for political liberalization was significant for two reasons. First, these moves were 
historic because both countries were ex-colonial powers that had provided significant support 
to Biya regime until that point. Second by linking aid to political reforms, France as 
Cameroon’s primary trading partner, was sending a strong message to Biya to succumb to its 
prerogatives or face financial sanctions. Following the view point of Takougang and Krieger 
(1998), He adds that the stance by the French reinforced the earlier decision by World Bank 
and the international Monetary Fund to link aid to economic restructurings and political 
liberalization.  
 
Pro- democratic agitation began with attempts to create new parties in 1990.The most 
prominent of these was the Social Democratic front (SDF) created de facto by John Fru Ndi, 
an Anglophone. The challenge and the embarrassment caused by SDF  led the government to 
react violently against a rally in May 1990 in Bamenda while contributing at the same time to 
the prominence of this party (Fearon and Laitin, 2005:15). After many hesitations illustrated 
with his promise during the CPDM National Congress of 1990 to reform some of the laws 
that impeded democratization, Biya opted finally for ‘genuine democratic transition’ in the 
words of Ngwa (2009) , by abrogating old laws and introducing new laws. On December 
1990, the National assembly approved more than 100 ‘liberty laws’ tabled by the president. 
These laws covered the issues related to a broad segment of Cameroonian society , but more 
important were those concerning the ability to hold public meeting and processions, the 
maintenance of law and order, the freedom of press and the creation of political party.  
 
In the first months of 1991 parties received their registration. Koning  (1996:257-258) 
provides a good description of the majors party, SDF, UPC and  the ‘ Union Nationale pour 
la Democratie et le Progres’ (UNDP). The SDF was originally largely an Anglophone party 
but it later spread its membership to the Francophone area, notably to the neighbouring 
francophone provinces. For example it was supported by the Bamileke in the West Province, 
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due partly to the cultural affinity of the Grassfield people. The UPC, which early has been 
suppressed by the French and Ahidjo‘s regime, was re-founded under a new leadership 
capable of winning strong support in its areas of operation, Douala and Bamileke and Bassa 
regions. Its leadership consisted partly of ex CPDM leaders and partly of old UPC leaders 
who had returned from exile. The UNDP enjoyed most support among the Fulbe of Northern 
Cameroon, Ahidjo’s ethnic group. Its leaders were former high ranking officials in the 
Ahidjo’s regime and early Biya regime who claimed Ahidjo heritage. 
 
Examining some of these new laws Ngwa (2009:11) highlights some interesting limitations 
acknowledging the incremental character of those reforms. He notes for example that the Law 
No. 90/55 of 19/12/90 governing the right to hold public meeting, while allowing for the 
organization of public meetings, that law nevertheless created a strict authorization process 
and contained a clause that permitted indiscriminate prosecution. Furthermore, Article 6(1) of 
the same law placed further restrictions on the holding public processions and demonstrations 
by complicating the application process. Law No. 90/54 of 19/12/90 which governed the 
maintenance of law and order instituted a preventive detention period of up to fifteen days, a 
timeframe that was eight days more than the detention period allowed for under a state of 
emergency. Also concerning freedom of the press, the abrogation of the Ordinance No. 
62/OF/18 of March 1962 and the subsequent enactment of Law No.90/46 allowed the 
establishment of a free press. As it was the case for the other new law, some clauses were 
inserted in this law to circumscribe the independence of the press. One of such clause can be 
found in Section 14 of Law No.90/052 which 'required newspapers to submit two signed 
copies to administrative authorities where the paper was published, two hours before dailies 
and four hour before weeklies were placed on sale’ so that the government official would be 
able to remove or make illegible ‘material considered subversive or politically inappropriate’ 
(Takougang and Krieger quoted in Ngwa, 2009:11) 
 
As it has been showed earlier in this chapter, in Cameroon political debate or struggle is less 
about a clash between the international economic order and the national economic orientation 
but about the mode of governance of the ruling elite. Consequently even if the genuine 
economic aspirations of the people tend to be antithetical to the neo-liberal doctrine of the 
International financial organizations, such a point is eluded by the political organizations and 
by the power elite because all their energy is dedicated to fight against each other within the 
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strictures of the existing systems- mostly neopatrimonial and neo-liberal level. In the same 
path Konings (1996:258) argues that the legalization of many small parties was suspected in 
Biya’s regime to be intended to split the opposition to the government. He notes that none of 
the party had worked out a well-defined programme, except maybe the SDF. Most of them 
did not go beyond the demand for better social justice, cleaning up of public life and end to 
secretive government and measures to restore the economic situation. In this respect he 
claims that nearly all of them supported the implementation of the SAP in Cameroon. 
Therefore a reading of Cameroonian socio-political landscape while privileging the agency of 
the ruling elite can inform this assertion Gabriel (1997:1): 
 
Cameroon is not in transition to democracy; there has been some liberalization but democracy is 
not in sight .Cameroon is not rebelling and has practically given up efforts to change the 
international economic order in league with other marginalized states. Cameroon is just a docile 
marginal state-like so many in sub-Saharan Africa (Gabriel, 1997:1). 
 
2.3.5 RECONFIGURATION OF RULING ELITE, CONSOLIDATION OF STATUS 
QOU, AND POPULAR DESENCHANTMENT. 
 
The liberalization of the political scene in Cameroon through the organization of ‘democratic 
elections’ affected the balance of power in Cameroon and led to a reconfiguration of the 
hegemonic alliance. Gabriel (1997:10) reports that the first contested elections were held in 
1992. In March there were parliamentary and in October presidential elections. In the former 
elections the CPDM failed to obtain a majority, 88 of 180 seats, but Biya managed to form a 
coalition made up of representatives of minor and divided parties. Ngwa (2009:16) argues 
that Biya’s regime bought off opposition leaders in order to reconfigurate the hegemonic 
alliance. He notes that the CPDM government was able to make use of all the benefits of 
incumbency, including the extensive patronage reward system that had been in place since 
independence. After the March parliamentary election, According to him the first party to 
accept the bribe from Biya’s regime was the Movement for Defence of the republic (MDR) 
led by a Kirdi, Daikole Daisala. The MDR accepted this patronage in exchange for forging an 
alliance with the CPDM. Thereby providing a CPDM with a tiny majority of 94 out of 180 
seats in parliamentary. In return, the MDR was given four cabinet posts (Takougang, 
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2003:430). Boycotting the 1992 election because of the belief that the CPDM planned to 
manipulate the outcome, the SDF have not been represented in the National assembly from 
1992 to 1997 but Fru Ndi decided to run personally the presidential election against Biya and 
almost won (Fearon and Laitin, 2005:16, Gabriel, 1997:15). The marginal position of the 
SDF, allowed the CPDM government with its junior partner, the MDR to promulgate laws 
that favoured the Biya regime. 
 
Nyamnjoh (2009:2) argues that there has been little dialogue and fair play in Cameroon’s 
multiparty democracy, even in comparison with most African country. According to him 
while the first multiparty legislative elections took place in 1991 under the one party electoral 
law, subsequent election have since been governed by the highly controversial September 
1992 electoral law. In the light of this new law candidates for presidential elections must be 
‘Cameroonian citizen by birth and show proof of having resided in Cameroon for an 
uninterrupted period of at least 12 (twelve) months’. As he notes , broadly one has to prove a 
continuous stay of at least six months in a given locality to qualify to vote there and to stand 
for elections in that locality one must be an indigene or a ‘long-staying resident’. The same 
issue is mentioned by Jua (2001:37) when he notes the shift of the official discourse from the 
emphasis on national integration to the prominence of allogenes /autochthones dichotomy 
during the liberalization. This rupture disables a national imagining among these allogenes 
who are often deny the same liberty as the one of autochtones, and promotes’ a republic of 
tribe rather than a republican model’ (Jua: 2001:41).Such issue of allogene/autochtones 
affects particularly the opposition candidate or their supporter. Nyamnjoh notes that it is not 
uncommon for oppositions supporters to be told in the city that they have to vote in their 
home area (their village of origin), but once in the village they are informed by the local 
authority that they have to vote where they live (in the city). In this context it is not surprising 
that many voters never make it to the polling station on election day. 
 
Some other examples of buying off of opposition leaders have been noticeable after the 1992 
elections. For instance the incorporation of prominent UNDP party into the Biya government 
after the October 1992 election. Ngwa notes that with the UNDP’s Vice-President Hamadou 
Mustapha and Secretary General Issa Thiroma breaking ranks and joining the CPDM 
government, the Leader of the UNDP had no option but to follow suit. He was appointed 
Minister of Industrial and Commercial Development in 1997.  Also UPC which had splitted 
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earlier because of intercine quarrel of leadership and fostered by the CPDM, have seen one of 
its faction led by Augustin Kodock abandoning the rank of opposition and joined the Biya 
government. In the same fashion,  the National Party for Progress of Antar Gassagay (MDR) 
also left the ranks of the opposition and joined the Biya team in return for ministerial 
positions. Ngwa (2009:17) says that: ‘by the end of 1997 the Biya regime had successfully 
weakened the opposition and driven it into disarray. Apart from working frantically to co- opt 
and destroy the opposition, the Biya regime also embarked on building up its support base’. 
 
In agreement with Ngwa (2009), Fearon and Laitin say that since the 1992 elections which 
Biya  won narrowly despite corruption and opposition fragmentation, he has come to 
consolidate his power through the two other elections in 1997 and 2002. Takougang 
(2003:424-25 ) argues that Biya’s political dominance is so pronounced that, surprised and 
embarrassed by its comprehensive victory in 2002 , his party (CPDM) conceded to several 
run-off elections to make the elections look less rigged. In this context of CPDM dominance, 
the desertion of political opposition had become fashionable in Cameroon’s political scene, 
obscuring the need for an alternative political vision but sustaining the visible colours of the 
quarrel of bellies in the public debate. For instance the 6th November 2009 while the  
Anglophone Prime Minister Yang Philemon was visiting the North West province ( his home 
town),  the general secretary Richard Munteh Ndula of SDF announced his desertion from 
SDF and  his new CPDM membership. Munteh Ndula justifies his desertion in these words: 
 
Comment comprendre que le sécrétaire particulier de la deuxième personnalité politique du pays 
n’est pas affilié à la CNPS, n’a pas de salaire ?  Je suis un responsable de famille avec quatre 
enfants dont les jumeaux…Ma mère est hospitalisée à l’hopital Saint Mary Soledad , j’ai fait des 
pieds et des mains pour  payer ses factures d’hospitalisation. Mon épouse et les enfants etaient 
aussi internés dans le même centre de sante, il fallait racoler auprès des amis pour qu’il m’aident à 
les libérer ( Suffo,2009 :1) 
 
How  to understand that the particular secretary of  the second political personality of the country 
is not affiliated to CNPS, does not have wage? I am responsible for my family with four children 
by whom the twins... My mother is hospitalized at Saint Mary Soledad hopital, I did my best to 
pay her bills of hospitalization. My spouse and the children were also hospitalized in the same 
hospital, it was necessary to solicit to the friends so that they help me to pay their bills of 
hospitalization (Suffo, 2009 :1, my translation). 
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This assertion of Munteh Ndulah contain everything about the precariiusness  of his social 
condition as a SDF’s employee but nothing about the  SDF’s  ideology  per se. In fact the  
raison d’être of Munteh Ndula’s desertion appears more clearly when he states in the first 
lines of his declaration that :   
 
‘Je vous écris humblement pour vous informer qu’une multitude 
d’incompréhensions au sein du Sdf, couplées de l’arrivée du Premier ministre 
chef du gouvernement Philémon Yang dans la région, m’ont permis de me faire 
une idée claire’.  
 
I hereby write to inform you that the numerous misunderstandings occuring in the 
SDF since the arrival of the Prime minister Philémon Yang in the region helped to 
clear my mind ( my translation ).  
 
 
In fact the Ndulah seems to portray himself as someone who discovered just recently that the 
political game in Cameroon is nothing more than a simulacra of political opposition and a 
‘politics of the belly’. However his  apparently new discovery do not deter him to do the 
same but legitimate his hidden but now opened expectations of  politics (feeding the belly) 
designing his new  political affiliation. In the light of this example, we can therefore agree 
with Lindberg (2003 :123)  who argues that’ the neopatrimonial rule has not diminished with 
the introduction of democracy. Rather there are some indications that it has actually regained 
strenghth and intensity with the establishment of multiparty system’.  
In addition if we consider the hypothesis  that Munteh Ndulah was really interested by the 
SDF ideology when he became a SDF’s member,  it is therefore quite strange to see a quasi 
absence of reference to the integrity of this ideology as a motivation for his new political 
choice. Therefore we may understand his reaction, through his historical and sociological 
path. In fact Munteh Ndula is a Cameroonian  of  29  who  graduated  at  University of 
Yaounde II and was appointed as SDF generally secretary in September 2006 (Suffo, 2009). 
The reference of the precarity of employment in his social condition  illustrate the situation of 
huge number of young people in the Cameroonian job market. Therefore his relative early 
membership as SDF member could be undestood as a disillusion brought by the Biya regime 
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but also as an outcome of identity politics. Such reasons for his involment in politics and 
latter his justification to quit the SDF pictures Cameroonian politics as roughly physical, 
economical, social and cultural survival. But after all his desertion lies in the patron client-
relationship typical of neo-patrimonial system, where vertical accountability is a matter of 
ensuring favours and benefits, often at the expense of public concerns and resources 
(Lindberg, 2003 :123). Thus in the dawn of the presidential election of 2011 , it is therefore  
quite easy to understand the  shift of political membership illustrated by  collective desertion 
of 2000 UNDP’s  supporters in Mayo Danay (Northern Cameroon) in November 2009  
joining the the ranks of CPDM (Kankili, 2009). In this context it is a real challenge to find a 
public figure  in Cameroon who is not a  member of  the CPDM  or a secret client of the 
regime, those who might deserve such features are usually not on the spotlight or far from the 
national political arena.Therefore the great dominance of the Biya regime had  serioulsy 
impacted on  the quality of leadership in all spheres of the society but less on its architecture. 
In this regard Nyamnjoh(2009 :4) argues that : 
The ambition of dominance have only resulted in power without responsibility, and  in arrogant 
insenssitivity to the predicaments of ordinary Cameroonians by those who claim to lead.With even 
a critical elite increasingly opting for shortcuts to power, privilege and comfort, ordinary 
Cameroonians are left at the mercy of poverty and an insensitive state. 
Drawing the schemata of the traditional structure of the leadership in postcolonial Cameroon, 
Gabriel (1999 :6) in reference to the earlier work of Pierre Flambeau Ngayap ( 1983) opines 
that there are two levels of elite integration: a‘ macroequilibre geopolitique’ and a ‘ 
microdosage regional’. At the macro-level the ‘presidence’, the cabinet and especially the 
‘ministre d’etats’ have at all times been composed of representatives of all major regions and 
ethnic groups.The appointments of both speakers of English and French to important posts 
definitively bridges the francophone-anglophone gap. Ahidjo and Biya , both francophone, 
have often chosen English-speaking prime ministers or vice presidents. ‘Microdosage’ is 
effective at the provincial level, where the more important positions are deliberately assigned 
to representatives of all ‘department‘. Moreover, and in order to promote integration, regional 
provincial offices are often headed by non local. That structure has been modified  by the 
Biya regime when encountering the political turmoil of the Biya- Ahidjo transition and the 
advent of political liberalization in 1990s. For instance, Nyamnjoh (1999 :6) notes that the 
policy and politics of ethnic balance instituted by Ahidjo have been perfected by Biya. He  
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notes that in effect the policy is less about diverting attention from real to imagined problem 
and causes. Either a civil servant appointed to high office or as are merely aspiring to such 
office, you are made to understand that the system or more clearly the head of state is of 
boundless benevolence and that you have the head of state to thank for any appointment, but 
yourself and those of your ethnic group to blame for the lack of any appointment. This policy 
relegates the power for struggle to the regions, while the system epitomised by the president 
play regional or ethnic group against each other. Thus under the the system of regional and 
ethnic balance presidentials elections are not really concerned about voting for the -president 
but more a test of the popularity of the party elite in their various regions. Nyamnjoh and 
Rowlands, (1998:320) argues that the influence elites exert in their home regions depends on 
the respect they gain in local politics for their knowledge and influence over external affairs. 
The focus is put on the  fact that the extent to which the urban elites will play a significantt 
role in defining a regional identity for their home area depends on the resources they bring 
with them and the incentives that encourage them mobilise local suppoters. Therefore they 
(Rowlands and Warnier) realized that during the Ahidjo’s regime in the 1960s and 1970s, 
there was much less reason for elite to remain attached to their home area. The search for 
regional ethnic loyalities was not tolerated by the  authoritarian interest of the centralized 
administration with which elites were encouraged to identify as their source of patronage. In 
contrast the political liberalization has acknowledged the change of the role of elite 
associations. Once interrested only in promoting local interests through the language of 
development , the elite associations tend now to reinvent or rework ethnic loyalities as part of 
political mobilisation of regional support to gain advantage in the national politics arena 
(Nyamnjoh and Rowlands,1988 :223-224). Considering the resurgence of identity politics in 
Cameroon ,one could expect a greater accountability of the leaders or better concerns about 
the interests of the people by them, unfortunately it is not the case. Nyamnjoh ( 2000 :12) 
claims that : 
The power elite in Africa have been contaminated by the hauting  rapacity of high office and / or 
prominence (cf, Russel,1999). Almost everywhere on the continent,people seek power in order to 
empty public coffers into private pockets. They take refuge under public interest banner to pursue 
personal goals with capitalist impunity.Thus it is not unusual to find African leaders doing abroad 
what they consider not feasible in ‘ our young generation’.Public owernership and control in good 
in Africa because of limited resources, but some African leaders can afford  money not only to buy 
43 
 
personal shares and stocks in foreign companies, but sometimes to own or take over these 
companies.               
In the same path Gabriel notes (1999:23-27) that with its pre-modern elite more interrested to 
comsumption rather than production, Cameroon suffers from a ‘ triangle of poor governance’ 
namely: Excessive governance, bad governance and non governance. By excessive 
governance, the sheer size of Cameroonian bureaucracy is meant and directly related, 
cumbersome procedures and unnecessary red tape. The bad governance refers to incomptence 
and corruption while the non-governance means the collapse of some sectors of the public 
administration due to the unavailability of officials busy with trips in home area or seminar or 
tourism abroad. In the same way , after a critique of the victimhood of African elite, his love 
for consumption and hatred for science and technology,  Axelle Kabou (Kabou quoted in 
Delville, 1991 :231) offers a picture of  contemporary Africa and Cameroon at the same time 
, dealing with the potential for change but also with the drivers of conflicts. 
 
2.3.6 EXPERIENCING THE SO CALLED ‘CIVIL SOCIETY’ IN CAMEROON 
 
The civil society-centered approach was the continuum of the liberalization introduced by the 
World Bank and other donors, who viewed it as one way  of disciplining inefficient and 
corrupt states and forcing through a participatory governance options on the basis of 
democracy and transparency (Mbuagbo and Akko, 2004:1). The so called ‘civil society’ in 
Cameroon matches with the neo-patrimonial and local cultural practices rather than its 
western alter ego , from whom it borrows its meaning and significance. Cox (2002:36) notes 
that:  
 
‘Civil society’, like the state is also in origin a Eurocentric concept. Initially it referred to the 
bourgeois order. The realm of private interests which the state existed to regulate in the general 
interest. Now civil society is seen as being distinct from both state and corporate powering so far 
as these two are perceived to be integrated in a comprehensive authority structure. The term civil 
society is now more commonly reserved for autonomous groups (autonomous in relation to both 
state and corporate power) capable of expressing and pursuing collective aims of social 
improvement and emancipation. Some of these groups aim to influence state policy some have 
humanitarian, ecological or peace concerns at the global level, and some organize protection and 
welfare at the local level. 
44 
 
 
In Cameroon Gifford (1997) states that civil society was quickly and speedily expunged from 
the political scene by Ahidjo’s regime that made virtually impossible for forces to emerge 
beyond those of ‘la presidency’. In the light of Ahidjo’s model of single party state, Paul Biya 
has come out with a politically ambitious but degenerative ‘majorite presidentielle’, equally 
designed to forestall any divergent political discourse on the future of Cameroon. Stressing 
the difficulty to adapt the civil society concept in the Cameroonian society, Mbuagbo and 
Akoko (2004:6) reports that: 
 
Similarly, the uncontrolled and almost anarchic creation of local NGOs, which are meant to serve 
as agent not only for the distribution of western aid, but also to tunnel such aid in private bank 
accounts, is indicative of the fact that civil society is a misappropriated model. Most remain 
narrow in scope and familial in character. A cursory observation of NGO activities in Cameroon 
reveals that many operate in ‘suitcases’ and function only on ad hoc basis (that is when fund are 
made available) because they lack rudimentary administrative structures and personnel to enable 
them function. 
 
Lieres (1999:141-142), reviewing the book of Mahmood Mamdani titled ‘Citizen and 
Subject: Contemporary Africa and The legacy of Late Colonialism’ provides a useful insight 
for the understanding of African civil society. He [Lieres] argues that Mamdani’s theoretical 
point of departure lies in a critique of both structuralist and post-structuralist theoretical 
frameworks. According to Mamdani structuralist approaches such as dependency theory view 
social reality through a series of binary opposites and understand anomalies as deviations. 
Post- structuralist theories are important because they offer a critique of structuralist-inspired 
binary opposites such as the normal and the abnormal, the civilized and the savage. However, 
in their attempt to de- exoticize Africa and to banalize it, the latter rob African history of any 
specificity. Therefore the objective of Mamdani is to overcome this impasse by arriving at 
synthesis of both approaches. Mamdani notes that civil society and ‘civic’ citizenship under 
colonialism were first and foremost the realms of the (largely white) colons. He notes that 
under the colonial state, the rights of free associations, free speech, and political 
representation, were the right of citizens under direct rule, and not of the subjects indirectly 
ruled by a customarily organized tribal authority. As a result power came to be crystallized 
through a series of dual encounters between direct and indirect rule that evolved into 
complementary ways of controlling the disenfranchised ‘subject’ majorities. Direct rule was 
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the form of urban civil power. It was about granting rights-based privileges to citizens. 
Indirect rule signified a rural tribal authority. It was incorporating natives into a state-
enforced customary order. The state was encompassing by two forms of power, one urban, 
speaking the language of civil society and civil rights and another one rural speaking the 
language of community and culture. Civil power claimed to protect individual rights; 
customary power claimed to protect custom, tradition and communal rights. The logic behind 
the politics of civil rights was the classical Eurocentric assumption of a universal agent with 
universal civilizing mission. Civil rights and the rule of law were applied to ‘citizens’ as they 
were seen to represent a universal agent. Yet, at the same time, there was little evidence that 
white administrators believed that there would be some point in history at which the civil law 
would be extended to all. Rather, what existed was a vast array of attempts to institutionalize 
the relation between both regimes of power. There seemed to be in the minds of colonial 
administrators no contradiction between both regimes of power. According to Mamdani there 
has not been a single peasant uprising that has not been ethnic in character and the anti- 
colonial struggle was first and foremost a struggle against the hierarchy of the colonial state. 
He argues that the postcolonial states failed to break the distinction between citizen and 
subject, that they retained a regime of differentiation while de-racializing the colonial state. 
 
In contrast Nyamnjoh (2005:26) call attention to the tendency for African and Cameroonians 
especially to be both ‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ for strategic politico-economic and cultural 
affairs. He notes that, although critical of simplistic dichotomies and ‘history by analogy’, 
Mamdani (1996:12-13) avoided the trap himself and fails to remain consistent to his idea of 
‘history as a process’. According to Nyamnjoh ‘his world is one of neat dichotomies because 
he relies too much on the structure of the state rather than a sociological reality on the 
ground’. Thus with a strict distinction between citizen and subject, Mandani’s argument 
might be persuasive as an analytical distinction, but the reality on the ground, the sociology 
or the anthropology of the living Africans remains something else. Following the view point 
of Nyamnjoh, Mbembe (1996:148) put emphasis on the cultural ‘politics of connivance’. He 
names a constellation of orthodox, clandestine and often criminal practices (fake documents, 
secret meetings, simulacra...etc) adopted by the Cameroonians to encounter the precarity of 
the poscolony and protest against the state violence. 
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In the light of the moral economy of power in Benin, Richard Banégas (1989:75-87), shows 
how the citizens of this country manipulate the clientelist networks during the periods of 
elections. Beninian citizens pretend to ‘sell’ their vote to the politician who can pay the 
highest price. The ‘market of votes’ is a simulacra of honours, where the citizens play the role 
of the subjects supporting any potential clients (politicians), hoping to get the maximum of 
benefits from him. After getting money or gifts from politicians, these citizens remain free to 
vote for the politician they really like. Often the ethnic identity and their perception of the 
client’s morality influence the vote rather than the gifts they received only during the 
electoral rally. The citizens of Benin consider the period of election as the right time where 
politicians can reimburse all the money they ‘stole’ from their constituents. The situation 
described in Benin is representative of some facets of the Cameroonian reality. Also 
representative is the situation described by Hansen (2003: 202-224 in the Northern 
Cameroon, emphasising the indigenisation of the concept democracy as ‘obedience to 
superior’ to legitimate the relationship of dominance between the traditional authorities, the 
official and the Cameroonian subjects and citizens. In such context, rhetoric inspired from the 
traditional values about generosity and brotherhood is used both by traditional and state 
officials to reinforce the clientelistic network and sustain the dominance of the ruling party in 
a context of multi party. 
 
Analyzing the political identity of the Aluund of the upper Kwaango in Kinshasha and 
Kikwit, Filip de Boeack argues that the Zairean citizens did not identify themselves as 
passive subjects of the regime in power but do retain their agency through the field of art, 
press, or spirituality to name but a few  (Lieres, 1999:145).  Following the same path in an 
analysis of cartoons in Cameroon , Mbembe (1996,160-165) shows how the artists take over 
the power of public imagination by representing the autocrat as a ‘thing’ in order to 
undermine his reputation. However as he points out in the postcolony there is no lawsuit for 
such initiative which might reinforce its ability to influence. Therefore because he believes 
that in such context, artists rather than weakening the standing of the autocrat, intensify its 
presence with the risk to obscure their own artworks; Mbembe argues that the first effect of 
the loss of total control by the autocrat (president) would have been to put him out of sight by 
so arranging things that he ceases to be on the spotlight. On the contrary, for Nyamnjoh 
(2005:227), the fact that President Biya or the autocrat in the words of Mbembe, dominates 
the discussions of current public affairs acknowledges how influential he is in the public 
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affairs. In the question if the cartoons make him less powerful which Mbembe seems to argue 
that his power would diminish if the public were less preoccupied with him in this way. In 
contrast Nyamnjoh argues that it is important to pay attention on the very negative terms in 
which the autocrat is portrayed which obviously has a greater effect than if the artist were 
simply to ignore him as if he did not exist. Similarly, examining the relationship between 
musicians and political power in Cameroon, Nyamnjoh and Fokwang (2005:262) notes that if 
some popular musician has been inclined to adopt the ‘politics of connivance; others remains 
critical of the regime as he suggests:  
 
Critical music in tune with popular expectations is not limited to the most disfavoured regions of 
the country. Even among the Beti, whose Bitkusi music has been given greater prominence on 
state television and radio by the sheer fact of association with President Paul Biya, not all the 
voices have heaped praise on the regime. Critical bitkutsi songs have arisen among local 
performers to challenge complacency and support for President Biya, ‘a son of the soil’ who has 
repeatedly failed to deliver on promise even to his own ethnic kin. 
 
Still the use of the state/society distinction is problematic because the Cameroonian state as 
well as other state in Africa is rarely the sole holder of power (Mbembe, 1992). For Bayart 
(1983:110) society and state do not belong to the same episteme in Africa. Each of these 
social units has its own logic. According to him civil society is plural and heterogeneous, and 
it is not automatically organized according to one specific structure. Civil society is not only 
the realm of associations (i.e. syndicate, churches) but also a sphere of  what he called ‘les 
modes populaires d’actions politiques’ (popular mode of political action, my translation). 
Therefore Bayart ( 1983: 100) provides a definitions of civil society more compatible with 
the Cameroonian experience of civil society when he notes: 
 
 
Besides, the civil society does not get organized automatically around a particular and unique 
structure which would allow to represent it and to characterize it; it is by nature plural and - we 
shall come back there- it recuperates heterogeneous practices in which a possible unification is 
constructed. Finally, the civil  society is not the expression of the only subordinated social groups: 
popular political modes of action are recovering from it (and it will be them who will keep the 
bulk of our attention), but in the same capacity as steps of groups which, to be socially 
predominant (as the dealers, the businessmen, the religious representatives), are nevertheless 
excluded from the direct management of political power( my translation ). 
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In fact this definition highlights the informal mode of civil actions which the Western 
understanding of civil society ignores or neglects. Furthermore it points out the agency of the 
citizens within the historical structures of the post colonial state. For Henry Lefebvre such 
underground movements (masses of excluded) creates an autonomous space of free 
expression through the interstices free from state violence (Bayart, 1983:98). This kind of 
reaction of the masses of excluded is partly explained by the hybridity effect6  of postcolonial 
state, understood by Bertrand Badie (1992) as a juxtaposition of different actions and 
discourses without homogeneity which create diverse reactions often contradictory. In 
conclusion we agree with Filip de Boeck who argues that contemporary African politics is 
not so much about contest, resistance and conflict with the state, as about attempts to use the 
state, to collaborate with it and to invade its space in order to further one’s own objectives. 
Rather than hegemony and resistance the new politics is about adaptation, accommodation 
and collaboration (Lieres, 1999:46).  
  
                                                 
6 the effect of hybridization can be envisaged only as effect of composition of actions (...) in which neither its 
homogeneity, nor its conscious character can be postulated ': ' If it is clear that certain actors of  the receiving 
societies react to riot caused by the importation of foreign models, it can be argued that-without big risk of  
making  a  mistake-  their reactions are various, contradictory, and that it would be miraculous that they lead to 
such functional and so consistent syntheses (Badie, 1992:224). 
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CHAPTER 3: NEGATION OF MARTYRDOM, SEDUCTION OF 
ILEGALITY7, PRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATION OF 
REBELS’ SUBJECTIVITIES8 
 
3.1 THE MEANING OF REBELLING 
 
‘Die pour rien’ it is one of those myriad of expressions which the urban youth in Cameroon 
use to express the reality of their life and death through a language called Camfranglais. 
Camfranglais is the language of the street in the cities of Yaoundé and Douala. According to 
Kiessling and Mous (2004:306), it is used predominantly by the male youth between the ages 
of ten and thirty-five in informal context. Its name , a blend of Cameroon, ‘Francais’ and 
‘Anglais’ acknowledges its composition as basically French with many items from Pidgin 
English and from several Cameroonian languages. They notes that while Cameroonian Pidgin 
arose because of the need to find a medium of communication among people speaking 
different languages, the origin of Camfranglais lies on the desire to have a secret code that 
excludes outsiders and at the same time the desire of the community speech to have some 
fun. As many of those expressions, ‘die pour rien ‘ has a specific meaning in the 
Cameroonian context , escaping from the literal explanation which any French or English 
speaking person can relate to. In fact ‘die pour rien’ means an unnatural death .In Cameroon, 
young people often say ‘Il est ‘die pour rien’ which means his death has been unnatural or 
more specifically he has been killed. ‘Pourquoi veux tu que je die pour rien?’ which means 
why do you want me to be killed or why do you wish my unnatural death? It is well known 
that in Cameroon ‘personne ne veut die pour rien ‘(no one wants to be killed or no one wishes 
for himself an unnatural death). The paradox is that the death in Cameroon is often seen as 
                                                 
7 I understand the state of Illegality as mode for establishing and authenticating the exercise of power over 
economic relations and forms of wealth, giving to political subjects who are one subjected to governmental 
relations and actives subjects within their realm ( Roitman,2006:264). 
8My understanding of subjectivity is drawn from Fokwang  (2008:158 ) , when he states: ‘By subjectivity, I 
refer to social actors’ thoughts, sentiments, and embodied sensibilities, and especially their sense of self and 
self-world relations (Holland and Leander, 2006 : 127). Subjectivities involves making choices about one’s 
identities as well as resisting those identities that are imposed by others or outsiders (Brettell and Sargent 206:4) 
‘ 
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unnatural, there is always someone who is suspected to be responsible for such a thing. In this 
respect Rowlands and Warnier (1988:123) gloss Geshiere's (1982) observation based on his 
study of the relationship between village communities and the post-colonial state among the 
Maka of south-eastern Cameroon devoting attention on sorcery. According to these scholars: 
 
In a ‘subsistence economy’ with fairly low productivity and little availability surplus, social life is 
perceived as zero sum game: what someone possesses must be appropriate at the expense of 
someone else. Having many wives means taking them away from other men. If someone has many 
goats or a bountiful harvest of yams or groundnuts, it is believed that he or she has sucked the 
fertility out of the livestock or field of someone else. This is often expressed as cannibalistic 
metaphor: someone has ‘eaten’ the life, the health, the crops, and the wealth of his neighbour. The 
wealthy will have to take this into consideration and should people experience misfortune or die 
among  his kin and  neighbours, such accusations may materialise. 
 
So it is common to hear during the funerals that ‘on la vendu’ (he has been sold). ‘ On l’a 
vendu ‘ means at least three things in the Cameroonian context, literally its means that 
something has been sold  but in Camfranglais it is sarcasm or just an exclamation which 
means that someone has been ‘eaten’ through the use of withes by his relatives. It also means 
that someone has been betrayed. Therefore ‘die pour rien’ is the unnatural death of someone 
who has been ‘eaten9’ or betrayed by his relatives10 (the members of his kinship or a close 
friends).  ‘Die pour rien ‘ evokes two dimensions of the causes of death , the visible through 
the betrayal and the invisible through witchcraft .In this evocation there is a dialectical 
relationship between the visible cause of death and the invisible. The betrayal keeps its literal 
                                                 
9 Nocturnal ‘bad’ sorcery, expressed as cannibalistic metaphor, is found everywhere in this area ( East of 
Cameroon). Most African languages, and all the Bantu ones, make a lexical distinction between eating-
swallowing soft and ground food on the one hand and eating that involves cutting and chewing on the other 
(Rowlands and Warnier, 1988:122) 
10  In general, witchcraft is supposed to thrive in relations that are marked by a mixture of intimacy and 
inequality. Witchcraft is often closely related to kinship or in any case to intimacy: elsewhere we characterized 
it as ‘the dark side of kinship’ (Geshiere, 1997). In many societies, the ‘witchcraft of the house’ is seen as the 
most deadly form of occult aggression; the origin of occult attacks is sought primarily within the victim’s 
intimacy, and curing the victim mostly requires a meeting or at least the collaboration of the members of the 
family (see de Rosny, 1987). Yet witchcraft is also generally related to inequality: on the one hand, to the envy 
of the poor who try to remind their richer ‘ brothers’ or ‘sisters’ of their family obligation; but, on the other 
hand, to the efforts of the rich and the powerful to protect  their superiority (Geshiere and Nyamnjoh,1998:72) 
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meaning, navigating therefore between the invisible cause of death and the visible. In this 
context  ‘die pour rien’ reveals a violence leading to death but stresses also the power hidden 
behind it. For instance between 1950-2000, Beninguissé and Koné (n.d: 104) notes a 
spectacular decrease in mortality, causing a life expectancy to increase from 36 years to 50 
years. However the age structure in 1976, 1987, and 1998 points out that young people 
remain the larger proportion of the population and consequently with a higher mortality rate 
(see figure 3). This demographic trend highlights the fact that the few people who enjoy the 
greater life expectancy (elders and parents) are often considered as sorcerers who have eaten 
the lives of  youngsters.                                                                                           
 
                                       Figure 3, source: Beninguissé and Koné (n.d:107) 
 
In their semiosis of the causes of death and the will to live, urban youth in Cameroon put the 
emphasis on the human agency while admitting the absolutism of death. Death is caused both 
by human beings and God. Human beings take a godlike character by causing the death of 
other. But the very fact that the death caused by human beings is perceived as unnatural in 
contrast to the death caused by God which is perceived as natural,  justifies the refusal of 
urban youth to die pour rien.  But also their  leitmotiv to rebel against the human 
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necropower11 despite the sentence of death which may  result directly from this kind of 
action. In this sense the godlike character of human beings is also an unmasked depiction of 
the state necropower and its materiality. This viewpoint is supports by the proposition of 
Rowlands and Warnier (1998:121) stating that ‘in the area under consideration , sorcery and 
power are perceived as the two sides of the same coin. As a result, power is ambiguous and 
any concentration of power in the hands of the state or local officials has to deal with this 
issue.’ Moreover, Simone (2005:523) reminds us that the Cameroonian state has managed to 
convinced many that ‘it rules by sorcery, that it is able to control through deploying invisible 
powers that take what is discernible to resident and connect it to unknown event, person and 
situations’. Rebelling for urban youth in Cameroon is therefore refusing to ‘die pour rien’, 
refusing to subjugate his life to  sorcerer’s necro-power (both  individuals and the state) and 
enjoying the benefits of their own death while living. The nature of this act of rebellion is 
political if we understood politics as death that live a human life (Mbembe 2003:14-15). 
  
Regardless of the fact that rebelling does not preserve the rebel’s life from the absolutism of 
death rather than risking to anticipate its term, it is neither a suicide nor a sacrifice per se. It is 
a personal economy of one own death and life, in which the distance between the death and 
life is transformed as a space of agency and construction of identity where the sense of what 
is right and what is wrong is redefined for the sake of survival. In their (re)-discovery of ‘the 
life of the Spirit12’, urban youth in Cameroon engaged themselves in a self –self relationship, 
an ethical relation which according to Foucault must struggle to invent the terms by which it 
will relate itself to others. Such term are not ready-made, they are not simply prescribed as a 
part of moral (Murray, 2006:210).Following this idea, urban youth’s acts of rebellion can be 
better appreciated through the prism of politics viewed in the words of Bataille as a spiral 
transgression , a difference that disorients the very idea of the limit (Mbembe,2003:16). 
 
                                                 
11 David Theo Goldberg notes that the necropower can take multiple forms: the terror of actual death; or a more 
benevolent forms , the result of which is the destruction of a culture in order to ‘save people’ from themselves 
(Mbembe,2003:22) 
12 According to Hegel the Life of the Spirit is not that life which is frightened of death and spares itself 
destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives with it (Mbembe, 2003:12). 
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3.2 THE STATIST PRODUCTION OF HISTORY AND THOSE WHO 
‘DIE POUR RIEN’: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR  PUBLIC 
COGNITION 
 
 
Thirty years after direct colonization, it is already known that the African state is engaged into an 
enterprise of production of time, manipulation of  memory and re-creation of  historical facts. It is 
also known that this refabrication of the history connects conflicts for social production and 
hegemonic control (Mbembe, 1991:93, my translation). 
 
The fact that the means of political violence has never succeed to overthrown any regime 
colonial or postcolonial in Cameroon have been in favour of the writing of a particular 
version of the political history unfaithful to the facts it describes and reinforcing the 
hegemony of the ruling elite. The postcolonial regimes in Cameroon eluded some violent 
episodes of the political history able to question his legitimacy and shaped an archetype of 
martyrdom in the public cognition. Crisis Group (2010:25) argues that ‘harrowing memories 
of guerrilla war of 1950s remain and are often handed down through families (with the advice 
to “ not get involved in politics”)’. Moreover the regimes of Ahidjo and Biya with the support 
of France have done everything to erase the traces of this movement in collective memories 
therefore discouraging if not forbidding any culture of martyrdom at the national level. In fact 
the movement of national liberation, UPC despite his prominence in Cameroon in the pre-
independence period and his struggle against the colonial power never took the lead of the 
country. Cressent (2003:1) notes that the book of Mongo Beti (one of the most famous 
Cameroonian writer) called Autopsie D’une Décolonisation (1972), focus on the trial of 
Ernest Ouandié Ndogmo ( a nationalist militant of UPC) denouncing both the Cameroonian 
dictatorship and the French connivance have been censored in France just after its 
publication. De Baets (2002:89-90) notes a couple of examples following this line. In March 
1985, a decree announced that it was forbidden to import, possess, sell, distribute or circulate 
a book of essay by Ruben Um Nyobe a leading figure of the nationalist movement edited by 
the historian Achille Mbembe. This book was censored because it discussed the pre-
independence nationalist uprising led by Um Nyobe and violently put down first by the 
French army and then by the Cameroonian army. In Gaulist Africa: Cameroon Under 
Ahmadu Ahidjo (Enugu, 1978), a book on the post independence dealing with repression laws 
and edited by historian Richard Joseph was confiscated in a police raid on the Yaoundé 
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university bookshop. According to De Beats the name of Ahmadou Ahidjo president in 1960-
82 have been systematically eliminated from text and speeches because of its alleged 
implication in the attempted coup of 1984. In 1994, the 6th  April edition of the newspaper Le 
Messager carried a cover story of the tenth anniversary of the 1984 failed coup attempt was  
banned by a province governor for ‘disturbing public order’. In relation to that censorship,  
Jua and Nyamnjoh (2002:58) argue that:  
 
The pervasive academic censorship exhausts and defeats most Cameroonian scholars. Pessimistic 
about their ability to provide innovative and convincing answers to Cameroon's present malaise, 
far too many become preoccupied with upward social mobility. Their ambition is fuelled by the 
media, especially state-run print and electronic media. Political intellectuals appear on television 
programs such as "Dimanche Midi," "Cameroon Calling," and "The Debate" and have contributed 
enormously to the growth of what might be called a "heteronomous culture" in Cameroon-that is, a 
culture of expertise validated by the mass media. Among other payoffs of this strategy has been 
the selection of these sorts of people to act as "Chargés de Missions" for CPDM campaign teams, 
positions that in turn increase in their visibility. 
 
Thus we can argue that the nationalists who perished for the sake of national independence 
‘die pour rien’ because neither their ideals have been respected genuinely nor their memories 
honoured. The negation of a culture of martyrdom has been also illustrated during the 
students revolt of the 1990s in Cameroon. Trying to investigate the drivers of youth revolt in 
postcolonial Africa , Diouf  (2003:3-4) says that early in the independence, African political 
cultures made use of both pre-colonial communitarian resources i.e. African values,  the 
practices of administrative modernity and postcolonial politics in order to redefine the 
meaning of young people and youth. Thus the post-colonial project intended to go beyond an 
ethnology/anthropology concerned with rituals of initiation and socialization to sociology 
focused on the generational and sexual division of labour and on social economic 
mobilization. According to him, in its cultural and political versions, the nationalist project 
sought to do two things: to maintain the frontier between elders and juniors that characterized 
traditional African values, and to put young people at the core of its plans for economic 
development and national liberation. Youth represented not only the hope of African nation 
under construction but also the chief actor in African societies’ struggle against 
underdevelopment, poverty, misery and illiteracy. As both subjects and objects of training 
and mobilization, young people incarnated the future and was the representation of the 
promise of restored identity, both national and pan- African, as opposed to the colonial 
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alienation and postcolonial forms of domination and subordination. Diouf argues that as 
bearers of the twofold project of modernity and the return to the source of African cultures, 
they were seen as the promoters of political and moral obligations of citizenship and of 
political, social, and cultural responsibility, with a view to construct African democracies. 
The results of these approaches were a conception of youth that relied heavily on cultural 
prestige and transformation of African societies. He [Diouf] notes that paradoxically, youth 
achieved this status only because they were considered as channelled and supervised by 
adults.  
 
Nonetheless Simone (2005:518) stresses that a huge number of urban youth in Africa are 
disconnected from both the post-independence narratives of national development and the 
collective social memories that had established an interweaving of individuals life histories 
with the prospective and ‘eternal return of ancestral knowledge. The failures of the 
nationalistic project marked in Cameroon by economic crisis of 1980s had a dreadful effects 
on youth but the political liberalization of the 1990s opened a door for youth to voice their 
grievances about the poor living and studying condition on campus . In his examination of 
student revolts at the University of Yaoundé-the only university institution until the 1993 
university reform-Konings (2002:181) points out that: 
 
While Cameroonian university students share most of the grievances expressed by their 
counterparts in other West-central African states, they appear to have played a somewhat different, 
and to a certain extent exceptional, role in the political liberalization process. Although political 
liberalization offered them the opportunity to organize to defend their interests, it also tended to 
divide them along ethno-regional lines. This led to the intensification of the simmering tensions 
between two groups of students: the ‘autochthonous’ Bêti students who tended to support the 
ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) on the other hand, and the Anglophone 
and Bamiléké ‘stranger’ students who were more inclined to support the major opposition party, 
the Social Democratic Front (SDF), on the other. 
 
In effect the configuration of the conflict during the political liberalization follows the 
schemata of the social space in Cameroon defended by Luc Sindjoun (n.d.:61-62). According 
to him the Cameroonian social space seems to be represented mainly but not exclusively by 
three geopolitical spaces: The anglo-bami space structured around the SDF and binds by the 
common grassfield culture of the people of Northwest and Southwest provinces. The Beti 
space, the most fragmented dominated by the ruling party and a culture called ‘pahouine’. 
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And finally the space dominated by the Fulbé and located between the Adamaoua and the 
Benoué. Sindjoun adds that these social spaces despite their national vocation are not 
homogeneous and there is also a process of reconfiguration of these social spaces by criminal 
networks. Through that  perspective, we can argue that the student revolts of 1994 followed 
merely the existing channels of the mainstream politics in Cameroon to express their 
grievances and defend their interests. Such attitude acknowledges a great degree of youth 
sympathy for the ethno-political ideologies of political organizations pro or against the 
government.  
 
Furthermore Konings (2002:192-199) notes that the repression of the student protests 
(parliament13) by the soldiers and the Bêti militia have been illustrated by an unprecedented 
degree of violence on campus. Reportedly, 218 students were arrested, but there were 
contradictory reports about the number of deaths, disappearances and injuries. However the 
minister of information and culture and government spokesman, Augustin Kontchou 
Kouomegni began swift rise to prominence in the regime and notoriety in the opposition by 
claiming ‘zero mort’ [no deaths].Realizing that the population was shocked after this bloody 
event, the government appointed a committee which while critical of the role of university 
authority and the law enforcement conclude that there were: ‘no deaths, no rapes, no 
disappearances’. Similarly to the failure of the opposition party to impose the national 
conference through ghost town, the ghost campus didn’t bring a considerable change 
concerning the living and the studying conditions on the campus but stopped finally with the 
deteriorated morale of the strikers. In effect the arrest and the dismissal of the revolt’s 
leaders, the deaths of many strikers but more importantly the public misrecognition of those 
deaths illustrates a statist production of a version of the history negating a culture of 
martyrdom in Cameroonian society. Additionally the fact that throughout the Cameroonian 
history the political violence has been unable to bring a substantial change , opened the door 
to the development of different kind of forms of rebellion more subtle and often illegal. Diouf 
(2003:10)  claims that: 
 
Combining violence , madness and pleasure, sex and the temptations of the religious chastity, the 
desire for autonomy and the impulse to rip themselves away from the continent and to erase all 
                                                 
13 Group of students often of Bamileke or Anglophone origins revolting against the authorities during the ghost 
campus. 
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attachment to history and place, young Africans symbolize the uneven trajectory of Africa in 
search of its rhythm and its identity. 
 
Further Fokwang (2006:76) notes the way urban young people  (students of the cities of 
Yaoundé and Limbé) negotiate their citizenship in the contemporary Cameroon was not 
homogeneous. In broad perspective he identifies three categories. This categorization is in 
agreement with the trajectories drawn by students in the realm of African politics as asserts 
by Koning (1997:2): 
 
Besides the rebels, there are students who tend to conform to the state model  of student behaviour 
which the president of Cameroon, Paul Biya, defined in 1991 as follows: ‘La politique aux 
politiciens, l’école aux écoliers’ (Konnig, 2002). They usually project themselves as responsible 
students who refuse to participate in any form of student activism, claiming that they have no 
interest than advancing their academic careers. In addition, there are students who are designated 
as victims and predators alike. Unlike the rebels, they still appear to have faith in the state as a 
vehicle for upward mobility. They remain to the group of  citizens that , as Bratton (1989:414-15) 
has acutely observed’ remain drawn to the state, because even in diminished circumstances, it 
remains a major source of spoils an one of the available channels for getting what little there is to 
get’.  
 
In the first category according to Fokwang we find  therefore individuals or members of 
groups who aspired to or saw themselves as an elite in –waiting that is as ‘ protégés’ of  the 
ruling regime. The individuals portray their transition to adulthood as an easy process 
facilitated further by their strategic connection to the state institutions and high officials. 
Secondly, individuals or groups who were scrupulous in their attempt to draw a line between 
themselves and the state but would make use of any possibilities (either from the state or 
elsewhere) to negotiate their transition into adulthood and for recognition as citizens. In this 
category you can find a group called PRESBY (President Biya Youth), which is in fact the 
avatar of the committee for Self –Defense and the Bêti vigilantes who illustrated itself during 
the student revolt of 1996. According to Koning (2002:200) this new group which expresses 
its unshakable loyalty to President Biya, is composed mainly of university students and other 
sections of the educated youth either engaged in informal-sector activities or unemployed, 
including number of university graduates and dropouts. Finally, individuals whose struggle 
for transition into adulthood were framed with secessionist discourses or yearning to seek 
different kind of opportunities such as migration. In this category the members of the 
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Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL), its original leadership was made of Anglophone 
members of Parliament and its membership was composed of ‘young people who do not see 
any future for themselves and who would prefer to die fighting than continue to submit to the 
fate imposed on Southern Cameroon by la République du Cameroon’ (Koning,1997:10-13).It 
is important to note that this group distances itself from the SDF or Southern Cameroon 
National Council14 ( SCNC)  by its use of violence as a means of pressing home their 
demands.  In some extent this distinction reflects the disillusion of urban youth about the 
traditional political organizations and the way politics is practiced in Cameroon. The SCYL is 
seen by the Cameroonian government as the most dangerous Anglophone movement some of 
their members have been arrested for their criminal activities and another went into exile. 
 
The diversity of the paths of the student’s involvement in politics in Cameroon remind us the 
fragmentation of the civil domain in the country. But does not enable us to understand the 
revolts of Cameroonian urban youth beyond the structure of the traditional politics or the veil 
of overt resistance. Furthermore the violence of conversion15 upon the students influence 
their behaviour in a certain way which is not surely the same as those of the urban youth who 
have never being students or who did not spend a lot of time studying in the academy. The 
expectations of students from the state could be higher than those who don’t have the same 
academic background as well as their faith in the system. Therefore the use of violence by 
educated youth could be slightly different from the one of those who are not educated. As a 
result the high schooling rate during the 1987 and 1998 –if we consider that it implies a high 
number of students attending universities- the huge number of youth, coupled with the 
economic crisis16 may explained some aspects of the political violence of 1990s in Cameroon 
(Urdal, 2006 ; see figure 4 and 5).  
                                                 
14  This organization is the mouth piece of the critical wing of Anglophone minority ( Nyamnjoh and 
Koning,2000:6) 
15 The essentially violent, externally- and internally-driven initiatives and processes to domesticate or harness, 
transform, alter, remodel, adapt, or reconstruct Africa and Africans through schools and universities to suit new 
ways of being, seeing, doing, and thinking, from colonial times to the postcolony  (Jua and Nyamjnoh:2002:3). 
16 The economic dependency ratio went from 0.89 in 1976 to 0.99 in 1987. In other words, in 1976, a working 
person supported on average less than one non working-person, whereas in 1987, one person was supported. 
Between 1991 and 1998, the weight of the working population and the economic dependency ratio stabilized. 
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                         Figure 4, source: Beninguissé and Koné (n.d:107) 
 
However the heterogeneity (predator and victim) of youth association like PRESBY broadly 
informs the politics of connivance of  the postcolony and emphasises the need of a re-
redefinition of the term rebelling as I suggested early. The state violence has seriously re-
structured the subjectivity of urban youth in Cameroon and therefore influenced the creation 
of a kind of habitus17  borrowing and sharing its features with the mainstream social habitus 
but keeping a high degree of autonomy. This urban youth’s habitus has contributed to the 
enlargement of the social space not only of its transformation but of its exploitation through 
an eager of illegality rather than political violence and its domestication through spirituality 
and migration. 
                                                                                                                                                        
The potential burden of the working population is mainly due to the under 15 years.( Beninguissé and Koné 
,n.d:108-109) 
 
17 Habitus are generative principles of distinct and distinctive practices-what the worker ears, and especially the 
way he eats it, the sport he practices and the way he practices it,  his political opinions and the way he expresses 
them are systematically different from industrial owner’s corresponding activities. But Habitus are also 
classificatory schemes, principle of classification, principle of vision and division, different tastes. They make 
distinction between what is good and what is bad, between what is right and what is wrong, between what is 
distinguished and what is vulgar and so forth, but the distinctions are not identical (Bourdieu, 1998:8). 
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3.3 SURVIVING IN THE POSTCOLONY: REBELLING AS A 
LIFESTYLE 
 
Contrasting the logic of martyrdom and the logic of survival, Mbembe (2003:36-37) argues 
that terror is not on one side and death on the other, terror and death are at the heart of each. 
Based on the argument of Elias Canetti, he points out that: 
 
The survivor is the one who, having stood in the path of the death, knowing of many deaths and 
standing in the midst of the fallen, is still alive. Or, more precisely, the survivor is the one who has 
taken on a whole pack of enemies and managed not only to escape alive, but to kill his or her 
attackers. 
 
In the logic of survival ‘each man is the enemy of every other’ and the cost of my survival is 
calculated in terms of my capacity and readiness to kill someone else in the words of 
Mbembe. Here the act of killing keeps its literal sense but means also the betrayal in the 
context of Cameroon. In other side , according to the logic of martyrdom , the will to die is 
fused with the willingness to take the enemy with you, that is with closing the door on the 
possibility of life for everyone. In her analysis of the figure of the suicide bomber in the 
Middle East, Murray (2006) emphasises the rhetorical effects of his death on those who 
remained alive. While the suicidal deed can be read by the suicide bomber community’s as an 
act of hope for the victim’s community it is the death of a despaired person. A death which 
haunted their imaginary and continue to kill. In this regard the death per se is has no 
meaning, what is at stake is the interpretation put upon it by those who remained alive. Thus 
in the context of Cameroon two questions can be explored: Why shall I rebel till death if the 
audience which is supposed to benefits from my death is not able to read it as a martyrdom ? 
How shall I die in order to benefits from my own death ? In the first question,  the self is 
represented as a potential martyr questioning the significance of its projected recognition. In 
the second, the self assumes that it will die but engage itself in an economy of its own death? 
Therefore view the negation of the culture of martyrdom in Cameroon it is almost sure that 
the self will be less prone to a meaningless action or ‘die pour rien’. The response to the 
second question deal with the logic of survival while admitting the absolutism of death. 
Those two questions and their answers are connected, they depict a gradual way to 
interrogate the same reality and inform about the habitus the one who is rebelling. 
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In his study of the urban youth in Douala, de Rosny (2002) notes the eager of social condition 
among them and equates its pursuit to migration’s attempts, practice of feymania and 
Pentecostalism. What he termed ‘les échappées’ are some means used by the urban youth to 
domesticate their difficult conditions of life or to escape physically or mentally the violence 
of the reality in Douala. The local terminology of migration offers an interesting insight to 
understand in depth the  modes of survival of urban youth. For the urban youth in Douala, to 
migrate means ‘aller au front’ (going to the battlefield).  ‘Aller au front’ can be understood 
like the readiness to die but also the will to survive. It implies that the journey leading to the 
projected destination will not be easy therefore only a soldier’s soul or the ‘Life of the Spirit’ 
could drive the migrant in order to reach his goals. Furthermore it is also a transgression of 
the prohibition to kill, a transgression of the legality not only during the journey to the 
intended destination but during the whole period of migrant’s life. Thus the shade of death 
behind the idea of migration reflects the way urban young people encode state violence and 
use it paradoxically as an energy to tame its ubiquity and to create or enlarge social space.  
 
Stressing the issue of state violence in Cameroon , Malaquais (2002) argues that  the 
instititution of the ‘commandement operationnel’ (Operational command or CO), a 
paramilitary body bringing together local and national police and armed forces in order to end 
to a wave of banditry during the years of economic crisis ( thefts, break-ins, car-jacking and 
murder) led to a process of reshaping Douala city with a vocabulary of death. According to 
him right at the beginning CO was well received both by poor and rich people. Before the 
government instituted CO  in the city’s many slums, men and women both had taken to 
lynching bandits because of the incapacity of the police to guarantee security. Very soon the 
activities of the CO started to go wrong. A huge number of people were being arrested. Entire 
neighbourhoods were being cordoned off and their youngsters taken in to CO post command . 
Malaquais says that for the people under the control of CO, two things happened: those 
arrested were being ransomed-made to buy their freedom- and many were being tortured. 
Many of the arrested disappeared. In the early days of the CO, bodies tortured and killed were 
positioned in highly strategic places by the army and police: at the most visited place like the 
colonial core of the city. The exhibition of the lifeless bodies of the victims of CO have been 
purposive, in so doing  the CO was trying to create a climate of fear and intimidation. As the 
number of death increased, a different approach was adopted. Corpses began to be 
systematically disposed of. They ( corpses) were dump around the city. Some of the masse 
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graves were discovered; other were the subject of hushed speculations and people began to 
speak about the burial sites as a circle of graves, ringing Douala. Sustained by the 
denunciation of the Archbishop of Douala (Christian Tumi) in a letter text in Le Messager,  
the geography of death became widespread rumours as Malaquais (2002:139) opines: 
 
This knowledge found expression in a series of renaming streets, plazas, dumps were given new 
names. Among these was a site located in the peripheral neighbourhood of PK 57.Here, a trench 
was uncovered, in which dozens of bodies had been piled. Once known as Mangoule, it was 
renamed ‘Montagne de sang ‘ ( Mountain of Blood ). In the neighbourhood of Bépanda, in April 
2001, nine young men arrested, alledgly for stealing a canister of cooking fuel, and murdered. 
Their remains were never found. This site, now infamous , was re-named Carrefour des Neuf 
Disparus (‘ Crossroads of the nine disappeared’) 
 
We suggest that the militarized terminology of migration in Francophone areas belongs to the 
vocabulary of death in Douala as a concept , but as a mode of action it draws the new lines of 
the geography of death of urban youth in the real world. Besides, the terminology of 
migration in the Anglophone cities of Cameroon make it clearer . ‘Falling in bush’ as it is 
called, it is Cameroonian pidgin phrase borrowing from ‘the indigenous notions of the odious 
and dangerous expedition into the black bush’ in the words of Fokwang (2006:84). According 
to the popular parlance, the black bush refers to a ‘forest’ far away from human settlement. It 
is a jungle of abundance par excellence, the area of mysterious entities, attractive to the 
daring but uncertain. For Argenti (2001:84) in the grassfield region personal status was 
achieved by hunting big game or success in the warfare located in the forest. He notes that:  
 
If  the forest could once be opposed to the village as a space of danger opposed to one of safety, 
nurture, and civilization, the fractured polity is now subject to modernist sources of danger which 
are no longer topographically distinct; the wild now breaches village boundaries as the state feeds 
upon itself, becoming its own monster. 
 
To ‘fall bush’ therefore means going to the black bush, not the one of the elders but the new 
‘black bush’ represented by Europe and North America (Fokwang, 2006:85).This tendency 
can be justify by the incapacity of the Cameroonian economy to absorb the population of 
unemployed youth but also by the inadequacy of the training offered by the national 
universities. This situation justify also at some points the diminution of the prestige of the 
figure of intellectual in the postcolony  which can be partly explained by the irrelevance of 
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the curricula of universities and the clientelistic practices of scholars as pointed by Nyamnjoh 
and Jua (2002).  
 
Richard Banégas and Warnier (2001: 6-8) on the other hand connect the degradation of the 
prestige of the intellectual in the postcolonial state with the rise of the new trajectories of 
accumulation of economic, social and political capital  epitomized by the figure of feyman, 
artist, athlete and religious leader or businessman. Those new role models do not reflect a 
complete autonomy but a kind of connivance with state apparatus. In Cameroon , if this point 
of view can be merely true for the athletes especially footballers, as it have been nicely put by 
Roger Milla - one of the best Cameroonian footballers and the best African football player of 
the last century- after scoring two goals against Romania in the world cup 1990: ‘Je suis un 
officier de reserve, fier de servir mon pays depuis vingt’ (Ramonet, 1996:29). For the other 
epitomes like artist and feyman, the argument of Banegas et al (2001) become seriously 
questionable (Nyamnjoh and Fokwang: 2005; Djio: 2008). Let us just insist in the next 
section on the figure of the feyman.  
 
Speaking about the feymania in Cameroon de Rosny (2002: 628-629) says that: 
 
I give him a place, because it reveals in a spectacular fashion the game of  invisible potency in the 
mental world of  youth. In the sense, it represents  a model of  transition between an escape abroad 
and an escape in the mystical world. It promises to the one one who practices it a greater  social 
upward, perhaps ephemeral but enough to make him think that he/she will gain  recognition just 
like in a daydream (my translation). 
 
For de Rosny,  the term feyman originates from the Cameroonian pidgin English. The feyman 
would be the fireman (‘homme de feu’). Fey originates from fire,  it means at the same time 
the blazing man and the one who blazes. In the traditional cosmology the fire represents an 
ambiguous and magical power. For example in Haiti the traditional healer in vaudou religion 
is called docte-fey. Exploring the rumour stating that all feyman come from New Bell, 
Malaquais (2002:142-144) reveals the raison d’être of this phenomenon and the determinants 
of its localization. In fact New Bell is a sprawling cluster of neighbourhoods southeast of the 
city’s colonial core, it is Douala’s poorest and most congested section. Its name come from 
the Bell dynasty , one of several Duala’s clans whose rulers in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries controlled trade networks linking Cameroon’s ivory and palm-rich interior with the 
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coast. As New Bell was taking shape, the tensions increased between the neighbourhood‘s 
first inhabitants mostly Duala and migrants from the grassfield region known as Bamiléké, 
representing 75 % of the population nowadays. New Bell has been at the centre of what the 
issue of autochthony/allogeny in Cameroon and  what has been called la question Bamiléké , 
concerning the economic hegemony of this ethnic group. Malaquais notes that the matter of 
alienation is central to any discussion of feymania or the commandement operationnel. Far 
from being an exclusivity of the Bamiléké’s practices, the phenomenon of feymania is pan-
ethnic. Still the first generation of feyman represented most famously by Donatien Koagne ( 
the most famous Cameroonian feyman)  himself counted among the plethora of young men of 
Bamiléké origin, a majority of whom had grown up in New Bell. This is to say that such 
phenomenon is due to the disastrous impact on poor urban youth of ever-worsening economic 
conditions in the 1980s and 90s.Malaquais (2002:145) argues that : 
 
It is from this context, of rural exile , demoralization and ever-worsening poverty, that feymania 
emerged. For Donatien, his colleague and those who sought to follow in their footsteps, the get-
rich-quick schemes for which feymania is infamous offered more than a way out. They were a 
form of revenge. French-style schooling, hard work, obeisance to the rules of chieftaincy and 
nation: these , young men had been told for generations, were the keys to success. Untrue half a 
century early, by the mid-1990s such admonitions, were laughable. Success was the stuff of ill-
gotten wealth and political patronage, lies, bribery, fraud. The means and methods used by feymen 
to acquire their fortune were those of the ruling elite- tools unavailable until then  to the common 
man , re-worked to fit his needs and the context at hand. 
 
Feymania defines a new aesthetic of social success borrowing from hip hop culture dress 
code to the neo classical portico demanding attention to the new bourgeoisie it represents. 
The practice of feymania reconfigured the Cameroonian economy and according to 
Malaquais it challenged the French sponsored elite and  the Biya’s regime. Roger Botte 
(2002:141) notes that the seduction of economic activities like feymania is reinforced because 
the lines of legal and illegal practices are blurred . While some feymen like Donation have 
benefited the support of some high ranking officials of the regime, feymania as whole  
experienced the disgrace of the ruling elite. Consequently the cohort of youth involved in this 
practice, have been the preferred target of the CO. Also intentionally or not those who 
suffered the most from it was the youth from Bamileke origins (Malaquais, 2002:148). One 
should take account of state violence among the factors which led the feymen to search new 
pasture outside the continent according to Djio (2008:11).  In fact the first factor was the 
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saturation of the African front. The second factor was growing setbacks of feymen and 419 
scammers in a number of African countries and the fact that many people was already aware 
of their old tricks. Finally, following the spectacular coups achieved by some notorious 
feymen and scammers in a number of African countries and the brutality of the response of 
local authorities. By exporting their expertise in Europe and North America, the feymen 
reinvented the global capitalism as Djio (2008:21-22) states that:  
 
Another critical aspect of this reinvention of global capitalism is its transmutation into a vast 
economy of illusion and simulacrum in which success in business ventures mainly depends on the 
‘ performance of the art of con games’ which involves stagecraft, impersonation, and those ‘ 
collusive fabrications’ as Apter ( 205: 228 would put it. In this moral economy of masquerade, 
delusion and semblance, the achievement of dirty tricks and economic malpractice also rest on 
one’s ability to cover one’s real project and activities, conceal one’s real motives and intention, or 
flout one’s true identity; in short to ‘wear the mask of appearance’ as Suzanne Brenner (1998) 
would say. 
 
In this sense the feymen is intimately what he represents, an admired figure of social success 
but also a crook. A victim of the state violence and other social injustices but a predator as 
well. If he can stimulate the desire to migrate as a source of hope  for urban youth because he 
is an overcomer of the odds of the ‘forest’, he can also  use the produced admiration as way 
to enrich himself. The feyman is both a sniper and a target: It is a survivor.  
 
‘In business it is dishonest to be honest because everybody is dishonest’ (Djio,2008:21).If 
this assertion can be considered as the maxim of feymen it is almost against all the beliefs of  
Pentecostal youth in Cameroon. however both Pentecostal and feyman  are concerned about 
the improvement of their economic situation. Therefore they represent different way to deal 
with the same reality on the ground. In effect Mbe (2002: 360-370) notes that the rise of 
Pentecostal churches during the years of economic crisis especially in the English speaking 
provinces of Northwest and Southwest of Cameroon. According to him several reasons 
explain the spread of Pentecostalism in Cameroon among urban youth. The first factor is  the 
fact that the Pentecostal  doctrine put an emphasis on salvation and justification by faith, the 
belief of the second coming of Jesus Christ, the stress on divine healing ,and the belief that 
the holy spirit empowers a Christian to live victoriously and to witness effectively and whose 
gift enables the believer to perform supernatural power. Secondly, the campaign of 
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evangelization run throughout the country has been a strong weapon to convert the 
unbelievers. Thirdly the economic opportunities provide by the building of facilities 
(churches, colleges) and a team of pastors who can only be benefited by a member of those 
churches. Fourthly contrary to the mainstream churches,  catholic and Presbyterian for 
instance, youth take the lead of strategic position in the organizational apparatus of the 
Pentecostal churches .Also the way the pastors preach and the style of music (soul, rap and 
reggae) play in those churches seduces the urban youth because of its shared features with the 
popular culture. Finally and maybe the most important for our study is the economic message 
of the Pentecostal churches. While they places less attention in the social success in the 
beginning of their development in Cameroon, Mbe notes a shift during the years of economic 
crisis .According to Him Pentecostals adopt a method by which they believe that they can 
possess whatever they want, a belief which is based on prosperity theology. For de Rosny 
(2002) the reasons of the success of Pentecostal churches lies also in his emotional appealing 
as well as in the flexibility in their doctrine and the belief in the divine miracle now. He notes 
that far from offering a refuge to their believers , Pentecostalism constructs an universe of 
dichotomy between the good and the evil and a permanent struggle between the holy spirit 
and the devil. Choosing the side of Holy Spirit, Pentecostals tend to see themselves as the 
faithful army of Christ where the enemy is represented by the unbelievers (persons who are 
not a member of a Pentecostal church). 
 
Broadly the Pentecostalism is an universe of spiritual struggle and where one of the outcomes 
of the struggle is the poverty alleviation for the believer and defeat for the enemy. The enemy 
here can be everyone but the Pentecostal believer; it’s not only the Devil as an imaginative 
figure but  a cohort of unbelievers constituted by some fragments the ruling elite and the poor 
masses. However becoming born –again (Pentecostal) can erase the evils of a member of the 
ruling elite as it can catalyst the improvement of the condition of life of a newly converted 
poor. This promise is objectively feasible and attractive if we look at the Pentecostalism as a 
network of people sharing the same doctrine about God and ideology about social success. 
Furthermore by dividing the world in to two sides good and evil, the Pentecostalism engage 
itself both in a symbolic and a materialistic struggle against the regime and the others 
unbelievers . First by their doctrine Pentecostals do a calculus in which their death equates to 
the natural death, a death which originate from God’s will. But not a death in vain like ‘die 
pour rien’ but a death occurring while fighting against the enemy. In this sense we can argue 
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Pentecostals experience the ‘Life of the Spirit’ in the same way feymen do. If we can agree 
that this kind of struggle tend to avoid the real death of the Pentecostal during a possible 
warfare against the enemy in the real world, we can also agree that such life dedicated to the 
economic improvement can have some effect on the ground not only by praying but by using 
the churches’ network for business venture and economic opportunities. The struggle of the 
Pentecostalism is a struggle for its members, a struggle which do not acknowledge a positive 
change outside the boundaries of its ideology and theology but which embrace anyone 
willing to operate inside its network and control. Therefore pentecotism is just a different 
means to conquer and attend social success in the postcolony with a genuine economy of 
death and life.  
 
3.4 THE RISE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 
 
Usually the use of political violence in Cameroon has been more spontaneous than planned 
for the reasons  we have stated up until but also because of the youth bulge (Urdal, 2006; 
Beninguisse and Kone, n.d.; Bidima,2001; see figure 3). In order to take account of this 
violence nowadays , we suggest that the acts of rebelling should be considered as a lifestyle. 
Failing to consider it as such , but comprehending it as an act of protestation trying to 
overthrow the regime in place instead  lead to the construction of the rebel in a more or less 
traditional sense of the term . I suggest that rebelling and becoming a rebel are located 
between the gradual shift of two kind of mimesis drawn  firstly by Michael Kirby and 
explored in African context by Frances Harding (1999) . According to those scholars there is 
a continuum between acting and performing. Therefore by rebelling urban young people are 
performing their own self but when they become rebel they simulate purposively their own 
self putting the emphasis on violence. Such a performance is rooted in the practicality of their 
existence but its meaning depend on the accustomed audience ( power elite and media) , for 
whom the use of violence takes another significance . 
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 Figure 5, source: United Nation estimates and Medium variant production quoted in Lam 
(2007:19) 
 
In this respect we should pay more attention on a particular group the so called ‘les 
Bendskineurs18’. Les bendskineurs are drivers who used motor bike as taxi in the urban cities 
of Cameroon . It is a form of self-employment and a means of resistance against the state . 
The bendskin phenomenon in Douala have been the outcome of the ghost town during the 
1990s. Initially designed as a contingent solution to replace the conventional system of public 
transportation during the ghost town , it became quickly a legitimate response by young 
people in Cameroon to the transportations problems facing the majority of residents of urban 
cities . According to Simone ( 2005: 523-524) they are about 35, 000 bendskineurs in Douala 
most of them are Bamiléké, predominantly youth between 18-35 years , whose origin are 
rooted in the north region of the city ( Dakar, New Bell, etc). In the light of a survey 
conducted by Konings (2006:42) among hundred bendskin drivers and fifty pousseurs19  in 
November 2003 : All were male, and most were quite young, 81 percent were between 15-35 
years old , 61 percent were single, and 76 percent had been in the profession for less than five 
                                                 
18 Benskineur originate from the word bendskin which is both a Pidgin English expression, meaning ‘ bend 
yourself’ ( to hold on tightly to the driver)  and the name of popular music introduced in the 1960s by the 
famous Bamiléké singer Andre Marie Talla (Konings, 2006:36) 
19 It is Francophone expression referring to the use of  handcarts for transporting merchandise. 
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years. They tended relatively well educated: 45 percent had attended primary school, 43 had 
enjoyed some secondary school education and 7 percent had been university students. The 
rest of five percent were illiterate. The bendskin drivers are usually organized in small 
groups. Konings argues that despite the fact that the majority of the members of these groups 
are Bamiléké , the group does not exclude  members of other ethnic groups but non- 
Bamiléké according to him are usually close friends such as ex-school mates or ex-
colleagues. Each of those groups is characterized by the solidarity among its member. Further 
those groups are able to transcends the rivalries which may occurred between them and act in 
common to protect their common interests or defend a colleagues threatened by outsiders. 
The bendskin drivers are well known for their non respect of traffic rules. In relation to that 
there are some animosities between taxi drivers and bendskin drivers which according to 
Konings (206:44-48) have precluded any form of coalition against their common enemies, 
namely the state and the police .  Due to some obvious reasons linked to corruption and social 
rights abuse, the relations between bendskin drivers, police and other state agent are really 
conflictual but the main source of this conflict lies in a competition for power and control 
over the road. In this regard bendskin drivers illustrated themselves with their recurrent habit 
to resolves their problems through violence instead of peaceful negotiations. In the same path 
Konings adds  that there is substantial evidences that bendskin drivers , just like taxi drivers, 
have become involved in armed robbery of their passengers. Also Bendskin drivers have 
fiercely resisted the government’s controlling efforts which have failed dismally. Roitman 
(2006:251-261) reports how in the Chad basin ( region including northern20 part of Cameroon 
) the legal deviations of Bendskin and Coupeurs-de-route- those who cut off the roads- is 
seen as a illegal yet licit practice. According to her in the late 1990s in an effort to quell 
incivisme fiscal and benefit from this lucrative domain bendskins were legalized through a 
series of regulations. These included a new tax ( impot libératoire), driver license, vehicle 
registration, a permit to carry passenger, a parking permit, and custom’s receipt for imported 
motorcycles. She notes that while drivers are supposed to paint the motor yellow and wear 
helmets and gloves, the reality is that almost all the bendskin drivers do not respect such 
prescriptions. In contrast to Douala where the relationship between bendskin and police is 
                                                 
20 There has been almost no  impact of the transport’s strike  during the February ‘s event  in the northern part of 
Cameroon. Perhaps it was a consequence of  the partnership between police and the bendskin drivers as reported 
by Roitman (2006) . 
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tense , in the northern part of the country things seems to be slightly different as a bensdkin 
driver in Ngaoundéré puts it : 
 
The police and the moto-taximen, we’re partners. We know that if we are disposed to giving them 
a bit of money from time to time, we can work together-that is , the police and the moto-taximen- 
we exploit illegality. Even when you have all your papers in order, you are in illegality because 
the motorcycle is illegal. Not even 5 percent are painted in yellow . We have imposed our vision 
of things on the authorities. The police themselves close their eyes; they can always find an 
infraction to ticket. That way, they have money for beer….So that the system can continue to 
function properly, it’s important that there are people in violation because, if everyone was in line 
with the law, the authorities-the police- wouldn’t gain their share and then they would suppress the 
motorcycles on the pretext that they causes, that we are hoodlums, etc. Today , maybe we are 
hoodlums , but we are hoodlums who helps sustain families and contribute to the well-beings of 
agents of the force of law .Long live the tolerant police [ la police comprehensive]! 
(Roitman,2006:262). 
 
Similarly  Roitman argues that in the same region road banditry is often regarded as a form of 
work. She mentions the example of zarguina (roughly translated as bandits but with a 
connotation of class actors ) who historically have been associated with local chiefdoms, 
some of then attaining the status of bandit-notables (bandit-dignitaries) ; enjoying the right to 
‘work’ the chiefdom’s territory in return of a part of the spoils and protected by various 
important chiefs. Roitman stresses that it is still the case in the territory of Rey Bouba in the 
northern Cameroon where the recently deceased chief have been an important member of the 
ruling political party (CPDM).  
 
In a context of increasing   insecurity  in Cameroon , Chouala ( 2001:13-14) infers from the 
practice of banditry, a political underpinning . This viewpoint is reinforced by Tedesco 
(2009:3) who acknowledge that in case of persistent social exclusion, different class citizens 
can be created especially among the poor and the disenfranchised who lack the means to use 
their political and civil rights. These subjects according to her create a different culture one 
bound to their day-to-day existence in the slums. Such culture which in previous years could 
have been labelled culture of poverty is now increasingly connected to violence, 
marginalization and hostility. Even so Roitman ( 2006:259) emphasizes that the ‘ambivalence 
which characterizes both organized banditry and unregulated economic activities today, is 
such that one cannot clearly delineate these endeavours in terms of counter-realm, or as 
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instances of rebellion, resistance to the state, or acts of social justice’. Hence it is important to 
examine closely  this type of illegal yet licit practices. Illustrative of such practices , is the 
series of pictures of bendskin’s actions captures by Konings (2006:45-47):  
 
In  early 2001 , a heated confrontation between a policeman and a group of bendskin drivers 
occurred in the quarter of Madagascar. The group had come to rescue of colleague who was being 
harassed by policeman. Feeling threatened, the policeman drew his pistol ,and at the moment that 
he wanted to fire, he was pushed from behind by a group member. During his fall, he accidentally 
shot and killed himself. 
 
In November of the same year , bendskin drivers occupied the most important traffic intersections 
in Douala, bringing all traffic to a standstill. They blew their horns continuously and carried 
placards protesting the corruption of municipal agent charged with collecting taxes from bendskin 
drivers. According to the demonstrators these agents were behaving like policemen and 
gendarmes, demanding not only their tax certificates , but also other documents, such as proof of 
vehicle insurance and driving license. If they could not produce these documents, the agents 
threatened to seize their motorbikes unless they paid a bribe of between FCFA 2,000 and FCFA 
5,000. The protesters were later received by the senior divisional officers, Laurent Mindja, who 
ordered the municipal agent to restrict themselves to collecting taxes. 
 
In March 2002, a police vehicle hit a group of bendskin drivers standing at their parking place on 
the road near Tunnel Ndokoti, killing one of them. In reaction, the group immediately set fire to 
the vehicle and wanted to lynch the two policemen in it. The latter narrowly escaped by firing 
several shot in the air. 
 
On several occasions, bendskin drivers have protested against police harassment and extortion by 
erecting barricades on the Wouri Bridge, which forms the only connection between the two parts 
of Douala . During a demonstration in the city on 23 February 2003, they used sticks to chase the 
police away. Only  a few months later, a renewed incident between the police and the bendskin 
driver in New Bell gave rise to a violent rebellion in the city (Messager2003b;Herald 
2003a.2003b) 
 
In those snapshots of the collective actions of bendskin drivers what is interesting  to bear in 
mind for the rest of this paper, is their strong capacity of mobilization ,the dynamic of greed 
and grievances in the movement  they impulse but also the central role of violence in their 
form of protestations. In relation to that on 25 February 2008 a general strike was launched 
by the syndicates of transporters including bendskineurs-it was the first time for this group to 
follow such strike- demanding the improvement of their social conditions (Ngouem,2008:11). 
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Subsequently, from the 25 to 29 February 2008 Cameroon was the theatre of violent 
demonstrations fuelled or explained by a vast array of arguments among them we can find, 
the proposed constitutional amendment, the rising prices of fuel and basic commodities  
(NHRO,2008). In this context the objectives of the next chapter won’t be to restore a 
particular regime of truth but to grasp different newspapers’ perspectives of the event and 
point out the implications that  particular versions of the reality which they promote  might 
conceal.  
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CHAPTER  4:  JOURNALISM  IN  CAMEROON:  A  FIELD 
BOUND BY THE RISK OF DEATH 
 
Introduction 
 
In short, the journalist is an uneasy awkward figure, capable of good as well as bad , who has  to come to term 
with the political and economic constraints that weigh on him, rendering his position unstable and 
uncomfortable (Champagne,2005:48). 
 
The double dependency of the journalistic field on economic and politics, suggested by 
Champagne are reflected in the way the freedom of press is experienced in Cameroon. The 
dual structure of the journalistic field in Cameroon shapes a space of liberties where 
journalists, journalism and the media business are constrained by the risk of death (violence 
against journalists, bankruptcy of press business and absence of ethic and deontology in the 
profession).  
 
4.1  THE  LEGAL  STRUCTURE  OF  PRESS  FREEDOM  IN 
CAMEROON 
 
The colonial legacy of civil law and common law, the former inherited from the French and 
the latter from the English have been a structuring factor in the history of press law in 
Cameroon. Until 1966 when the first press law was enacted, pressmen in French speaking 
Cameroon were regulated by different laws from those of English speaking Cameroon. In 
Francophone areas, the law in force was the French law on press freedom of July 29, 1881 
which was introduced in the mandated territory in 1923 and amended in 1936. The French 
Cameroon assembly adopted the 1881 law as law No. 55-35 of May 27, 1959. This law 
regulated the press in francophone Cameroon until 1966. In the Anglophone sector, the 
sources of press law originate from Licensing Act in Britain in 1662. But the law which 
regulated the practice of journalism in the area was the Nigerian Newspaper Ordinance No. 
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10 of 1903, modelled after the Sierra Leonean press law of 1857. The 103 law was further 
amended by the Newspaper Ordinance No. 40 of 1917, the newspaper Ordinance No. 26, 
1941 and the Eastern Nigerian Law of 1955. By the time the Nigerian Newspaper Ordinance 
was enacted, Southern Cameroon was operating as an autonomous region but it was only 
after unification in 1961 that the West Cameroon Newspaper Ordinance was passed to govern 
the establishment of newspapers. 
 
Churchill (1992:21-22) says that with the unification of the country, the practice of vetting 
and censorship provided in the 1959 French Cameroon law, was extended to the English 
speaking Cameroon under the instructions of the Minister of Territorial Administration. The 
Anglophone journalists decried the practice this law implied and regarded it as 
unconstitutional since the 1959 law was signed prior to unification. Considering the 
embarrassment these protestations caused, the federal government prompted its adaptation by 
enacting the Law No. 66/LF/13 of December 21, 1966 by the Federal Assembly. Churchill 
notes that: 
 
The major feature of the 1966 press law and its subsequent amendments was its elaborated system 
of control which involved administrative, financial and territorial surveillance. It was based on 
‘preventive press’ ideology where ownership of a press organ was scrutinized and emphasis laid 
on pre-publication control by the administrative authorities. Less regard was given to judicial 
control of the press in matters of libel and defamation. Moreover, the spirit of the law was 
essentially repressive which showed in its prescription for heavy imprisonment sentences 
whenever its provisions were violated. The 1966  law was essentially a newspaper  law which 
excluded  radio journalist from actionable offences committed under common law as concepts 
such as ‘publisher’ and ‘printer’ could not be extended to the Director or Chief of Station of a 
radio station. 
 
Ndam (2004:548-549) reports that the 1966 press law liberated Cameroon from the French 
law of 29 July 1881 regarding the press. According to him the former made the publication of 
newspapers subject to censorship, seizure or interdiction by the administration if deemed 
detrimental to public order, social mores and national security. After some minor adjustments 
the law 80-18 of the 14 July 1980 marked a break with the liberal character inherited from 
French legislation, thus signalling the conceptual autonomy of the legislators in Cameroon: 
the creation of a newspaper became subject to administrative authorization and required both 
a fiscal and the deposit of security receipt. In contrast the audiovisual communication regime 
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underwent a slower evolution, limited early to radio broadcasting, the service was 
monopolised by the state. This was also the case for the television which has been entrusted 
to a public institution whose organic and functional autonomy was limited in its effectiveness 
by the existence of state-imposed control. Ndam suggests that the monolithic political system 
founded in 1966 with the creation of a single party, largely explains the restrictive character 
of the legislation and administrative control in place until 1990. On December 19, 1990 the 
government scrapped the 1966 law and its subsequent amendments like the 1987 law and 
replaced it with law No. 90/052 related to the freedom of mass communications. This shift of 
the Cameroonian government’s policies regarding the press freedom should be understood in 
the context of the political and professional turmoil of the 1990s. Concerning the spirit of this 
law and its objectives, Churchill (1992:24) notes that at a political level, it sought to create a 
forum to permit the expression of diverse opinions while at the professional level it was 
aimed at creating responsible journalism. 
 
Ndam (2004:549-551) provides an interesting analysis of Law 90-52. He argues that this law 
did not establish a single administrative system for the creation of all information- providing 
organizations. According to him in the article 6, the freedom of the press is affirmed but it 
makes publication subject-in the light of article 7, paragraph 1- to prior statement of intent to 
the prefect of the relevant department. De jure , this system should lead to the prefectural 
authorities noting the creation of a newspaper. De facto in accordance to the prior statement 
of intent, there is not only the noting of the creation of a press organization but also the 
administrative recognition of said creation. For instance speaking about the recognition by 
the way of prior statement of intent, he notes that since 1990 the government tolerates 
publishers to operate without prior authorization or deposit of security but any publication 
must be preceded by a statement of intent in accordance with Article 7 , paragraph 1 of law 
90-52. Furthermore the role of the prefect is pivotal in the procedure for issuing the receipt 
for the statement that is valid as administrative recognition of the creation of newspaper. This 
pivotal role has been made possible by the 1990 reform and by the legislative modification of 
1996.  Ndam argues that: 
 
From prefecture control of the procedure….The exorbitant power of the prefect in issuing the 
receipt can be measured from the laconic wording of Article 7 of Law 90-52 following the 
submission of the prior statement of intent without any formal advice of receipt as foreseen by 
paragraph 1, paragraph 3 states in fine that a receipt is issued by the prefect. Without prescribing 
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any formalities for confirming neither the submission nor a limitation on the delay which the 
prefect may impose, it could be understood that the submission of the statement and the issuing of 
the receipt are simultaneous. However, the prefect can remain silent, given that he/she is not 
constrained by a precise period of time. On this point, it has been claimed that a manager can 
publish his/her newspaper without waiting for a receipt just by meeting the requirements for 
submission. We cannot subscribe to this point of view because receipt by the prefect copies of the 
newspaper does not constitute a tacit issuing of a receipt. The latter which implies administrative 
recognition of the creation, must be obtained prior to publication, because failure to complete the 
prior statement of intent properly is considered by the authorities to be a case of illegal 
publication… 
 
2…to the procedural framework for prefectural power. The framework for prefectural power is 
issuing the receipt for prior statement is subject matter of the prescriptions of the article 7 of Law 
96-4. Paragraph 1 of this article stipulates that submission of the prior statement of intent is always 
acknowledged with a receipt. This formality marks the point in time at which the procedure 
regarding the prior statement that should end in the issuing of a receipt by the administrative 
authority is initiated 
 
Churchill (1992:26-29) highlights the majors defects of the 1990 press law. Firstly by 
embracing a variety of issues, the law reflects its structural weakness. The division of the 
laws affecting written communication, audio-visual communication, journalists and offences 
is too broad. According to him this law is essentially a print law because while sections on 
print media represent almost 31 (32%), those on audiovisual media are only 10 (9%) and 
those affecting journalists spread over only 6 sections. Secondly, the restrictive classification 
of the means of mass communications into the print (newspapers, periodicals, magazines, 
pamphlets, books and bill posting) and the audiovisual media (radio and television). This 
classification is far too be exhaustive because it omits other mass communication channels 
like photography, the cinema, paintings, mobile advertisement vans ,and folk media like 
songs, dances and drama. Thirdly the law is based on the false assumption that the judiciary 
in Cameroon is independent. In practice the judiciary has political and administrative 
functions. Fourthly, the issue of libel is not clear. The law is silent on who is liable in cases of 
reproduced libellous material. It does not also state precisely whether the publisher and editor 
could be joint tortfeasors if they were not on the day the libellous article was published. 
Fifthly, the law also have not been able to create a competitive political systems based on 
media exposure. For instance the section 41(1) states the principle of equal access to airtime 
by all political parties but does not stipulates whether it would be equal or proportional. 
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Finally the law is silent on other issues of media like plagiarism, obscene publication and 
seditious libel.  
 
In addition, Ndam (2004, 555:556) puts the emphasis on the reality of freedom press in 
regard to public order. He suggests that censorship, seizure and interdiction of newspapers 
significantly limit  the freedom of the press but do not always take the written form, thus 
making it problematic to qualify them as administrative decisions. According to him the 
decisions that restrict freedom with the recurrent motive of disturbance of public order take 
an important place. When it is obligatory in character the motive leads the party taking a 
decision to explain the legal and factual reasons for which it is being taken. In Cameroon, the 
measures that restrict the freedom of the press depend on whether the newspaper is located in 
Cameroonian territory or not. On the one hand the legislator justifies the censorship seizure 
or interdiction of national press publication that would be detrimental to the public order or 
more; on the other hand the legislator remains silent concerning the motives for its decision, 
whereas the second case is not subject to an obligation of motive. In effect the Cameroonian 
authorities justify their intervention mainly on the basis of the need to maintain ‘public 
order’. Drawn on the argument of some Cameroonian scholars, Ndam states that in 
Cameroonian law , public order is a legal notion surrounded by a ‘thick fog’ that the doctrine 
has not failed to emphasize. While acknowledging that ‘this notion of public order is not 
defined in Cameroonian law whereas it even seems to have a particular meaning , in any case 
one more restrictive than that in French law upon which is based’. Professor Kamto  assumes 
that ‘ the notion of public order so dear to administrative law on its own efficiency for 
controlling the press with goal of protecting the public interest’. For Doctor Biyoum the 
polysemic character of this notion legitimise all intervention by the state that be whether a 
priori and a posteriori. From that point on, Professor Nlep invites us to go further in depth 
and not be satisfied with the public order alibi to reveal and comprehend the motives for 
censorship, seizure or interdiction of newspapers. For him, the defence of power in place 
constitutes the unstated motive expressed as ‘ all those reasons which, although not found in 
either the letter or the spirit of the law nonetheless influence the decision to censor, seize or 
forbid on behalf of the administrative authorities’. Thus it is through this lens that the 
numerous decisions to seize national or foreign newspapers should be viewed and analysed. 
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In order to make sense of the gap between the statement of the press Law of 1990 and the 
administrative censorship, Nyamnjoh (2005:175-182) explores the way this law has been 
interpreted both by the government and by the press. By quoting a Cameroonian minister, he 
infers the government’s interpretation. In fact the Minister argues that the Cameroonian state 
‘exercise a sort of legal control on the press, thanks to some legal measure providing for a 
censorship that is extremely light and symbolic’. For Him [Minister], ‘poorly managed, 
poorly used, freedom of expression can prove harmful to the consolidation of social balance 
and especially to the integration of and peace’. Thus according to the minister viewpoint the 
administrative censorship taken against certain papers and some journalists of the private 
press critical to the government could be justified by the lack of respect for the law or the 
lack of respect for deontology. On the contrary the newspapers believe that the administrative 
control is merely a means to limit their freedom in other to silent the critical voices of the 
state’s political behaviour. Many journalists assume that the critical press’ only crime has 
been its consistent refusal to succumb state violence and the refusal of the statute of praise 
singer of the government and ruling party (CPDM). 
 
On the 4 January 1996, law No. 96/04 was promulgated amending certain provisions of the 
1990 law. Nyamnjoh’s reading of that new law gives us an overview of what it is about. In 
fact according to the new law, news paper publishers are no longer expected to submit their 
dummies or papers for administrative control by civil servants. However the administrative 
hasn’t been totally abandoned because some sanctions like seizure, ban and suspension 
remain legal with possible severe financial consequences for the press. The process of 
establishing a newspaper has been made more difficult by requiring more documents. The 
new law empowers the administrative authority either to grant or reject an application 
therefore re-instating the principle of prior authorization which was abolished 1990 law. Also 
the 1996 law allows for seize of the premises of a press organ by the police without warrant 
or judicial action, if the public order is considered endangered by an administrative authority. 
Hence the state’s structuring power through the means of law has produced a particular type 
of press freedom where journalists’ rights and duties have been defined more by the political 
will than by the journalists’ professional groups. 
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4.2 THE ECONOMY OF JOURNALISTIC PRACTICE 
 
In Cameroon practising journalists should be registered with the government, so that they 
acquire a card granting the access to cover public events. The Cameroon Union of Journalists 
(UJC) acknowledged in 2005 that there are 874 practicing journalists in the country: 183 
women and 691 men (Alobwede, 2006:8). Those numbers should be take with caution 
because journalism in Cameroon is not a unified body. For Nyamnjoh et al (n.d:55) , unlikely 
other professional groups in Cameroon such as medicine, Law and architecture, journalism is 
the only one whose has stayed fragmented. He notes that even UCJ created in 1996 does not 
represent the consensus within all the factions of the divided professional landscape of 
Cameroonian journalism. Paquot and Abega (2000:4-9) stress that among the numerous 
factors splitting the journalism profession there are: ethnic divisions, division between 
journalists in the public press and independent press, divisions between employees and free-
lance journalists, and divisions between ‘bosses and journalists’. According to those scholars, 
these intercine divisions have weakened the lobbying for the respect of journalists’ rights as a 
profession and strengthened the state interferences in this field. In this respect, Frère 
(2007:176) captures the state of Cameroonian printed media in these words: 
 
The written press, losing momentum, is now suffering from a double burden: the weariness of the 
people, who have seen that polemics have not led to the hoped-for changes; and the economic 
crises, which force people to ‘make do’ in order to survive. Obsolete equipment is not replaced , 
journalists are underpaid and therefore open to corruption, and cost high. Circulation has fallen 
spectacularly. 
  
Paquot and Abéga  underlines several factors fuelling the crisis undergoing by the 
Cameroonian press: Plummeting sales, readers lacks of trust in newspapers, corruption and  
‘media blackmail’ on the rise , low quality writing, very tense relationships between public 
authorities and the independent press etc. Furthermore they insist that the public loss of 
interest for press is justified by the devaluation of the CFA and the disillusion of the masses 
who had believed in political change and democracy.  
 
In effect the practice of journalism has been shaped by the economic environment but also by 
the multiple cleavages embedded in Cameroonian social space. For instance Frère (2007:176) 
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points out the existing tensions between the Anglophone press support the separatist ideas  
and the Francophone press hostile to any idea of splitting the country. She also highlights the 
contrast between the Bamiléké owned press more inclined to support the political opposition 
and the Bêti owned press more supportive of the Government. According  to her the main 
players of the written Cameroonian press, principally Le Messager, La Nouvelle Expression, 
Challenge Hebdo ( no longer published) and Le Quotidien Mutations have been accused by 
the supporters of the government of being instrumental in the service of the Bamiléké cause, 
seeking to seize power and removed the Bêti from the government.  
 
Looking at the media frame in Cameroon as dependent variable, ethnicity21  and gombo22 can 
be considered as the major factors influencing the way journalists represent certain issues. 
Also Nyamnjoh (n.d:2) stresses the importance of ethnic factor both in the media frame and 
individual frame: 
 
Unwittingly or not, the press in Cameroon has seen its case weakened by appearing to be 
regionalist, ethnic or partisan. It is common to judge papers not from their content, but from the 
region of origin of their proprietors and to dismiss or accept them accordingly, even without 
having read their contents. Quite coincidentally the most critical private papers in Cameroon 
happen to be owned by persons who share the same ethnic/regional origins as the most persistent 
opposition leaders (Anglophone and Bamileke) and  the most conciliatory papers to government 
also happen to be owned by persons from the same ethnic group or region like President Paul Biya 
(Bêti) (cf Nga ndongo, 1993; Nyamnjoh, 1997; Ndembiyembe,1997;Chindji-Kouleu, 1997). It is 
                                                 
21 For Vubo (2003:597:598) ethnicity influence the equilibrium of the administration as well as  the popular 
imaginary. According to him ethnicity is seen as a force fuelling all social phenomena within the political sphere 
in Cameroon. Inter-ethnic conflicts such as (Baya-Fulbe, Shuwa Arab-Kotoko, Bali Nyonga and its neighbour, 
Balikumbat-Bafanji. Kedjom Ketinguh- Bambili, Kedjom Keku- Ndawara) are often perceived as illustrative of 
the political cleavage between the ruling party and the opposition. Moreover we should bear in mind that ethnic 
conflicts in Cameroon are most of the time based on a political manipulation of  the fluctuating notion of 
ethnicity that instead designate political alliances between groups. Consequently the reconfiguration of interest 
groups entails re-defining the lines dividing ethnic territories in Cameroon (Paquot and Abega, 2000:1).  
 
22 ‘Within Cameroon’s journalism fraternity , gombo is a metaphor for various payments, freebies and rewards 
solicited by journalists an provided by various new actors to journalists before, during or after events to tilt a 
news report in favour of a benefactor( Ndangam,2009:820)’. 
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therefore incumbent on the press to unfetter itself to become veritable champion of public interest 
and the concerns of the powerless in society, regardless of ethnic origin or political affiliation. 
 
Ndangam (2009:826:829) notes that reporting ‘breaking news’- understood as hard news (e.g. 
crime, accident, public demonstration, political resignations, arrests) distinguish ‘real’ 
journalists from ‘other’ journalists. This distinction is flawed since she agrees that gombo can 
function as a technology of anticipated rewards and ambush. Because framing the hard news 
according to a particular perspective could increase the symbolic capital23 of a journalist 
therefore increase the chance of some kind reward in the future. Further both ‘real’ journalists 
and ‘other’ journalists can be influenced by gombo in the way they write hard or soft news 
because it is an internalized structure, as she puts it: 
 
Gombo is frequently cash but can assume the form of drinks, fuel, free rides, materials goods such 
as car, airtime for mobile phones and sexual favours (this category is rare). It involves diverse 
processes of negotiations, which have in turn been internalized by both those who solicit or 
receive gombo and those who provide it. In its most obvious manifestation, it entails receiving 
cash from elites, politicians, NGOs and companies, in return for reporting an event, organization 
or personal favourably. The exchange initiates a patron-client relationship in which both journalist 
and the news actor  mutually  benefit. 
 
In respect to the ownership of media in Cameroon we subscribe with the viewpoint of field 
theorists. Benson and Neveu (2005:10) argues that in relation to political economy, field 
theory rejects the Chomsky style notion that the news media’s behaviour can be explained 
solely in the light of their capitalist ownership and control. They note that in contrast to such 
mechanical thinking, field theory is concerned with the understanding of the web of 
mediations which intervenes between Marx’s ‘infrastructure’ and ‘superstructure’. In fact in 
2000, 1,300 papers were legally existing in Cameroon. Newspapers which arose before the 
political liberalization of press and which continued to publish were: Cameroon tribune was 
established in 1955, Le Messager in 1979, Aurore Plus in 1988, L’Effort Camerounais in 
1955, and Le Patriote in 1984. Other papers was established after 1990. We can mention 
                                                 
23 ‘ I call symbolic capital any kind of capital (economic, cultural, academic, or social) when it is perceived 
according to the categories of perceptions , the principle of vision division, the systems of classification, the 
classification of schemes, the cognitive schemata, objectives structures of the field in consideration, that is , of 
the structure of  the distribution of capital in the field being considered (Bourdieu, 1998:85).’ 
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Mutations, Perspective Hebdo, PoPoli, La Nouvelle Expression, Dikalo, Ouest Echos, Le 
Front Independent, The Skecth, The Herald, and The Messenger. During that period all those 
newspapers were weeklies, bi-weeklies or tri-weeklies. Cameroon tribune ( the state -owned 
paper) was the only daily and bilingual. For Paquot and Abega (2000:5) outside of these 
leading newspapers the other (irregular) publications are filled with editorial-style 
advertisements and harm the profession because of the lack of the poor quality of their 
content. Drawn from UJC records, Alobwede (2006:19) provides an updated picture of the 
Cameroonian media landscape nowadays (figure 6). In contrast to the circulation of papers, 
he notes that the market for press itself in Cameroon saw a massive growth in the number of 
newspapers and magazines from around 50 in 2000 to 500 in 2005. 
                                                                  Figure 6 
 
In effect in Cameroon, the media ownership and control has been the subject of more political 
constraints than economic forces. The laws enacted and enforced by the successive 
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governments clarified the fact that the press was at the mercy of politics. The survival or the 
death of a paper has been much more the result of  its political orientation rather than their 
economic performance (Nyamnjoh, 1996:1). In a context where the political factor prevail 
over the economic it is then easy to understand why the journalistic field understood as a 
business is far to acquire its autonomy. In this regard the subsidies provide by the government 
to support the private media can be used as a weapons against any paper which attempt to 
rebel. In this highly politicised environment where the salaries24 of journalists, especially 
those of independent media are very low, the practice of corruption libel, blackmail and risk 
of death have become common. In this regard Paquot and Abega (2000:8) argues that ‘ 
Journalism in Cameroon remains a journalism of struggle, with the implication and courage 
that it implies in a very morose text but also with all the accompanying excesses and lacks of 
professional ethics’. Furthermore the arrests , the detentions, the trials  and the imprisonment 
of journalists, all those legal and illegal means used by the state in order to protect the so 
called ‘public order’ weaken the development of journalism both as a profession and as a 
media business . In this respect Amnesty international (2009:20-26) reports many violations 
of freedom of expression through state violence against journalists, prohibition of 
broadcasting for critical media and seizure of equipments. On the other hand, Nyamnjoh 
(2005:94-191) says that it is difficult if not impossible to find journalist who go for the truth 
and who treat it with the respect and distance that a news story deserves. He equates the 
practice of bad journalism in Africa with the lack of professional training for most journalists. 
According to him while the journalists of official media have generally speaking, benefited 
more from formal training in such of journalism, it is not by their professionalism they 
distinguish themselves from their counterparts in the private press who had little or no formal 
training in most cases. He also stresses the lack of material resources and the dilapidated 
equipments which rendered the training schools increasingly theoretical in approach. In this 
regard Alobwede (2006:9) numbered the few institutions providing journalism training in 
Cameroon (figure 7). He notes that there is a vocational journalism school, the advanced 
School of Mass Communication based in Yaounde. There are also three university 
                                                 
24 ‘ State media employees are categorised as A2 state workers, getting an average monthly  salary of F.CFA 
165, 500 ($U 300) (republic of Cameroon,2000b). An average monthly salary for teacher is also $US 300. It is 
difficult to estimate the wages of independent journalist in Cameroon. Private media employers generally poorly 
remunerate journalists.(Alobwede,2006:8).’ 
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departments offering journalism programmes , two which are private institutions ( Siantou 
and Institut Ndi Samba Superieure ) and the third a public institutions ( Department of 
Journalism and Mass Communication , University of Buea). He notes also that there are 
NGOs providing journalism training such as UNESCO, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the 
British Council in Collaboration with the Thompson Foundation.  
                                                                     Figure 7 
 
In other words the lack of ethic and deontology but also state violence and manipulation of 
laws bound the journalistic field in Cameroon by the risk of death both as a media business 
and as a profession. Therefore the risk of death produces by the political sphere can also be 
considered as main factor influencing the way the journalists frame news in the country. 
4.3  CONTRASTING  REPRESENTATIONS  OF  THE  FEBRUARY’S 
EVENT IN CAMEROONIAN  NEWSPAPERS 
 
Cameroon Tribune is the government owned printed media, it has been established in 1979 
and till now it enjoys the highest percentage of readership in Cameroon. By its ascribed role 
of mouthpiece of the government in the words of Nyamnjoh (2005:155), it is one of the main 
vehicles of the ideology of the ruling elite. This has been verified before and after the 
liberalization as predicted by Nga Ndongo (Nga quoted in Gallagher , 1991: 48) in the dawn 
of political liberalization: ‘It is Cameroon Tribune best interest to keep the audience it has…if 
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it want to keep its audience it should be more critical of the opposition. A paper should have 
a clear ideology.’. By its pivotal role in the government apparatus of governance , Cameroon 
tribune itself conceals yet simultaneously  reveals the strategies used by the power elite to 
produce and reproduce their dominance. Consequently the articles published in this paper 
highlight the way the power elite attempts to (re) shape the public cognition in order to 
sustain their dominance. Conversely some independent papers such as Le Messager, Le 
Quotidien Mutation and the Post provide some perspectives more inclined to support the 
view of political opposition and the Anglophone cause, In this respect those papers 
differentiate themselves from Cameroon Tribune’s framing. Further those independent 
newspapers enjoy a relatively high circulation.For those reasons stated above,  we would like 
to analyse the content of those papers during the period starting from 25 to 29 February 2008 
marking  some violent demonstrations in Cameroon. 
 
The report of the National Human Rights Observer ( 2008:9-10) provides us a recapitulation  
of the event prior 25th  February 2008. According to this report view the climate of latent 
tension in Douala, on 15th January 2008 the Governor of the Littoral province issued a 
banned order . This order prohibited, inter alia, unauthorized public manifestation throughout 
the province for an indefinite period. The report notes that this decision reawakened the 
popular discontent fuelled by the proposed reform of the constitution. Even though  several 
meetings convened by the opposition parties on the issue of constitutional reform 
successfully taken place in Douala, the capital of the Littoral province. On 13th Wednesday, 
after a press conference on constitutional reform granted by Mr. Ni John Fru Ndi , the leader 
of SDF, clashes occurred between the participants of that conference. On Thursday 21 
February, Equinoxe TV , a Douala based private television station which broadcasted the 
images of this strike was shut down by the local authority for the motive that it was’ 
operating without the legal framework of audiovisual communication’. On Friday, February 
22, Radio Equinoxe was also shut down. The report adds that these media were usually 
critical toward the government and especially in respect of the proposed constitutional 
amendment. Saturday the 23rd of February , a rally of the SDF scheduled to take place at ‘ 
Rond point Dakar’ in Douala with the aim to raise awareness about the amendment of the 
section 6 sub.2 of the constitution, was cancelled at the last minute by the SDF Provincial 
officials for fear of police reprisal. Regardless of this later cancellation, the situation 
degenerates to a riot. The report says that :  
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The spontaneous confrontation turns out to be bloody in this neighbourhood of Douala. The riots 
continued in the night. In addition to the confrontations between the youth and police there was 
looting of shops, burning of vehicles and destruction of buildings ( petrol stations, the kiosks of 
Pari-Mutuel Urbain Camerounais- PMUC). The police fired live bullets and killed three persons 
and wounded  many.  A  number of  people were also arrested. 
 
On Sunday 24th  February, the tension in Douala was continuous but no violence was 
reported except for some sporadic gunfire. The report says that through the channel of the 
political movements that were protesting against the constitutional amendment, the agitators 
expressed a range of economic grievances. At this very moment the transporters unions also 
called for a general strike. On Monday 25th  February, the call for general strike was 
respected. The transportation system was shut down. In the main cities of five provinces 
namely; Centre, Littoral, North West, West and South West, no taxis, no bendskin, and 
intercity buses circulated . Aware of the danger of possible vandalism , most vehicles were 
packed. The Post gives an account of the event:  
 
‘Benskin Riders Poised for Strikes Action Today’ 
 
Over 42,000 commercial motorcycle riders commonly called bendskin riders have vowed to 
paralyse activities in the economic capital, Douala , today Monday February 25, to protest the 
continuous hike in the prices of fuel. The bendskin riders arrived at the decision after fuel prices 
soared to as high as FCFA 600 a litre. They complained that the prices have made it impossible for 
them to break even in their business activities. 
 
On February 21 , a group of about 100 benskin riders, some of whom carried placards noisily rode 
round town, announcing their planned strike. They were however confronted at ‘ Rond Point’ 
Deido, by a truckload of anti-riot policemen from the mobile Intervention Unit GMI, Bonanjo who 
blocked the road. 
 
In the violent confrontation that ensued, four people were wounded with two of the victims from 
each side. The local administration has since being holding series of emergency meeting with 
security officials on how to tackle the planned strike. The local administration is the more worried 
with the planned strike because the leaders of bendskin riders are not coming out clear, when they 
talk of no circulation in Douala on that day. Many are interpreting this to mean that the bendskin 
riders will not allow urban transporters like taxis to circulate. 
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 Meanwhile in the morning of February 23, the SDO of Wouri, Bernard  Atebede, hired a local 
publicity operator known as Papa Douala, to go round town and propagate his message of appeal 
for peace and public order to bendskin drivers. But Douala, had barely started his mission when a 
group of bendskin riders gave chase and caught up with him opposite former Maturité at Mboppi. 
The irritated bendskin riders dragged him out of his publicity van, sucked out fuel from the tank of 
the van and were about fire on the vehicle, when gendarme arrived and stopped them (Pefok 
,2008:1). 
 
The focus on Bensdskin drivers in this article,  is certainly justified by the fact that it was 
their first time  to strike together with taxi-men. In effect the tension between bendskin 
drivers and taxi men have precluded any form of association against the state. Although when 
the taxi drivers went on strike in 2004 and 2005 against police harassment extortion  and 
excessive rise of petrol price , the bendskin drivers took the advantage of theses strike to 
double or even quadruple their fares (Konings,2006: 46). By putting the emphasis on the 
strike of benskin drivers, The Post highlights the causes of such actions, the forms it may take 
and the risk of violence it mayt generate. 
 
In the front page of No 9044/5243 of Cameroon Tribune of the 25th February we can read two 
things in relations to the strike : Un mort dans une emeute a Douala ( a death in a riot in 
Douala) and  LA  FERME CONDAMNATION DU GOUVERNEMENT (THE STRONG 
CONDEMNATION OF THE GOVERNMENT). The latter clause has been written in capital 
letters while the former has been written in small letters. Considering the size of the letter is 
obvious that Cameroon Tribune  puts the emphasis on the reaction of the government. The 
opposition/association between ‘ A death in a riot in Douala / THE STRONG 
CONDEMNATION OF THE GOVERNMENT’ plays a dual role which can be captured if 
we understand these clauses firstly separately and secondly in opposition/association to each 
other.  
 
‘A death in a riot in Douala’. The use of indefinite article  ‘a’ alters the significance of ‘riot 
‘and ‘death’ by making it sounds distant therefore difficult to relate to ( Linklater,2007). Also 
while we can assume that Douala is the location where this death and riot occurred , we can 
also acknowledge the fact that the symbolism of  Douala – town of political opposition and 
disorder par excellence -put together with the vagueness of the pronouns used,  reinforce the 
banality of this event. 
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THE STRONG CONDEMNATION OF THE GOVERNMENT.  This sole clause implies 
many other questions like what is the object of this condemnation . Why is the government 
condemning ? why  is it a strong  condemnation ? Why is the government angry?  The 
questions surrounding this clause help to internalise and reinforce the authority of the 
government without questioning its genesis. Because of the size of its letter , this clause is the 
first to capture the attention of the reader and the fact that the questions it raised only find 
some responses in association or in opposition with the former clause are purposive. This 
inverted reading put the emphasis on the authority of the government but dilutes and justifies 
this authority when relates to the second clause. 
 
‘A death in a riot in Douala /THE STRONG CONDEMNATION OF THE GOVERNMENT. 
The banality of the first clause contrasts with the vigour of the second to create a double 
meaning. A first reading of the association of the two clauses may suggest that the 
government care about the life of any of its citizen therefore it is ready to defend its citizens 
against any threat, no matter its scale. A second reading  embedded in a rupture between  
these two clauses, stresses that on one side we are in front of a strong and caring government 
and on the other side with a casual event. But the overall implication is that there is nothing 
to worry about because the government is in control. 
 
In contrast in the headlines of Le Quotidien Mutations of  the same date ( 25 February 2008) 
we could read : DOUALA, LA REVISION CONSTITUTIONELLE FAIT SES PREMIERS 
MORTS.(DOUALA,THE FIRST VICTIMS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT). The location of ‘Douala’ at the beginning of this sentence and as the first 
clause, structures the space of the semiotic power of the reader with the symbolism of this 
town. The second clause of this sentence fills this space with the following content: the 
victims of the constitutional amendment. The reliability of the second clause is constructed 
when “The first victims of the constitutional amendment’ are associated with the symbolism 
of “Douala”. In fact  Douala , Constitution, and victims are three terms which remind the 
ghost town of 1990s. As a result Le Quotidien Mutations put the emphasis on the political 
linkage between the deaths,  the resistance and the current issue of constitutional amendment. 
The symbolic capital of Douala - a town of political opposition and historical resistance since 
the transition- is used here as a hyperbole of the political capital resulting from the death of 
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some people  related to the  issue of amendment of constitution. Faithful to this frame is the 
article about the strike which occurred on February 23rd  February 2008:  La Revision 
Constitutionelle : Les Premiers morts tombent à Douala ( The Constitutional Amendment: 
The First Victims in Douala) 
 
Samedi 23 Fevrier 2008. Les populations riveraines du lieu dit rond point Madagascar 
commencent à  supputer sur les raisons de la non tenues d’une marche annoncée par le Social 
Democratic Front (SDF). Sur la chausse, liberée depuis par les badauds accourrus sur le lieu 
présume de la manifestation, la vie reprend son cours normal. C’est alors qu’une colonne de 
véhicules de la gendarmerie en tete s’immobilise. La grille de protection du char  se baisse et une 
manoeuvre suspecte commence. 
 
La  population de passage ainsi que des personnes assises devant les bars qui jouxtent le Carrefour  
sont copieusement arroses.Des bombes lacrymogenes sorties des caisses neuves sont projetes dans 
toutes les directions. Des fusils à pompes degainent aussi et propulse des tubes de gaz. Pris dans la 
nasse, les journalistes ne sont pas  épargnes. Peu avant le debut des operations l’adjoint au 
commissaire de Douala leur avait déjà réitéres leurs pièces d’identité. 
 
La manoeuvre solitaire des hommes en tenue va se pousuivre pendant plus d’une heure. La 
manette tournante du char-lance-eau commence à montrer des signes de faiblesse. La nuit tombe 
sur Douala, et la zone chaude de Madagascar-Brazaville-Axe lourd va vivre les pires émeutes  
jamais connues de ce coin de la capitale économique. De leurs retranchements, les jeunes de ces 
quartiers organisent la riposte contre ‘ceux qui ont jétés les gaz… 
 
Au cour du face a face ou tous les coups sont permis les populations s’emprennent a tout ce qui est 
associé aux hommes en tenue…Deux morts au moins sont tombés sous les balles des forces. Le 
jeune Alex Raoul Pelo, un mecanicien de 18 ans atteint sur le flanc gauche est mort sur le champ. 
Là également , Loveth Tingia Ndima, un vendeur de porc à la braise oridinaire de la province du 
Nord-ouest à été mortellement atteint au cou…La mort des deux jeunes à Madagascar , à en effet 
radicalisé les populations riveraines. Ces bavures seraient donc à l’origine de la violence qui à 
sécouée  une bonne partie de la ville de Douala Samédi dans la nuit (Kwebo, 2008). 
 
On Saturday, 23 Th February on 2008. The populations bordering the street of the place  called ‘ 
rond point Madagascar’ begin to whisper  on reasons of not keepings of a planned step by 
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (SDF). On the  free road  supposed to host the demonstration , 
the passers-by have left since some minutes  and life takes back his normal lesson.  
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It is while a column of vehicles of the gendarmerie arrived. The gate of protection of the tank 
bends down and a suspicious manoeuvre begins.The people passing by this place and those sat in 
front of the pubs near the crossroad are sprinkled. Tear gases are thrown in every direction. Guns 
with pump shoot  and project  gas tubes... 
 
The night falls on Douala, and the suburb of Madagascar-Brazzaville-axis is going to live the 
worst riots never known by this corner of the  economic capital. In their entrenchment, the young 
persons of these quarters organize quick-witted answer against ' those who have thrown the tear 
gas … 
 
More high other young persons in solidarity with the movement have attacks a gas station 
belonging  to Tradex company . The gas station called Mobil was subjected to the meme goes out. 
Its shop was looted and  ransacked   by angry people (Kwebo,2008:4, my translation ). 
 
 
In this article the policemen started the hostilities by using an unjustified violence against the 
population of the neighbourhood of ‘the so called ‘rond point Madagascar’ , despite the fact 
that  the happening of the SDF’s rally was cancelled. This situation led to the reaction of 
young people of the neighbourhood, who were followed by the other segments of the 
population in their use of counter-violence against the policemen and other symbols of the 
state authority. Also the involvement of other groups of youth later in solidarity with this 
initial wave of protestation deviated to the destruction of private properties and looting of 
shops. The violence escalated when the policemen killed two people. Mutations insists on the 
profile of these people, the first was an employed youth male  (18 years of age/ auto 
mechanic )  named Alex Raoul Pelo and the second was a self employed male name Loveth 
Tinga Ndima from the North –West province. Apparently the portrayal of the identities of 
those victims could be seen as the consequence of the available information  which the 
journalists  were able to grasp at the time of their investigation. It could be also be seen as a 
genuine way to identify people both by journalists and their targeted audience. In this respect 
we can ask what does it mean  when a young  ‘ debrouillard25’ name Alex Raoul Pelo die in 
such conditions? What does it mean when a  young ‘debrouillard’  from the North –West 
province die in such conditions ? The responses to those questions should be in line with the 
                                                 
25 ‘Un debrouillard’ is self employed person in the informal sector of the economy in Cameroon. 
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semiotic power26 of the targeted audience in Cameroon. In this regard , firstly we can notes 
that the precarious conditions of the employment of those victims are a sign of their strong 
will to survive honestly. But the circumstances surrounding their death suggest something 
else. Secondly there is a kind of incoherence between the way they die and the way they 
manage to survive. Commonly these contradictions infer that the death of those young people 
is unnatural , meaning that they die pour rien. Knowing that is common to identify the 
ethnicity of someone according to his surname , we can ask more questions .What does it 
mean to be called Alex Raoul Pelo? Or what does it mean to be called Loveth Tinga Ndima 
and came from the North-West province? The answers of these questions depend also on the 
semiotic power of the target audience. It is possible to deduce the ethnicity of  a Cameroonian 
just by inferring from his name his region or the ethnic group who usually adopt that name. 
But that popular method of identification is problematic and sometimes inaccurate 
considering the inter-ethnic wedding and other factors influencing the process of naming a 
child  in the contemporary Cameroon ( Nyamnjoh,2002:613). However the inference one can 
make from the North-West province seems more obvious. The North-West province is the 
cradle of the SDF and a symbol of Anglophone political opposition. One can ask if Le 
Quotidien Mutation was not tempted to draw and adds force to the Anglo-Bamileke axis 
through the use of the surnames and the province of origin of the victims. This question finds 
its answer in the individuals’ frames of its targeted audience. 
 
The story of Cameroon tribune in relation to the same event follows a different rationale. The 
article titled Cameroun: Les Emeutes à Douala (Cameroon: Riots in Douala) suggests that: 
 
La nuit tombe sur Douala. Les quartiers Dakar et Village, sur l'axe lourd Douala-Yaoundé, ne vont 
pas dormir. C'est que les forces de sécurité viennent de quitter Dakar où elles sont venues 
disperser une manifestation du Social Democratic Front (SDF), explique le gouverneur de la 
province du Littoral, Faï Yengo Francis. Une fois le secteur bouclé, quelques policiers remontent 
dans leurs camions pour s'en aller. C'est après leur départ, et à la faveur de la tombée de la nuit, 
que des centaines et des centaines de jeunes gens installent des barricades sur les routes, 
incendient des pneus et se livrent à des déprédations. Stations d'essence, véhicules dont un bus de 
la Socatur, et d'autres biens sont saccagés ou brûlés. Pillages et braquages sont perpétrés dans des 
habitations et des commerces. Dakar et Village, sur l'axe lourd Douala-Yaoundé, sont 
                                                 
26 Ability to an audience to assign meaning to media representations, even if these were not intended ( Danesi, 
2009:265) 
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particulièrement touchés. Toute la nuit, les forces de sécurité interviennent. Un mort27, Gingay 
Louvert Fouambouh, est enregistré alors qu'un blessé grave, Ngeugang Guetnberg, est interné à 
l'hôpital Laquintinie, de source policière. 24 personnes sont interpellées ( Tchakam, 2008:1). 
 
In fact that article, Cameroon tribune , reporting a state official notes that the policemen 
intervene to stop the SDF’s rally which was about to happen. It is just after this intervention 
and in the absence of policemen, when started some indiscriminate acts of violence and 
looting by young people. As a result the policemen intervened during the whole night . One 
person name Gingay Louvert Fouamboh died and another one was  seriously injured. 24 
people were arrested. In this story the policemen are portrayed as those who intervene,  which 
means  those who happen in the time between events or those who interrupt an action or a 
process by happening ( Oxford,2002:539). Therefore the policemen’s aim in the 
neighbourhood of ‘rond point Madagascar ‘ was to interrupt the acts of violence. By 
portraying the policemen in this manner their actions become legitimate in contrast to those 
of youth which appear unjustified  and ruthless. Such a view is echoed by the headlines of the 
No 90555245 of Cameroon Tribune , 26th February 2008: “Violences aveugles et destructions 
injustifiées à Douala/FORCE RESTERA A LA LOI” ( Blind Violence and Unjustified 
Destructions in Douala/ FORCE REMAINS TO LAW) or ‘Douala ,Government Bent on 
Restoring Order’.In this issue of Cameroon Tribune , the article  titled  Revoltantes Derives 
(Annoying Deviations) informs of that the motivations of government’s action/reaction is to 
restore order. 
 
On les croyait définitivement  exorcisés les vieux démons de l’intolérance, de la diabolisation de 
l’adversaire, de la haine des institutions. C’ était sans compter avec les politiciens opportunistes et 
autres acteurs de l’ombre. Si prompte la récupération du moindre malaise social pour avancer leur 
pions. Aux fin de positionément, d’instrumentalisation et de manipulation. Dans le but inavoué de 
conquérir subitement et à moindre frais tout ou partie de pouvoir politique…L’on ne trompera 
personne  à cet egard les acteurs d’une telle enterprise criminelle se rendent coupable d’une 
violence aussi révoltante qu’injustifiée( Pondi,2008:3). 
 
Here, Cameroon Tribune  acknowledges  that there is a social crisis in the country , a ‘ 
malaise social’ to use its own terminology . However it rejects the fact that the social malaise 
                                                 
27 Considering the identities of the victims cited in the papers we are analysing, during the riot in ‘rond point 
Dakar’ it seems that there were at least 3 victims instead of 2 for Mutations and 1 for Cameroon Tribune.  
93 
 
as he puts it can be a justifiable impulse for the current acts of violence. According to him 
this violence are the fact of opportunist politicians and other actors of the shade trying to 
destabilise the regime by the means of violence. In his view their actions are merely criminal. 
Thus it is really interesting to see how the rationale of this article follow or introduce the 
Biya’s perspective of this event became apparent  one day later ( Wednesday 27 February 
2008) in his address to the nation. 
Our country is witnessing a situation which brings back unpleasant memories of a period we 
thought was long gone. 
While it may be understandable that when negotiations fail, the demands of a group are sometimes 
expressed through strike action, it is unacceptable that such action should serve as a pretext for 
outpourings of violence against people and property. Besides, it is now established that any 
industrial dispute can always be resolved through negotiation. 
In actual fact, that is not the problem. What is at issue is the use, not to say exploitation of the 
transporters’ strike for political ends. For some people, who by the way, did not hide their 
intentions, the objective is to obtain through violence what they were unable to obtain through the 
ballot box, that is to say, through the normal functioning of democracy. 
They therefore did not hesitate to throw into the streets bands of youths who were joined by 
delinquents lured by the possibility of looting.  The results are there: public buildings destroyed or 
burnt down, shops and businesses looted or devastated (Post,2008:1). 
According to the president Biya, the country is undergoing some events reminding  a painful 
epoch- ghost town, my emphasis- which was considered as no longer relevant. For him the 
strike of transporters is the surface of this social conflict. The real cause of this conflict 
should be found in the deeds of his political opponents. Unable to attend their goals through a 
fair election they are now manipulating young people .Those ‘apprenti sorciers’ as he called 
them later in his speech, has intrumentalized the transporters’ strike and youth  for their own 
sake. In this part of Biya’s speech we can realize that the question of constitutional 
amendment is eluded. While he recognize that there is a conflict, he ascribed the caused of 
this conflict and  labelled it ‘social’. In so doing , he moves the referent of understanding of 
the cause of violence firstly from the constitutional amendment to the transporters strike , and 
secondly  from transporter strike to the actions of political opponents. This process of 
fabrication of  a new meaning for the current violence construct the legitimacy of  Biya’s plan 
to restore order. The protestations have been firstly disconnected with the political, secondly 
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limited to a specific social space, and thirdly abounded by law or more clearly projected into 
the sphere of illegality. It is therefore with confidence but also with a fabricated legality that 
he says later in his speech: . ‘It should therefore be made absolutely clear that Cameroon is a 
Constitutional state and intends to remain so. It has democratic institutions which are 
functioning normally. It is within this framework that the nation’s problems are addressed. ’. 
In order to fully understand the implications of  Biya’s statement  it is important to 
comprehend the notion of order or constitutional state  within the frame of  a rhetorical 
engine of the legal command28. 
On the other hand , Le Messager of 26 February 2008 has a different tone as one of its  
headlines suggest :LA REVOLTE DU PEUPLE ( PEOPLE’s REVOLT). For this paper the 
demonstrations which are occurring in the country  are the illustration of people’s agency. 
The strike launched by the transporters have been followed also by the majority of the 
population .While it recognizes that there have been some acts of vandalism, it emphasis 
remains on the plethora of grievances of protesters. These grievances encompassed the 
constitutional amendment, the resign of Biya, the rising prices of fuel and basic commodities 
etc…The entire paper provides a snapshot of the event in almost the entire country. The 
insights of some quotations took from this newspaper  draw the leading lines of trajectory of 
its frame .For instance ‘ La population donne l’impression d’avoir repris son destin en 
main’(Massoussi,2008:1). Clearly the idea behind this assertion is that the people seems to 
regain the control of their fate therefore the manipulations of some segments of population is 
not on the menu. However the role of the policemen during the protests in Douala is at stake 
as RT (2008:2) puts it: ‘ Mais pendant qu’ils manifestaient pacifiquement , les éléments de la 
gendarmérie les ont dispersés avec du gaz lacrymogène. Les manifestestants ont pris cet acte 
comme de la provocation.’ The paper argues that the protestations were initially peaceful, it 
turns into a violent reaction just after the attempt of the policemen and gendarmes  to stop the 
movement through the use of weapons ( tear gas).  
 
                                                 
28 For Englebert (2009:62) what endures African statehood in times of weakness or failure is legal command 
that is the capacity to control, dominate, extract, or dictate through the law. 
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Besides it is interesting to look at the way this newspaper connects the current acts of 
violence with some other conflicts in the world. In this path the report of the death of a man 
at ‘Village’ is a good example (Awana,2008:3).The first sentence of this article state: ‘ La 
scene rappelle quelque peu la Palestine’ ( “the setting reminds Palestine in some extent”  ) . 
Another article is merely titled : ‘Scènes de guerre à Mendong’ – which means “Episodes of 
warfare in Mendong” (Tamba,2008,3-4). For Le Messager, Cameroon is a battlefield where 
the people are fighting against the regime represented by the policemen and gendarme. The 
reasons of the rise of violence in the country are explained by the misbehaviours of 
policemen and gendarmes in the way they used coercion. Moreover there is not a single cause 
which can capture entirely the drive of this movement, since it is no longer limited to the 
transporters or the youth but drove by an heterogeneous group of people. Consequently the 
grievances expressed justified the diversity of the population involved in the protestations. 
The comparison between the event in Cameroon with the conflict in Palestine and the use of 
the vocabulary of asymmetrical warfare by Le Messager acknowledge the imbalance of 
power between the protesters and the policemen but also the political nature of the protests. 
Further Le Messager assumes that the state has used a disproportionate violence against its 
own civil population .Such type of  representation of state violence betrays its illegitimacy 
and might open the door to the claim for  an international humanitarian intervention. 
 
The Post’s headline of the 3rd March 2008, “CAMEROON: NATION DEMONSTRATIONS 
TIT-BITS”   suggests a chorus of grievances and a spread of people’s actions throughout the 
entire country ( Pefok, Bongben, and Tah, 2008:1). The patchwork of facts contented in this 
paper points out the complexity of actors’ behaviour during the February event. According to 
this paper the act of looting were not the exclusivity of youth. Policemen were also involved 
in the looting of private properties. For instance in an article titled, ‘Gendarmes vandalise 
Magic FM’, The Post reports that gendarmes vandalise this radio because they accused it to 
inciting people’s revolt. In Buea the paper notes that ‘the transporters strike plunged Buea on 
Monday, February 25th  into a  ghost town of sorts. While the paper insists on youth’s acts of 
looting in Amanda , it reports also that at the same time some  activities of a coalition of 
students associations both Anglophone and Francophone which held a meeting in Douala in 
February 17th  declaring that the constitution could only be revised after 2011. The Post 
acknowledges  some acts of violence both by the policemen and the youth in an article titled 
4 Shot, I killed IN Muea. 
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Troops deployed in Muea reportedly shot youths killing one on Wednesday, February 27. A boy 
of about 12 was shot in the chest and he died immediately. Bullets caught three others in their legs 
and buttocks. A certain Roland  Moki was shot in his right buttock, while another, Yenyong 
Abubakar, received a bullet in his ankle. 
 
The third only name we got as Eric , received a bullet in his right leg that was amputated. The post 
learned from Buea Provincial Hospital Annex that five victims injured by police bullet were 
received on Tuesday, February 26. The youth  had  reportedly blocked the entrance and exit of 
Muea. They destroyed part of king David  Squarel Hotel and the house of its owner, Chief David 
Molinge , who allegedly told the protesters to go and strike in Bamenda ( Pefok, Bongben, and 
Tah, 2008:2). 
 
In fact The Post suggests  that the deployment of troops in Muea intails the death of a young 
boy and the injuries of  2 others on February 27th . This action was not an isolated one since 
five other victims were injured by the police the day before. Consequently  the youth 
perpetrated some acts of violence in Muea and destroyed some private properties owned by 
Chief David Molinge. The Chief allegedly urged the protesters to go and strike in Bamenda. 
It is clear that in this article of The Post ,  the troops started the hostilities and the youth react. 
However the article eludes to mention the causes which entailed the presence of troops at 
Muea. By doing so the actions of the troops appear unjustified and take the form of gratuitous 
violence while the youth violence is portrayed as a reaction. Besides The reported allegation 
of Chief Molinge illustrates the rivalry among Anglophone elite between the North-West 
province and South West province. The former is well known as a core of political opposition 
and the second famous for his sympathy for the Biya’s regime. Moreover the CPDM’ elite of 
those regions  compete for positions in Biya’s government. By urging the protesters to go and 
strike in Bamenda, the Chief Molinge is described as a guardian of the regime, a 
characteristic which in this context of uprising is not fashionable and which may explained 
the attacks upon his property. 
 
On February 27th an address of the Cameroonian government has been published in 
Cameroon tribune, declaring the reduction of  the price of gas and oil as the outcome of the 
negotiations between the government and the representatives’ of transporters undertaken on 
the 26th February. The government has stated that the application of the new pricing start on 
27th February. The paper reports that after the government’s declaration , the transporters 
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called off  the strike. Despite the calling of transporters and the measures of Cameroonian 
authorities,  Cameroon Tribune acknowledges that the strike continues in Yaoundé  and notes 
the decrease of acts of violence in Douala (Tchakam,2008:5). Unlikely,  The Post points out 
the bias in the agreement between the government and the transporters and provides some 
reasons which justified the continuity of the strike in an article titled  Drivers Say their 
Leaders Were Bribed: 
 
Drivers have accused their leaders of being corrupted by the government for  them to call off the 
strike. They say that this explains why they did not negotiate well enough. To them , it is normal 
for the government to raise fuel by 16 FCFA only to take it downs by a meagre FCFA 6. 
Following the accusations , some of the syndicate offices are said to have been destroyed and the 
leaders are in hiding. Though there are threats for the strike to resume on  Monday, the president 
of the Taxi Drivers Trade Union has maintained that efforts are underway to ensure that the 
arrested drivers are released before Monday (Pefok, Bonghen and Tah, 2008:1). 
 
On Thursday February 28 , the NHRO (2008:16) reports that  the main cities of the country 
were under surveillance by the military the day long due to the measures taken by the head of 
State on Wednesday night during his address to the nation. There was a relative calm but the 
tension remains in most cities. Apart from ‘le Jour’, a privately-own daily press newspaper 
and Cameroon-tribune, no news paper was available in the capital city .The publishers of 
press organs were invited to the Ministry of communication .The gendarmerie invade Magic 
FM, confiscated their equipment and  some mobile phones belonging to journalists. On 
Friday 29th  February due to the massive presence of the law enforcement officers calm 
returned to the country. 
 
4.4  THE  WORK  OF  THE  POLITICAL  DISCOURSE  IN 
CAMEROONIAN  MEDIA  :  CONSTRUCTING  A  MEANING  OF 
YOUTH IN RELATION TO VIOLENCE 
 
 
Political discourse in the media is a complex phenomenon incorporating institutional 
discourse, media discourse and mediated political discourse. As institutional discourse, it 
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differs from everyday conversation in being subject to institutional goals and procedures. As 
media discourse it is different from other types of institutional discourses by being above all, 
public discourse addressed to a mass media audience. This sets it apart from the discourse of 
other institutions such as mediated political discourse as it is the outcome of the encounter of 
two different institutional discourses those of politics and media (Lauerbasch and Fetzer, 
2007:15).The discourse in the media is a means used by the power elites to (re) produce their 
social domination . This section analyse the discourse on youth in relation to violence in 
Cameroonian media ( mostly newspapers). 
 
In his Address to the nation on the 27th February when the violence in the country escalated, the 
President  Biya  notes that  ‘They [ his political opponents, my emphasis] therefore did not 
hesitate to throw into the streets bands of youths who were joined by delinquents lured by the 
possibility of looting.  The results are there: public buildings destroyed or burnt down, shops 
and businesses looted or devastated.’. He adds that ‘Cameroonians knows that disorder can 
only bring about calamity and misery. We cannot allow that to happen . To those who are 
responsible for manipulating the youth to achieve their aims, I want to tell them that their 
attempts are doomed to failure. All legal means available to Government will be brought into 
play to ensure the rule of law’. While he thinks that the protestors have been manipulated, 
Biya  distinguishes among them in one side youth and in another side what he called 
‘delinquent’. In his view it seems like youth are not delinquent or the youth are not supposed 
to be delinquent. To understand what he really means by youth it is important to return to his 
speech during the ghost town , at that time condemning the youth involvement in the 
protestations , he said ‘ la politique aux politiciens et l’école aux écoliers’ ( politicians should 
be concerned with politics while  pupils should be concerned with school). Therefore the 
distinction made between youth/delinquent it is in fact a distinction between 
student/delinquent. In his viewpoint a student is not a delinquent. What does delinquent 
means for him ? It appears clearly that by delinquent he refers to those protesters who were 
involved in the acts of  looting. But how can he be sure that the students were not  involved in 
such acts ? There is not the point,  because in his rationale he equates  protestation to a mere 
act of manipulation by his  political opponents. Since the protestations originate from a  
political action , they   exclude students in principle. Further the youth's protests per se loose 
their autonomy through the alleged manipulation of his political opponents ; but at the same 
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time its political significance ( if there was ) is removed. At this stage we can understand the 
usefulness of his distinction between youth/delinquent. In Biya’s calculus Youth=Political 
opponents but in the real world political opponents = Youth + Political parties – if we 
consider that youth have specific grievances. The real function of  Biya’ equation is to negate 
the existence of a new political opponent (youth) while tackling two political opponents 
(youth + political parties) in the figure of one only  (political parties). By relegating the youth 
violence to political parties’ outcome , Biya clothes the former with the illegitimacy of the 
latter. For Biya the action of his political opponents (political parties) through the use of 
youth violence is illegal since he won a fair election. Further those delinquents involved in 
the protestations are violating the laws of the state protecting the Cameroonian citizens. To 
overcome the turmoil created by such illegal actions , Biya process by announcing the 
forthcoming measures regarding law enforcement , by mentioning early that the Cameroonian 
knows that  misery and suffering result from  disorder .This  process has two direct 
objectives. The first one is to reinforces the legitimacy of state violence and the second one is 
to appear as acting on the behalf of the general interest of the population while using state 
violence. In this respect Mbembe (n.d:319)  argues that :  
As a counterpoint to political imaginaries that make the project of domestication of violence their 
central object are cultural configurations where politics consists in conserving individual life by 
virtue of the presupposition of its sacrifice. In other words, the production of political imaginaries 
hinges on two parameters : the fear of death and the will to survive.... 
For individual subjects , immunizing themselves against death involved continually calculating the 
risk to which their words and actions could expose them and contriving, at any price, the means of 
avoiding such situation or extracting themselves from it (Esposito, 2000:25-35). 
In such circumstances, the angle of refraction from which the subject considered life and gauged 
the political environment was the desire to avoid death at all costs. And it is this desire that was its 
corollary , but to build uncertainty. Instability and the unexpected became from this vantage point, 
resources for the exercises of power. 
Thus the function of Biya’s  speech is also to strengthen the status quo in people’s political 
imaginaries which seems to be challenged by youth’s protests in the country. Biya’s 
viewpoint and political action  is rooted in the Cameroonian political history and behaviours. 
For example the declaration- this declaration aggravated the situation just as the address of 
the president’s Biya did  during the  February’s event - of  Peter Agbor Tabi -minister of 
education accompanied with more than two hundred gendarmes in Yaoundé  University 
campus -  during the students’ protests (parliament) against the imposition of special levies 
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upon them by university authorities, on May 7th , 1996  is evocative:’ You people already 
know me and the sanctions I can take against you caught striking. If you want to march, go 
on marching, but I advise you to run rather than to march. If you want violence, I will teach 
you what it means to love it ( Herald quoted in Konings ,2002:197)’. As a result we can re-
assert that the risk of death is embedded in any attempt to protest in Cameroon and its fear 
works both as a mechanism to avoid protest and protect one’s own life.  However since the 
state necro-power hasn’t been able to eliminate youth’s protests in the country it therefore 
important to explore how those who refuse to die pour rien have been  represented (or 
involved) in the February event. 
In Tiko, CT gathered that vandals attacked the main market yesterday morning and scared away 
vendors and buyers. We contacted by telephone ) the assistant Divisional Officer for Tiko 
subdivision Mrs Eyong Charlotte who informed that there were no taxi or commercial motor-bike 
in the street. She said the scare was extended to many schools whose pupils and students had to 
rush back home... 
Kumba was seriously affected by the strike action. Contacted by phone, the Meme Divisional 
Delegate of Communication. Mr Tafong Tchichi , said strikers had erected barricades in town and 
no transport vehicle visible on the streets. He noted that the situation was still as tense as it was 
when the strike started on Monday. An attempt to burn the taxation on Office at the Buea Road ( in 
kumba)  was halted by the security forces (Mbonkwon,2008:6). 
This article of Cameroon Tribune reflects without ambiguity the position of state officials, it 
provides their reports of the event. Here we can see that the vandals are represented as a 
threat for the rest of the population because they destroy public and private properties and 
avoid the student to undertake their class.  They are neither identified as  strikers nor as 
students. But they are portrayed as using the strike as a way to channel their violence. Besides 
there is nothing about the identity of those vandals , nothing is mentioned about their age and 
their profession or sex. They  are represented as a common enemy of the rest of the 
population ( students, vendors and  buyers). The dichotomy between vandals and the rest of 
the population corroborates the distinction  youth/delinquent- a vandal is synonym of 
delinquent. But who are those vandals? Another article  of this paper, provides some details 
about their identity. 
Early on Monday, 25th  February, the departmental capital of Haut Nkam has been by hundreds of 
demonstrators blockading the traffic in the city. All the shops have been closed  and the students of 
different schools of the town have been ejected from classes by demonstrators. Some acts of 
vandalism have been also recorded but the situation remains in control... 
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This peace of Monday  will be quickly replaced by  the violence of the first hours of Tuesday, 26th  
February on 2008 notably in the city of Bafoussam. Population woke up and discovered the 
blockade in the main streets of the town... 
Demonstration is going to turn in drama in the mobile grouping of intervention of Bafoussam 
taken by attack by demonstrators apparently obviously angry. As part of face to face has tightened 
and while police force remains calm despite the rain of pebbles which beats down on them, 
gunshots erupted and  Tantoh  Emmanuel ages of  23 years  died and  others  get wounded... 
The relative young age of the demonstrators has been noticed , this imply the presence of some 
manipulators hidden in the shade ( Biyeck, 2008:6). 
 In this text the opposition between the vandals and the rest of the population is also relevant. 
This text notes that the protesters are youth and they started the hostilities ( using stones) 
against the military. During the clashes one youth has been killed and others were wounded. 
Cameroon Tribune does not describe the military shouting youth but represent the death of a 
young people as an inevitable accident resulting from the imbalance of powers (stones/guns) 
during the clashes. It adds that because of the young age of protestors it seems that they have 
been manipulated by some actors of the shade. Therefore it appears that this paper  denies the 
agency of Cameroonian youth and relegates their actions to the artefact of political 
manipulations of people in the shade and the drive to loot. But the young people represented 
in this manner are not students or more clearly are not supposed to be students as the state 
officials ( gendarmerie and police) have claimed during the violence in Douala on the 23rd  
February . According to them they are  volatile youth addicted to drugs and perhaps 
manipulated ( Mutation,2008). 
The strike organized since Monday in the main cities of the country is a demonstration of a 
generalised discontentment . Different attempts of certain members of the government and punters 
of the  Cameroonian People Democratic Movement (CPDM) to manipulate the public opinion in 
governmental and independent media, have also irritated the population. The police and the 
gendarmerie called to repress the populations, should consider these parameters. They failed in the 
mission of advice and supervision of populations (Massoussi, 2008:1) 
According to  Le Messager among the protesters there are many youth as well. For this paper 
the protestations are the fact of the whole population and that situation reveals the failure of 
law enforcement to fill their duty – advice and control the population. The February’s event 
for this paper is the theatre of conflict between youth and states’ officials ( policemen and 
gendarmes). Here youth are identified as a component of the group of protesters which is the 
whole population. 
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“Paul Biya, youth before the revision of constitution ', they could read on the placard held by a 
child less than 14 years  old. Around him, one packs of young people come from Bépanda area 
gets ahead towards ‘Carrefour écoles publique of Deido '. They advance by singing slogans 
roughly audible under the gaze of  stunned populations. The police station of the 9th  division 
nearby is warned. The policemen take out nightstick, willing to disperse this crowd come to fluster 
their quietude. They collide against unusual demonstrators, toddlers, who for most part sound like 
pupils. Tearing off clapping and dinghies of the public, they stop in front  of the national flag 
standing  near the police station (Batana, 2008:3) 
The scene reminds a little of the Palestine. It is almost 10 o’clock at 'texaco aeroport'. Five young 
peoples, pot washes in one huge They , push a carrier - very by running and by howling, ‘they 
have killed! they have killed! on a carrier, lies the body of a young man of  about 20 years (Awana, 
2008:3). 
However the terminology used to portray youth  refers to innocence, immaturity but 
sometime violence. For instance the toddler (‘bambin’) which means ‘child who is just 
beginning to walk’(oxford. 2002:1109); or the expression ‘packs  of young people’( meutes 
de jeunes) referring  to  the aggressive character of youth. In so doing Le Messager just like 
Cameroon Tribune denies youth’s agency . By victimizing them or hyperbolizing their 
characteristics, it validated the superiority of state’s necro-power and its rationale and 
paradoxically weakens the people’s revolt it pretends to report and in some extent to support. 
Le Quotidien Mutations attempt to restore the agency of youth through this article about 
violence in Douala on 23 rd February.  
On Saturday, 23 February on 2008. The populations bordering the street of the place  called ‘ rond 
point Madagascar’ begin to whisper  on reasons of not keepings of a planned step by SOCIAL 
DEMOCRATIC FRONT (SDF). On the  free road  supposed to host the demonstration , the 
passers-by have left since some minutes  and life takes back his normal lesson. It is while a 
column of vehicles of the gendarmerie arrived. The gate of protection of the tank bends down and 
a suspicious manoeuvre begins. 
 
The people passing by this place and those sat in front of the pubs near the crossroad are sprinkled. 
Tear gases are thrown in every direction. Guns with pump shoot  and project  gas tubes... 
The night falls on Douala, and the suburb of Madagascar-Brazzaville-axis is going to live the 
worst riots never known by this corner of the  economic capital. In their entrenchment, the young 
persons of these quarters organize quick-witted answer against ' those who have thrown the tear 
gas … 
 
103 
 
More high other young persons organized in solidarity with the movement have attacks a gas 
station belonging  to Tradex company. The gas station called Mobil was subjected to the meme 
goes out. His shop was looted. It is even with rapidity that its shop is ransacked by angry people 
(Kwebo,2008:4). 
 
In this text  youth are organizing themselves  to react against  state violence and through their 
impulse the rest of the population followed the movement. Further the acts of lootings and 
destruction of private properties are perpetrated  later by another group of youth who join the 
movement in solidarity with those who initiated it. The sequences of the event are gradual 
first the cancelation of SDF’s rally, second the state violence, third the reaction of youth 
explicated by the destruction of state’s symbols and finally the act of looting linked with the 
enlargement of the movement. Still the main protesters are young people  and  the expression 
of their grievances induces also greed. But right at the beginning of this article, Mutations 
disconnects the cancelation of SDF rally with state violence and links the latter with the 
violent reactions of youth in a tacit fashion. In so doing  he raises some doubts about the 
accuracy of his story  and weakens it own text as a counter-narrative. Because the  presence 
of SDF even as a passive actor  in this text and  context of political  instability is a pretext 
which can be capitalise  by the State officials to nullify the youth agency . In this respect the 
Cameroonian Minister of Communication stated that : ‘As I said earlier, the nerve centre of 
the trouble is in Douala V, IV, III and a part of Douala. These areas are the areas where there 
is a strong presence of SDF. Government will take its responsibility to restore order 
(Forbinake,2008:4)’.The Post provides a more nuanced picture of the event of Saturday , 23rd 
February in Douala. 
 
Troops in the evening  of Saturday, February 23 , reportedly shot to death two young people  and 
wounded others they (troops) clashed with anti-constitutional demonstrators in Douala. 
The victims, whose names we did not readily get; one is lying in the mortuary, while the other is 
critical condition in hospital. Early, troops had dispersed a group of demonstrators after the SDF 
littoral Provincial Chair, Jean Michel Nintcheu, addressed SDF militants and other sympathisers  
Rond Point Madagascar. 
 
He was requesting Littoral Governor, Francis Fai Yengo, to lift the Ban he had slammed on public 
demonstrations. But later, irate commercial motorcycle riders commonly called bendskin, started 
another demonstration, demanding the lifting of the ban on Equinox RV/Radio, the decrease of 
fuel price and end the bid to amendment the constitution. 
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A confrontation later erupted between the troops and riders. It was at this point the police open 
fire, killing one and wounding the other in Quartier Belongue and Madagascar. The furious riders 
also burnt down a newly acquired SOCATUR bus run by the Douala City Council ( Pefok, 
2008:1). 
 
In this article it is clear that the expresssion “young people” encompasses also the bendskin 
drivers. In fact according to The Post , the bendskin drivers started a protestation 
independently of the rally planned by the SDF and for many reasons (lifting of the ban of 
Equinoxe RV/Radio, the decrease of the fuel price) but still in connection with the 
constitutional amendment. The death of two young people is the outcome of the confrontation 
opposing bendskin drivers and the police officials; and according to the Post, it seems that the 
young people who died were bendskin drivers. Therefore we can question the use of  the term 
youth ( or the expression “young people”) in the Cameroonian newspapers. Does the word 
youth refers to some characteristics or to a social group according to these newspapers? It 
seems that youth in the newspapers which we are analysing  refers more to some 
characteristic like age, immaturity or innocence and less to a coherent social category . In 
addition by putting the emphasis on the age of victims and protestors these newspapers 
denounce their youth’s immaturity and pronounce youth’s innocence. Hence the youth’s 
portrayals in both public and independent newspapers remain trapped in the dynamic parties’ 
politics therefore of continuous denial of youth’s agency. In this regard,  John Fru Ndi the -
leader of the political  opposition- in  line with Biya’s address states that   : 
 
Some white collar thugs manipulated the State apparatus and his information system, who helped 
Cameroon top corruption league and are unfortunately still free and in position of power, want to 
escape the of Ondo Ndong [ former member of state official and member of the CPDM] and 
others and have therefore decided to loot and burn our fatherland in order to change the ongoing of 
their imminent demise ( Post News line, 2008:1) 
 
Although the reference to Bendskin drivers in the newspapers  is slightly different. In reality 
there is not a particular focus on this group as instigator of violence in the government owned 
press, Cameroon Tribune . This paper refers to young people incline to use violence just as 
delinquent or vandals. A teleological reading of the collective actions of bendskin’s drivers  
can equate their social behaviours to those of vandals or delinquents (see, Chapter 4). It 
seems that by representing the violent youth as vandal or delinquent , the government’s 
officials  and  state- owned press is also targeting the bendskin drivers. But why do they do it 
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implicitly ? We have seen that in his address to the nation , the president Biya recognises the 
relevancy of transporters strike, urges for negotiations and  condemns violence . However by 
connecting the violence to delinquent and the actors in the shade the president Biya avoids a 
public  and direct conflict with the transporters- a conflict he could probably  looses because 
of the legitimacy and the resilience of the movement - but by labelling such actions illegal he 
tackles the very mode of protests of Bendskin drivers and other actors using the same means 
to threat his regime.  
4.5. REPRODUCTION OF THE DOMINANT REPRESENTATION OF 
YOUTH  
 
In a press release published in Cameroon tribune on 27th February 2008 , Simon Tonye Bakot 
,the Catholic Bishop of  Yaoundé says: 
Violence has never had benefit of reason in any way. The claim of fundamental rights is legitimate 
as long as it is evicted  from any will of violence and destruction... 
That the Cameroonians should not be driven by violence but by reason. May the Christians and 
volunteers present in different political areas, economic and social become artisans of peace, 
friendship and of comprehension in the service of the good for all. Cameroon undergone too much 
similar  violence in the past , so that it would be improbable to do not wish that common sense and 
wisdom, justice and respect for civil peace continue to sustain the life in our country. 
That all Christians, men and women and volunteers,  put an end to any acts of violence and other 
evils which may threat the good step of our country... 
We invite you all  to pray for our country, you Christians, believers and all the volunteers for the 
recovering of a lasting peace in our country . 
That God bless us and that He grants us his peace. 
 
In this declaration , the catholic bishop29 is not only targeting catholic or the Christians but 
the believers in general . He points out the inaccuracy of violence to express for the 
grievances of human rights and emphasises its destructive character. He opposes the use of 
violence with the use of reason and recommends the Christian and other actors involved in 
                                                 
29 The viewpoints of the Catholic church is not homogenous, The former cardinal of Douala Bishop Christian 
Tumi has been really critical of the regime in the issues related to state violence and human right abuses. 
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the social arena in Cameroon to become peace-makers. The bishop reminds that Cameroon 
encountered extreme violence in the past and because of that the common sense and the 
wisdom dictate a civil peace in the country. Bishop Tonye preaches Cameroonian  to stop 
using violence and other evils which can threat the stability in the country. For him [ Bishop 
Tonye ] those who use violent in the country are not rational since the violence is destructive 
and remains a threat for social stability. This position echoed the viewpoint of state officials 
who describe the violent youth as drug addicted or merely delinquent. The inaccuracy of 
violence as a mode of protestation and the emphasis of its destructive character have been 
also accentuated by the president Biya in his address to the nation . The political theology of 
violence of Biya and the bishop are quite similar.  
 
Furthermore in his ‘sermon’ the bishop preaches the believers to abandon violence and pray  
for peace. But what type of peace is he talking about  ? Surely the absence of violence of 
February event’s intensity. Therefore the bishop is speaking about a negative peace. In this 
press release the legitimacy of the bishop is used for the political gain of the regime and the 
Catholic church. If we can agree that it is one of the prerogatives of the bishop to  act in 
coalition with the government to sustain social stability, we can also question the type of 
stability the bishop want to sustain and the real driver of its action. The third chapter of this 
thesis response clearly to the first question, for the second one  I will draw my argument from 
Bayart idea the so called “the governmentality30 of belly”. Bayart (1973, 521-524) notes that 
the relationships between churches and the state are political in nature and institutional in 
many extent. But it is difficult to understand these relationships without taking in 
consideration the ethnicity, families and personalisation. Concerning the historical 
relationship between the churches and the state in Cameroon, he notes that: 
 
                                                 
30 Gouvernementality is defined by Michel Foucault ( Foucault quoted in Bayart , 1989:8) in this word ’ There is 
number of possible actions: it operates  on the field of possibilities or comes to register the behaviour of active 
subjects: it encourages, leads, he diverts, he makes easier or make it more difficult it enlarge or he restricts, it is 
more or less probable, to the lesser extent it limits or avoids absolutely; but it is definitely a way of  acting upon 
one or  many active subjects,  as long that  they  act or as they are likely to act ' 
’ 
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Far from expressing only particular interests, churches consider themselves as universal. The 
achievement of their pastoral mission has therefore caused political conflicts, and not religious 
antagonism as such. However they just partially substitute of the structures which are considered 
fully political. They constraint their own actions: they know that the regime would not support to 
be criticised. On the other hand, if Protestant-especially presbyterians and the well known 
evangelical pastors feel undoubtedly a deep nostalgia of “ l’Union of the Population of Cameroon 
(UPC)”, at least an historical one . The Catholic Church has been always against this movement in 
whom she saw a serious danger <communist>.T he rebels reacted to this unfriendly feeling by 
attacking systematically the catholic missions. Broadly the called for terrorism and violence were 
not fashionable in the Christian circles and this inform the Catholic church position to stay apart 
from the nationalist left. Therefore the catholic church haven’t brought any logistical support to 
UPC -If we except individual cases among which, the most famous case with Bishop Dogmo. 
Similarly , they haven’t participated in any attempt to overthrown the regime, except  the confused 
and probably  imaginary ‘ complot sainte croix’. 
 
The relationship between the churches and the state is  therefore a relationship of connivance 
. While the  question of their own survival it is at the centre , the churches do pledge for the 
general interests as long as these interests do not threat their very interests. Historically  the 
Catholic church has condemned the use of violence by the dissidents , such attitude toward 
violence is justified by their fear of the spreading of communists’ ideals- a fear raised by, a 
nationalist movement (UPC) connected to communist regimes around the period of 
independence- in the country and a dogmatic rejection of violence and terrorism. 
Alternatively, the position of the Bishop Tonye in the realm of politics of belly can also 
inform his disposition to act in favour of the regime. Inspired from Achilles Mbembe’s essay 
Afriques Indociles,  Bayart (1973:12) argues that the religious leaders in coalition with the 
ruling elite , used their social imaginary to sustain authoritative regime in one side . On the 
other side churches follow the logic of accumulation of wealth in  the poscolony just like the 
ruling elite. Thus the catholic church perhaps like other churches in the country, is 
contributing in its own way to the reproduction of the system.  Such a practice is not limited 
to the churches but it is illustrative of the political behaviours of the power elite in Cameroon, 
as this report of the Post  acknowledges : 
Archbishop Esua 
We expected a fatherly advice from the head of state when we heard he was going to address the 
nation. Unfortunately that fatherly advice never came, I called youth to turn to Christ despite their 
grievances because violence can never solve any problem. 
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Simon Achidi Achu [former Anglophone ,member of the government] 
I call on the youths to exercise restraint because Biya remains the only leader they should look up 
to. We are destroying our houses just as we did in 1990/91 and we are going to be the hardest hit 
and losers in all of this. 
Simon Nkwenti, Civil Society 
Biya’s address worsened matters because he [ Biya] missed the target and instead of addressing 
the real issues as presented by the protesters , he instead directed missiles at opposition that had 
nothing to do either the strike action. Nkwenti called on the youth to restrain form looting and 
wanton, destruction. 
Fon Chafah [ traditional Chief], President General Northwest fon’s Union , NOWEFU 
I was devastated and disgraced by the extent the strike action look. Let the youths come to us the 
Fons for dialogue so that as custodians of our traditions and auxiliarities to the administration, we 
can channel their grievances to the highest authority. I congratulate President Biya for his prompt 
reaction which to him brought calm to the most part of the nation ( Post newline,2008:1-2). 
 
To sum up there is not something we can call a counter-narrative of youth in the political 
discourse in the Cameroonian newspapers we have examined. Youth is a mute social category 
still in search for its own leaders or for a genuine narrative liberated from the miasma of 
parties’ politics and others impurities of the systems ( corruption, nepotism, neo-
patrimonialism , etc…).  Such a situation may be due to inherent vagueness of the term 
youth. Even the understand of youth by the Cameroonian media remains fuzzy despite the 
fact that it nullifies the agency of the people  they describe-there is not a clear cut on the age 
and other social and biological characteristics. It seems that the media construction’s of  the 
term “youth” would like to operate more in the term of a relationship between  ‘ainee-
cadet 31 ’( elder-junior). Thus more as means of domination and less as a social group. 
Therefore we can interrogate the relevancy of this term (youth) as a social category in 
Cameroon.  De Boeck and Honwana (2005: 3) note that: 
 
As Bourdieu remind us, youth is ‘just a word; (Bourdieu, 1993). We understand childhood and 
youth to be historically situated social and cultural constructions (Aries, 1962; James and Prout, 
                                                 
31 It is the relationship between youth and elders, which according to Bayart the process of historical 
reproduction of  social inequalities and political domination  (Toulabour, 1985:448).  
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1990). The concept ‘youth’ is, to adopt Durham phrase, a ‘social shifter’: it is a relational concept 
situated in a dynamic context, a social landscape of power, knowledge rights, and cultural notions 
of agency and personhood. According to Durham’ to imagine youth and to imagine the concept 
relationally, is to imagine the grounds and forces of sociality’ (Durham, 2000: 116). Definitions 
and notions of children and youth cannot, therefore, be simply based on biology or chronological 
age. They do not denote a fixed group or a demographic cohort (Aguillar, 1998;Kurimoto and 
Simone, 1998).Such social and cultural variables as gender, religion, class, responsibilities, 
expectations, race and ethnicity play important parts in defining who is regarded or considers 
themselves as child or youth-and ways young persons are perceived do not necessarily coincide 
with their self-definitions. 
 
Jua (2003:17-18) argues that in Cameroon, the state control the borderline between youth and 
adulthood and the markers that it uses in defining youth tend to change. According to him the 
ambiguity in definition of youth is acknowledge by the fact that whereas the penal code 
stipulates that criminal responsibility starts at the age of 18, the electoral law gives the 
franchise only to those who are 21 and above. Further, he [Jua] adds that the elasticity of 
‘adult; becomes obvious  when we explore  carefully the text of the ruling party (CPDM), 
which comprehends youth as being between 15 and 25 years old. But in practice is common 
to find members of its youth wing, especially national officials, who are more than 40 years 
of age. Therefore if we look at youth as a heterogeneous category, we should also look at the 
narrative it might produce as heterogeneous. Consequently, there is the possibility of 
misrecognition of a  produced counter-narrative due maybe to the limitation of the selected 
data we analysed for the current study  since then; or simply to the doxic32 attitude we share 
in common with journalists in the way we look at youth. Thus in agreement with Diouf who 
argues that young Africans can be seen as searching for a narrative, we would like to turn a 
little bit our focus by locating youth’s agency inside on the practice of rebellion as lifestyle as 
a whole. 
 
 
                                                 
32 ‘It is when the embodied structures and the objective structures are in agreement, when perception is 
constructed according to the structures of what is perceived, everything seems obvious and goes without saying, 
It is the doxical experience in which one attributes to the world a deeper belief than all beliefs (in the ordinary 
sense), since does not think of itself as a belief (Bourdieu, 1998:81).’ 
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CHAPTER 5:  THE PRACTICE OF REBELLION AS A 
LIFESTYLE 
 
 
Note from the front 
Crime vs. . . . 
Who’re the criminals, the gangs or the government? 
Did the Capital just happen to have the power to punish men? 
Monopolice manipulate majoraties to run with them 
So whats the police force but a resource to reinforce the plan of the dominant? 
I’ am haunted by questions, spending time behind bars 
Statistics on TV, that concede we’re sadistic, deceive me 
‘cause murder and thievery thrives on all sides of the lines that divide class. 
I take pepper-spray with a pinch a’ssault and battery and I’m charged to step’n say: 
“yo  honour, go bother the office of your bosses where the crime starts’ 
And  I ask, while cleaning dirty white collars for a living, 
Why  law suites the raw brutes in board rooms that horde loot? 
They set the precedent then send the president to assure you, 
His lady justice, is blind. But she’s got contacts that say too! 
The colonists, the capitalists and wordy bright scholars make a killing. 
(Marlon Burgess quoted in Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006:1). 
 
5.1    IN SEARCH FOR A NARRATIVE  : YOUTH, VIOLENCE, AND 
RAP MBOA 
 
If violence per se tends to be silent, it always finds a voice in the legal and religious 
discourses or in the narratives of its perpetrators and victims. Donald Black (Black quoted in 
Wilkinson, 2007:27) argues that: 'Crime becomes social control when state laws and 
protection fail'. Without law the violence may be outrageous, immoral, depressing, hurtful, 
demoralizing and lamentable but is not a crime. The socio-genesis of Law enlightens the 
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forces leading to the construction of the meaning of violence. In fact there are two strands 
explaining how laws are created. For the consensus model, the members of a society by and 
large agreed on what is right or wrong and the law codifies these agreed-upon social values 
(Adler Mueller and Laufer,1998). The second strand is the conflict model, in which power is 
the key for lawmaking. According to this model people with political and economic power 
make laws that protect their interests while using laws to keep the poor at a disadvantage. 
Related to the conflict perspective is the view that social reality in general, including criminal 
law is constructed (Berger and Lukmann; Spector and Kitsuse1987). Brownstein provides a 
succinct statement of this perspective when he argues that: 
 
From the social constructionist perspective, social reality is a product of social interaction in the 
form of individual decision, interpretation and actions. In that individuals act and interaction make 
decisions and interpret their experience in the context of their unique social positions and interest, 
social reality and hence all social phenomena are necessarily constructed in an ideological and 
political context. That is the social world in which we live is designed by us in the context of our 
own values and interests, or more precisely by those among us who have the power to design that 
world in the context of their own values and interests.  
 
The address of the president Biya during the February 2008 illustrates Brownsteins’s 
statement by the virtue of being an explicit form of “legal command”. Further, Mbembe 
(2001:6) notes that  the social reality in Africa is the outcome of  a number of socially 
produced and objectified practices. According to him, ‘These practices are not simply a 
matter of discourse and language, although of course the existential experience of the world 
is here as elsewhere symbolically structured by language; the constitution of the African self 
as reflexive subject also involve doing, seeing, hearing, tasting, feeling, and touching’. 
Acknowledging that the African subject like other human beings engaged meaningful acts, 
Mbembe adds that ’the African subject does not exist apart from the acts that produce social 
reality, or apart from the process by which those practices are, so to speak imbued of 
meanings’. Concerning the logic  of practice,  Bourdieu (1998:82) argues that  “practice has a 
logic which is not that of logic, and thus to apply practical logic is to run the risk of 
destroying the logic one wants to describe with the instrument used to describe it’. Therefore 
the  practice of rebellion as a lifestyle  has its own logic , a logic which is neither the logic 
ascribed to it by the political discourse in the media nor by the logic of any given archetypes 
of traditional custom or culture even if hegemonic. Therefore the practice of rebellion as a 
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lifestyle is asserted in what Biaya (2000) called ‘ Culture de la rue’ ( culture of the street ). In 
this regard the next paragraphs will explore some trends of the popular culture in Cameroon, 
especially the so called the ‘ Mboa rap’.  
 
There is not a clear definition of  the so called ‘rap Mboa ’ in Cameroon and it is not the 
purpose of this paper to vanish the clouds weakening its conceptualization or to do justice to 
its opponents or proponents. However I would like to state that the ‘rap Mboa’ it is an 
appropriation and mutation of American hip hop music and culture by Cameroonians living 
mostly in the country. To paraphrase Caldeira (2006:117) ,  'rap Mboa'  represents languages 
and styles appropriated by groups suffering from discrimination and prejudices worldwide to 
re-elaborate their identities and expose the injustices to which they are subjected. In this 
sense it is to some extent   ‘a monstrous screen, a repugnant mask of the lack of character of 
our artistic project. It fills a place, a geographical plot, small corner where we ( 
Cameroonians) masturbate of our artistic stammerings because we are unable to assert 
ourselves on the global scene’(Nick,2009:1). Presenting ‘ rap Mboa’ in these words is also to 
criticise it.  But the very nature of this critique underpins our interest on it as  an alternative 
media33 for  marginalized youth in Cameroon. For this purpose I will have a look on the work 
of two prominent figures of ‘rap Mboa’ Sultan Hoschmin (n.d.) and Valsero (2008) - those 
artists are former university students in Cameroon, some of their video and songs have been 
censored both by public and some independent media. The reason why I choose these two 
artists is because of the way they engaged the thematic of youth, education, violence and 
political leadership in Cameroon. 
 
In his song  titled What school is that ? ( Quelle  Ecole? ), Hoschmin (n.d.) says: 
 
What school is that ? 
They  say that primary school is for free in Cameroon 
The levies ( frais d’ APE) are still obligatory 
                                                 
33 The new technology of information and communication (internet, computers and CD’s) and some private 
radio and TV facilitate the circulation of ‘rap Mboa’ in Cameroon. 
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Parents have no money to purchase books 
When the school start they are in trouble 
Youth understood that issue, all they are in centre of the cities 
They sell sweeties , they sell groundnuts 
 When is difficult , they smoke weed  
Babylone , look! Look! Look! look! 
 
This song is a critique of the whole educational system in Cameroon as its title informs: What 
school is this? Here Hoschmin reminds that  youth are conscious of the duplicity of the ruling 
elite. While they ( ruling elite )affirm publicly that the school is for free, they keep the levies 
obligatory. Conscious of this situation and anticipating the trouble which this situation may 
cause to their poor parents, young people abandon their studies to get involved in the 
informal sector of the economy in urban cities. Once there, when they (young people) 
undergone difficulties , they just smoke weed to relax . Hoschmin urges Babylone to look, as 
if it was saying to those  who are ruling the country to pay attention to the outcome of their 
political behaviours. Clearly from this statement of the rapper we can see that the youth are 
not mute or naïve and Biya’s urge for students to be dedicated to their studies instead of 
politics is not practical. The delinquency he condemns is according to this text the outcome of 
failure of its own regime. Following the same path in  Lettre au Presi ( Letter to the President 
) , Valsero says that : 
  
Sorry , Prési I have to speak to you 
On your behalf all of them speak but for us none speak 
They pretend to defend your vision, It seems that they follow your agenda 
But you are the one who decided to exclude us from your plan 
Prési , I would like to know why for us things are not working 
 I studied during many years but I did not find a job 
 Do you remember you promise that we would reach the end of the tunnel 
 We are still there and the same people are the masters of the game 
 Look in the country those young girls have no choice 
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Younger than 16 years old,  they sell their body[ prostitution], they have no choice  
 Apparently school ( education)  is useless, ‘ les gars’ [ dudes] ! it sinks like shit. 
While your ministers are swaggering with their Prado. C. A [ luxury cars of government’s official] 
 
Right at the beginning of this text we can see how the relationship elder-cadet is diluted, 
despite the fact that the rapper starts by excusing himself for this unusual letter, the word ‘ 
Prési34’ he uses to designate the head of state show that, along his text he does not intend to 
be the junior par excellence but will use both simulacra of respect  and insolence to  channel 
his aim. Valsero says that ‘ they ‘ ( certainly to mention the patrons and clients of the regime)  
speak for and in favour of the head of state but none is speaking for them ( youth). And he 
recognizes that apparently ‘they’ are following the impulse of Biya, who according to him 
has decided to exclude the youth in his plan35. He reminds the president of a promise he made 
at the height of the economic crisis, which was calling for a better situation for all after this 
difficult phase. In so doing he acknowledges that nothing has changed for them (the youth) 
the same people are ruling and are enjoying the fruits of the state to the detriment of youth. 
Thus having no solution the young girl of 16 years of age become prostitute. Also he portrays 
himself as someone who studied during many years without being able to find a job after his 
graduation therefore concluding that education seems useless. Moreover in the midst of this 
misery the government officials are frustrating the masses with the riches of the state.  
 
In the words of Valsero, Biya’s empty promises are attacked and the relevancy of education is 
questioned in relationship with the predation and the bad-governance of the elite in power. 
The quest for the relevancy of school in Cameroon which rises from these texts  is found and 
echoed among the masses in Cameroon and is made salient by the existing gap between the 
                                                 
34 Presi is common name used by Cameroonians to designate some prominent members of organization and 
other persons in order to get favour from them. Many people can be called presi without being effectively 
member of any organization. In this sense Prési determines mostly the intention of the one who designate rather  
than  the social  status  of  the one who is designated. (De Rosny, 2002). 
35 For Jua (2002:18) , Biya did not fail categorically to appoint youth to position of authorithy. In fact he did 
appoint many connected youths, mostly the children or the protégés of the ruling party‘s barons. These rappers 
are conscious of that, as is acknowledged by some of their songs and texts which are not analysed in this study. 
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salaries of civil servant and the military. Jua (2003:19) notes for example  that , a sergeant in 
the army on index 530 with just a primary or grade school certificate earned 193,855 FCFA 
that is twice the salary of a secondary school teacher with a bachelor  degree. Considering the 
devaluation of cultural capital in Cameroon, for  Hoschmin and Valsero it appears that the 
delinquency is resultant from the system and it is perpetuated by it. Such aview is 
strengthened in another song of Valsero (2008)  entitled ‘ Ce pays tue  les Jeunes’ ( This 
country kills young people) in direct connection with the February event. He notes: 
 
In this situation we understand each other because we speak to each other. 
For 2008, I speak to myself 
For 2008 , I speak to you  
I hope you are fine and that life will treat you well 
Valsero 
I am 28 years of age, no job  but a child and a girfriend to support  
I live in Yaounde, you consider it as a life !  
Gars ( dude) ! it is better to die 
Here we survive through ‘grattage’ [ activities oscillating between  mendicity and informal jobs] 
And often banditry became the option of those who refuse to become homosexual 
Among  Prado .C.A [ luxury cars of government’s official], I am walking on the dust  
The dry mouth , the empty stomach and the eyes in fire like a volcano. 
It is difficult to be young in rio dos Camaroes (Cameroon) 
You should be a child of wealthy family, a homosexual, a policemen or politician 
Meanwhile the same people eat 
It is the same people who starve  
 
The  way the rapper portrays himself illustrate the vagueness and the elasticity of the term  
“youth”.In the tone of the test seems both connected to a form of warning and a call for 
dialogue. In effect accoding to Valsero , young Cameroonians are undergoing the evils of the 
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system and their responses ( banditry,’ debrouillardise’, violence, homosexuality36 ) are just 
some strategies to survive. In so doing the artist points out that the youth are neither listened 
nor considered with dignity but exploited by the political system. In relation to that the chorus 
of this song is evocative: 
 
This country kills young people 
The elders are still in control 
50 years in control 
 After that there are still in control 
The country is degrading  youth 
Youth is dying gradually  
While the elders  in their fortress  are getting drunk with whisky 
 
By highlighting the dichotomy  between an older generation enjoying riches and  stocked in 
power since many years and a dying and excluded young generation, valsero portrays the 
elder as the sources of the evils which threat the existence of youth.  Besides the elders to 
whom the youtth look up for guidance, have let the youth down , by accepting their situation 
and not advocating for agenuine uprising. But this portrayal of the youth’s pain is not a 
victimization as these other verses of ‘letter au prési  can acknowledge: 
 
Even if is often say  people are died 
People are sovereign , they are never wrong  
 People have the numerical advantage, they can mistaken you 
We are not afraid of death  
Even if your friends called the policemen to support you  
They say you are the lion-man  
But their only dream is to kill the lion 
                                                 
36 Homosexuality and prostitution of young women have became a common practice in Cameroon used by the 
youth to survive  and abused by the power elite for sexual or witchcraft related reasons ( Jua,2003:20) 
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They encourage repression 
The use of tear gas against your people is stupid 
Listen to your people , when they  say ‘no’ 
They [people] make perhaps noise but they have grievances 
Presi, what are your intentions? 
Presi , do you have solutions ? 
 Because our situation has to change in the country 
Otherwise , my friend you will have different kind of dreams 
 
By opposing people’s sovereignty against state violence in this fashion, the artist questions 
the legitimacy of the regime and insists on the grievances of the masses. While pointing the 
inaccurate tendency of Biya’s clique to prone the use of violence against the population, the  
rapper also warns him against the ambitions of those members of his crew who the sole aim 
is to replace him. In this text we can see that the pain of youth in Cameroon is not an isolated 
case. Youth’s grievances according to the rapper are in line with those of the rest of the 
population. However he [Valsero] represents youth taking the lead of people’s grievances in 
Cameroon. By presenting  young people in this manner,  the rapper re-enforces the legitimacy 
of youth revolt and attempt to grasp support from the different strata of the population. For 
him the common enemy of the whole population is Biya and his clique. Further the claim that 
the people are not afraid of death, coupled with the fact that he urges Biya to find solutions if 
he wants to continue his job, makes  explicit his view that the recourse to violence is a means 
we should consider to reach  social and political change. Through this lens (“rap Mboa”), 
youth are neither silent nor unaware of the development in Cameroonian politics. Moreover 
they are producing a narrative which is deconstructing the political discourse in the media on 
youth and challenging the traditional mode of actions by its explicit reference to collective 
violence and banditry as a means of survival but also of political change. Therefore we are in 
agreement with  Nyamnjoh ( 2002:663) when he argues that: 
In a context where youth unemployment is rife and where education has ceased to be equated with 
social mobility, the frustrations of Cameroonian young people are quite understandable. The ; 
petit’ , the ‘ sauveteur’ or ‘ debrouillard’, unable to make ends meet in the midst of official 
optimism about the future, and daily provoked by the sumptuous display of wealth by few, finds 
himself at the mercy of violent thoughts and acts, which in turn are used by filthy rich to justify 
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further containment of the poor. Feymania (crookery), prostitution, burglary, riots, are various 
practical strategies for the side-stepped in the face of the repressive instincts of the state. Dreams 
of escape, and fantasies articulated around the West and whiteness, are the mental equivalents of 
those material strategies. 
5.2 THE STYLE OF YOUTH VIOLENCE 
 
To substitute a practical relationship of pre-occupation, immediate presence to a coming moment 
inscribed in the present, with a rational calculating consciousness, positing ends as such , as 
possible, is to raise the question of cynicism, which poses unmentionable  ends as such ( Bourdieu, 
1998:82) .  
In the continuum of a possible  counter-narrative led  by mboa-rap movement or induced by 
some practices of young Cameroonians , this thesis has attempted to situate the use of 
violence during  the February event  within the broad spectrum of  rebellion as a lifestyle. 
The aim of this concluding  section is not to capture the whole logic of the rebellion as a 
lifestyle but  to  emphasise the contextual relevancy  of  its violence and the sign  it may infer  
prior to its  association to the political or the illegal.  
 
By locating the rise of ‘ la culture de la rue’ ( culture of the street) in a context of economic 
crisis in Africa, Biaya (2000:3) notes that: 
In urban middle, this economic crisis also had very important impact on the traditional, family, 
clan or ethnic solidarities, favouring associative groupings in return. There is  at the same time, a 
promotion of the culture of the street, which the basics features are the uniformity of modes of 
survival, the mechanisms of production of the child of the street are (extreme poverty, parental 
divorce, individualism and moral crisis) and invisible and visible violence . Often latent, this one 
widens as soon as institutions and social regulations get weaker and as soon as corruption corrupts 
them. The culture of the street works out therefore in a particular context where forms of violence 
answer (the social violence calling one against - state violence), but reveal only a party of the 
dialectic of violence. Brutal urban violence is far from constituting the unequivocal mode of 
expression of the young persons; games, poses and attitudes  of consumption and free time are 
used by them just as much for asserting their historical presence as social group and actor in each 
postcolonial society. So, the making of the culture of the street registers in the transformative 
dynamics of the postcolony and in its contradiction; it is fulfiled in several historical stages to a 
double logic of rupture with the colonial society: have been born in the postcolony and live in the 
urban margin. Influenced by this double referent, the urban young people re-appropriate  existing  
hobbies  while transforming them. 
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According to this statement violence together with many other elements (games, attitudes, 
consumption ...etc) follow the  logic of  transformation of  the space in urban African cities 
but also of  rupture with the colonial society. It appears then that youth violence is not only 
destructive but also transformational. Kriegel distinguishes violence from force. For her , ‘la 
force, ou le conatus, telle que l’on analysée les classiques, c’est-à-dire l’énergie, la puissance, 
n’a en soi rien de mauvais. La force est à l’origine du movement, du déployment de 
l’énergie’. In contrast she notes that ‘ la violence est autre. C’est une énergie, mais au lieu 
d’être une énergie c’est une énergie destructrive. La violence n’est pas une augmentation de 
la puissance d’agir mais la destruction de la puissance d’exister d’un autre’. She adds ‘ A 
l’inverse, la violence est toujours destructrice. Elle est fondée non sur la compétition par 
l’accumulation de forces mais sur l’établissement de la domination par la suppréssion des 
vies humaines.’ In contrast as Breen (2007)  argues,  we cannot operate a clear cut  between 
those using force in one side and those using violence in another as Kriegel’s distinction 
suggests. In the symbiosis of violence and power lies her arbitrariness and her (Kriegel) 
flawed supposition that force doesn not  kill. Because even if we agree that those who label 
themselves as law enforcement (force) are really agents of force, it remains utopian  to 
believe that the movement impulse by those agents will never kill. If by force she 
distinguishes actors who are technologically advanced from those who are not  by violence 
she designates both the two categories . The energy can be used both as a destructive and 
transformational means asshe notes, but labelling violence or force with positive/negative 
attributes reflects more about the  position and the dispositions of the one who is observing 
than the practicality of a violent act (signifier). Following this path, Konings (2002:2) notes 
that according to some existing studies, the reason why both African governments and youth 
are using violence lies in the tendency of the former to still look upon youth (students) as ‘ 
cadet’-who according to African tradition should listen to elders. Consequently by using 
violence students attempt to transform their relationship with their government (elders). But 
in Cameroon the use of violence as a mode of protestation is not the monopoly of students or 
the sole characteristic of  a political turmoil. In fact the use of violence by social group has 
become endemic. The Bendskin drivers’ use of violence is an illustration of this fact , it is 
almost impossible to differentiate their behaviour during political turmoil and during an 
incident of the every day life . This story reported by Simone( 2005) shared all the 
characteristics of some sequences of the February’s demonstrations without being one. 
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In the early morning hours of 10 July 2003 near the major market at Nkololoun, a bendskineur, 
age 19 was reportedly killed from a blow to the head during an altercation with police. Several 
other deaths occurred in the immediate aftermath of this struggles. Within hours, after word of the 
incident spread like wildfire, the entire city was shut down , with hundreds of barricades set up 
using commandeered vehicles, equipment being used in the massive road repair project, and 
various corner stalls used for cell phone calls and lottery sales. Whiles many youths who were not 
bendskineurs were quick to join in the escalating may, bendskineurs were also seen in strenuous 
efforts to curtail looting and other actions not focused on simply shutting down the roads. Bridges 
roundabouts, majors axis routes, underpasses and lateral arteries were all quickly cut , significantly 
delaying the possibilities for state security organs to provide reinforcements and allowing 
bendskineurs to burn several police stations, as well as ferry significant numbers of their 
supporters to key strategic locations. Without any centralized command operation, the speed 
through which the dispersion of blockades was accomplished indicated a remarkable proficiency 
in both disseminating information and ensuring a comprehensive coverage of the entire urban area. 
 
Usually those who strike encourage or force others (members of their groups or the rest of the 
population) to do the same. The rationale behind such action is clear: in order to expect from 
the government to consider the strikers’ grievances, a state of chaos is necessary in the area 
where the protestations occurred. This report of Bendskin drivers’ practices during strike  
highlights their mode of reasoning : 
‘Mister parks here. Fast, don’t waste us  time ! ’urge  angry motorbikes-taximen, angry to a driver 
in the Steering wheel of his personal vehicle. This altercation occurs at the Lycee billingue d ’ 
Essos. This one tries to make understand to them that the vehicle is not has commercial usage, 
without success. ‘You use some combustible( gas)’. It is the bulk. Do not make believe us that 
when you arrive at  the gas station , the prices are lower because the combustible which you take 
will not be used for commercials aims.’ Cease to live a lie’. ‘ Help  us struggle for everybody, 
argues one motor-taximan. As long as the personal vehicle circulates the government cannot take 
our problem  seriously ’, adds another one while snatching the car’s key. This driver  is giving a 
left  to his pregnant wife, unable to reach her office on feet. ’ (Tchuente, 2008:4) 
Such measures of coercion have been adopted  also by  taxi-men against the bendskins 
drivers who failed to respect the order of strike.  
In Yaoundé, the quarter Briqueterie is packed the biggest number of drivers of taxis. The most part 
of the syndicates of public transport install their sieges there. On Monday, 25 th February  2008  
around  7 o'clock, the atmosphere is tense. In the said place ‘carrefour Aurora’, a group of taxi-
men are conversing about the ongoing strike decided the day before. Student and other passers-by 
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are crowded at the side of the road since the beginning of the day. They are waiting for taxis and 
other means of transport. No yellow-car ( taxi) arrived.. Almost all of them decided to walk . 
Youssoufa, taxi driver, seems to enjoy this situation:’ Combustible ( gas) is expensive! And the 
students that you are seeing usually pay  100  FCFA, half of the of the official fare ( for taxi) in 
Cameroon. The government has nothing. Coupled with the police and other states officials’ 
harassment, we interrogate the relevancy  of such job. It is necessary therefore for the populations 
to tolerate our strike ' .While  expressing himself in that  way,  his argument is confirmed by the 
agreeing smiles of  his colleagues, and at the same time cars become more and more rare on the 
road.  
On the contrary, the crowd of the students which have to reach their schools hurries up on  the 
road. Even the which cars has personal usage become rare. Especially taxi-men strikers order them 
to prove to be supportive of the cause of the movement. Some bendskins transporting students 
cross the quarter. This situation irritates right away the group of the taxis’ drivers. ' What does it 
means? ' One of them argues: ‘they say that there is strike and some people take the liberty of 
cheating? We must stop this situation now ' Immediately, very the motorcycles which cross 
Briqueterie with passengers are stopped. The motos-taxi-men protest is manhandle (Chanon, 
2008:4). 
 
Also during  the students’ strike in 1996, Konings (2002:196)) notes that : during the 
operation ghost Campus, any students who were carrying books to or from the campus were 
seized by the strikers, ‘baptized’ with dirty water and urine, had their faces smeared with 
mud, and ordered to return home . It follows then that this type of violence is used by 
different groups in Cameroon and often for the same purposes. In the context mentioned it is 
used as incentive to cooperate, to formulate and strengthen a collective action against the 
state. The coercion created through private violence increase the number of grievances and 
the incoherence of protestation. In this context the organizational apparatus of both taxi-men 
and bendskin groups can operates as channel of the grievances of the rest of population just 
as it has been the case in the food riot in Argentina, on May 1994 -when some delinquents 
and theft gangs’ organizations structured the protestations (Sekulnikov, 1994:77).  By doing 
this, they (bendskin-drivers and taxi men) create a political turmoil37 because of the very fact 
                                                 
37 ‘Political turmoil in Africa does not depend so much upon the size and the profile of the jobless population in 
to, but rather upon the number and the profile of unemployed individuals. The political mobilization of these 
unemployed individuals seems to be facilitated by their age, their matrimonial status and their urban and 
educational experiences… 
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of their cooperation with the rest of the population. It follows then that the initial drive of the 
violence is the practicality of protestation but it incidentally infer a sign which can be 
interpreted, misunderstood, manipulated or devaluated but no longer ignored. It is a sign of 
the practicality of their existence, with a disturbing signifier for the power elite,  a nuisance 
which is absolutely labelled for political gain but which open the door to any kind of social 
deviations as well. Put succinctly violence in the hands of those who refuse to die pour rien is 
just another feature of the lifestyle of the postcolonial subjects and agents in Cameroon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Political turmoil may depend, upon the degree to which unemployed persons are able to obtain the cooperation 
of their peers who have lost employment. While the political mobilization of the unemployed seems to result 
from the alienation associated with their relative deprivation, that of those who have lost jobs probably reflects 
the fears of a growing misery (Clignet,1969:486-487)’. 
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